CATO AND LÆLIUS:

OR,

ESSAYS

ON

OLD-AGE AND FRIENDSHIP:

BY

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO.

WITH

REMARKS,

By WILLIAM MELMOTH, Esq.

PROSIMUS, SI POSSUMUS, OTIOSI. Cic.

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Sermo oritur, non de villis domibuſve *alienis,*
Nec, male necne, Lepos ſaltet; *ſed quod magis ad nos*
Pertinet, et neſcire malum *eſt, agitamus.*— HOR.



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TO THE

REV. MR. JOHN SKYNNER,

RECTOR OF EASTON,

IN THE COUNTY OF NORTHAMPTON,

THE FOLLOWING PAGES,

AS A SINCERE MEMORIAL

OF ESTEEM AND FRIENDSHIP,

ARE INSCRIBED,

BY HIS

AFFECTIONATE RELATION,

WILLIAM MELMOTH.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following conference ſeems to have been drawn up with a particular view to the ſtate of public affairs at the time it was written, as well as for the more general and extenſive purpoſe of moral inſtruction; ſeveral paſſages evidently alluding to the very critical circumſtances of the commonwealth at that period. It was publiſhed immediately after the aſſaſſination of JULIUS CÆSAR; *when ſome of the moſt reſpectable partizans of that ambitious chief were indirectly endeavouring to turn the popular odium upon the cauſe and the perſons of the conſpirators, by the public honours they exhibited to his memory: a conduct which they attempted to juſtify by the* duties *of private friendſhip. At a conjuncture, therefore, when the reſtoration of the republic in ſome meaſure depended upon the notions that were entertained concerning thoſe* obligations; *to aſcertain the true principles of that* connection, *and mark out the juſt limits of its claims, was a deſign worthy of* CICERO, *no leſs in his* patriotic *than his* philoſophical *character. Many of the antients, indeed, maintained very extra-*

vagant opinions upon thoſe points: and for this reaſon, perhaps, it is, that there is ſcarcely a ſingle ethic writer of eminence, during the philoſophic ages of Greece (of whoſe works any account has been preſerved) who does not appear to have diſcuſſed the queſtion, as a neceſſary and important branch of his moral ſyſtem. It is probable that the ſubſtance of what the moſt judicious of thoſe philoſophers had delivered, in relation to that inquiry, *is wrought into the preſent performance: it is certain, at leaſt, that* CICERO *has conſiderably availed himſelf of* ARISTOTLE'S *diſſertation inſerted in his* ethics; *as he may be traced likewiſe in the few fragments that ſtill remain of a diſcourſe on the ſame topic, compoſed by* THEOPHRASTUS. *In fact, he hath ſo accurately ſketched the principal outlines of his ſubject, as to have left little more to thoſe, who might reſume it after him, than to purſue his principles, extend his reaſonings, and apply his maxims. Accordingly,* Biſhop TAYLOR *in our own language, and the very ingenious* Monſ. SACY *in the French (the only modern authors of* diſtinction *who have written treatiſes* profeſſedly *on friendſhip) have added nothing* eſſential *to the admirable draught he has delineated.*

LÆLIUS:

LÆLIUS:

OR, AN

ESSAY ON FRIENDSHIP.

To TITUS POMPONIUS ATTICUS.

QUINTUS MUCIUS, the Augur[a], uſed to relate, in a very agreeable manner, a variety of particulars which he remembered concerning his father-in-law, the *ſage* Lælius, as he conſtantly ſtiled him. My father introduced me to Mucius as ſoon as I was inveſted with the manly robe; and

[a] See Rem. on Cato, p. 249. Rem. 66.

he ſo ſtrongly recommended him to my obſervance, that I never neglected any opportunity in my power of attending him. In conſequence of this privilege, I had the advantage to hear him occaſionally diſcuſs ſeveral important topics, and throw out many judicious maxims, which I carefully treaſured up in my mind; endeavouring to improve myſelf in wiſdom and knowledge by the benefit of his enlightening obſervations.[1] After his death, I attached myſelf in the ſame manner, and with the ſame views, to his relation Mucius Scævola, the chief pontiff: and I will venture to ſay, that in regard both to the powers of his mind and the integrity of his heart, Rome never produced a greater nor more reſpectable character.[2] But I ſhall take ſome other occaſion to do juſtice to the merit of this excellent man: my preſent buſineſs is ſolely with the Augur.

As

As I was one day ſitting with him and two or three of his intimate acquaintance, in his ſemicircular apartment where he uſually received company; among ſeveral other points, he fell into diſcourſe upon an event which had lately happened, and was, as you well know, the general ſubject of converſation: for, you cannot but remember, (as you were much connected with one of the parties[b]) that when Publius Sulpicius was Tribune and Quintus Pompeius Conſul, the implacable animoſity that broke out between them, after having lived together in the moſt affectionate union, was univerſally mentioned with concern and ſurprize. Mucius having caſually touched upon this unexpected rupture, took occaſion to relate to us the ſubſtance of a conference which Lælius formerly held with him and his other ſon-in-law,

[b] Publius Sulpicius. See the Remarks, note 3.

Caius Fannius, a few days after the death of Scipio Africanus, upon the ſubject of friendſhip. As I perfectly well recollect the general purport of the relation he gave us, I have wrought it up, after my own manner, in the following eſſay. But that I might not encumber the dialogue with perpetually interpoſing *ſaid I*, and *ſaid he*, I have introduced the ſpeakers themſelves to the reader; by which means he may conſider himſelf as a ſort of party in the conference.

It turns on a ſubject upon which you have frequently preſſed me to write my thoughts; and indeed, beſides being peculiarly ſuitable to that intimacy which has ſo long ſubſiſted between us, it is well worthy of being univerſally conſidered and underſtood. I have the more willingly, therefore, entered into the diſcuſſion you recommended, as it affords me an opportunity of rendering a general ſervice, at the ſame time that I am

I am complying with your particular requeſt.

In the treatiſe I lately inſcribed to you on old-age, I repreſented the elder Cato as the principal ſpeaker; being perſuaded that no perſon could with more weight and propriety be introduced, as delivering his ideas in relation to that advanced ſtate, than one who had ſo long flouriſhed in it with unequalled ſpirit and vigour. In purſuance of the ſame principle; the memorable amity which, we are told, ſubſiſted between Lælius and Scipio, rendered the former, I thought, a very ſuitable character to ſupport a converſation on the ſubject of friendſhip: and the reaſoning I have aſcribed to him, is agreeable to thoſe ſentiments which Mucius informed us he expreſſed.

This kind of dialogue, where the queſtion is agitated by illuſtrious perſonages of former ages, is apt, I know not

how, to make a ſtronger impreſſion on the mind of the reader, than any other ſpecies of compoſition. This effect, at leaſt, I have experienced in my own writings of that kind; as I have ſometimes imagined, when I was reviſing the eſſay I lately inſcribed to you, that Cato himſelf, and not your friend in his name, was the real ſpeaker. As in that performance, it was one veteran addreſſing another on the article of old-age; ſo in the preſent, it is a friend explaining to a friend his notions concerning friendſhip. In the former conference, Cato, who was diſtinguiſhed among his contemporaries by his great age and ſuperior wiſdom, ſtands forth as the principal ſpeaker: in this which I now preſent to you, Lælius, who was no leſs reſpected in the times in which he flouriſhed, for his eminent virtues and faithful attachment to his friend, takes the lead in the diſcourſe. I muſt requeſt you, therefore, to turn your thoughts a while from the writer,

and

and ſuppoſe yourſelf converſing with Lælius.

For this purpoſe you are to imagine Fannius and Mucius' making a viſit to their father-in-law, ſoon after the death of Scipio Africanus; and from that circumſtance, giving occaſion to Lælius' to enter upon the ſubject in queſtion. I will only add, that in contemplating the portrait of a true friend, as delineated in the following pages, you cannot be at a loſs to diſcover your own.

FANNIUS.

I AGREE with you entirely, Lælius; no man ever poſſeſſed more amiable or more illuſtrious virtues than Scipio Africanus.' Nevertheleſs, let me intreat you to remember, that the public eye is particularly turned towards you upon the preſent occaſion, and extremely attentive to obſerve how Lælius, the *ſage* Lælius, (as, by a very ſingular diſtinction you are univerſally both called and acknowledged) behaves under the great loſs he has ſuſtained. When I ſay "by a very ſingular diſtinction," I am not ignorant that the late Marcus Cato, in our own times, and Lucius Attilius, in the days of our fore-

fore-fathers, were generally mentioned with the ſame honourable addition; but I know, too, that it was for attainments ſomewhat different from thoſe which have ſo juſtly occaſioned it to be conferred on you. To the latter it was given, in alluſion to his eminent ſkill in the laws of his country; as it was to the former, on account of the wonderful compaſs and variety of his knowledge, together with his great experience in the affairs of the world. Indeed, the many ſignal proofs that Cato gave, both in the forum and the ſenate, of his judgment, his ſpirit, and his penetration, produced ſuch frequent occaſions to ſpeak of his wiſdom with admiration, that the epithet ſeems, by continually recurring, to have been conſidered in his latter days as his original and proper name [c]. But the ſame appellation (and I cannot forbear repeating it again) has been conferred on you, for qualifications not altogether of the ſame nature; not merely in re-

[c] See Eſſay on Old-Age, p. 9. n. *b*.

ſpect

ſpect to the ſuperior excellency of your political accompliſhments, and thoſe intellectual endowments which adorn your mind, but principally in conſequence of the ſingular advancement you have made in the ſtudy and practice of *moral* wiſdom. In ſhort, if Lælius is never named without the deſignation I am ſpeaking of; it is not ſo much in the popular, as in the philoſophical ſenſe of the term, that this characteriſtic is applied to him: and in that ſenſe, I will venture to ſay there is not a ſingle inſtance throughout all the ſtates of Greece, of its ever having been thus attributed to any man by the unanimous conſent of a whole people. For as to thoſe famous ſages who are commonly known by the general denomination of "the ſeven wiſe men of Greece;" it is aſſerted by the moſt accurate inquirers into their hiſtory, that they cannot properly be ranked in the claſs of *moral* philoſophers.[8] One celebrated Grecian, however, there was, a native of Athens,

Athens, whom the Oracle of Apollo declared to be the wiſeſt of the ſons of men[d]: and believe me, Lælius, it is the ſame ſpecies of wiſdom which this excellent moraliſt diſplayed, that all the world is agreed in aſcribing to you: that wiſdom, I mean, by which you hold virtue to be capable of fortifying the ſoul againſt all the various aſſaults of human calamities, and are taught to conſider happineſs as depending upon yourſelf alone.

In conſequence of this general opinion I have been frequently aſked, (and the ſame queſtion, I believe, has no leſs often, Scævola, been propoſed to you) in what manner Lælius ſupports the loſs he has lately ſuſtained? And this inquiry was the rather made, as it was remarked that you abſented yourſelf from our laſt monthly meeting in the Gardens of Brutus the Augur,

[d] See Rem. on Cato, p. 231. Rem. 79.

where

where you had always before very regularly aſſiſted.

SCÆVOLA.

I acknowledge, Lælius, that the queſtion which Fannius mentions, has repeatedly been put to me by many of my acquaintance: and I have always aſſured them that, as far as I could obſerve, you received the wound that has been inflicted upon you by the death of your affectionate and illuſtrious friend, with great compoſure and equanimity; nevertheleſs, that it was not poſſible, nor indeed conſiſtent with the general humane diſpoſition of your nature, not to be affected by it in a very ſenſible manner; however, that it was by no means grief, but merely indiſpoſition, which prevented you from being preſent at the laſt meeting of our aſſembly.

LÆLIUS.

LÆLIUS.

Your anſwer, Scævola, was perfectly agreeable to the fact. Ill, certainly, would it become me, on account of any private affliction, to decline a conference which I have never failed to attend when my health permitted: and indeed I am perſuaded that no man who poſſeſſes a proper firmneſs of mind, will ſuffer his misfortunes, how heavily ſoever they may preſs upon his heart, to interrupt his duties of any kind. For the reſt; I conſider the high opinion, Fannius, which you ſuppoſe the world entertains of my character, as an obliging proof of your friendſhip: but it is an opinion which, as I am not conſcious of deſerving, I have no diſpoſition to claim. As little am I inclined to ſubſcribe to your judgment concerning Cato: for if conſummate wiſdom, in the moral and philoſophic idea of that expreſſion, was ever to be found in the

character of any human being, (which, I will confeſs, however, I very much doubt) it certainly appeared throughout the whole conduct of that excellent perſon. Not to mention other proofs; with what unexampled fortitude, let me aſk, did he ſupport the death of his incomparable ſon? I was no ſtranger to the behaviour of Paulus,[e] and was an eye-witneſs to that of Gallus[e], labouring under an affliction of the ſame kind; but the ſons whom they were reſpectively bereaved of, died when they were mere boys: whereas Cato's was ſnatched from him when he had arrived at the prime of manhood, and was flouriſhing in the general eſteem of his country[f]. Let me caution you, then, from ſuffering any man to rival Cato in your good opinion; not excepting even Him whom the Oracle of Apollo, you ſay,

[e] See Rem. on Cato, p. 233. Rem. 56.
[f] See Rem. on Cato, p. 256. Rem. 68.

declared

declared to be the wiſeſt of the human race. The truth is, the memory of Socrates is held in honour for the admirable *doctrine* he delivered, but Cato's for the glorious *deeds* he performed.

Thus far in particular reply to Fannius.—I now addreſs myſelf to both: and if I were to deny that I regret the death of Scipio; how far ſuch a diſpoſition of mind would be right, I leave philoſophers to determine; but far, I confeſs, it is from the ſentiments of my heart. I am ſenſibly, indeed, affected by the loſs of a friend, whoſe equal no man, I will venture to ſay, ever poſſeſſed before; and none, I am perſuaded, will ever meet with again. Nevertheleſs, I ſtand in want of no external aſſiſtance to heal the wound I have received. My own reflections ſupply me with ſufficient conſolation: and I find it principally from not having given into that falſe opinion which adds poignancy to the grief of ſo many others under

under a loſs of the ſame kind. For I am convinced there is no circumſtance in the death of Scipio that can juſtly be lamented with reſpect to *himſelf:* whatever there is of *private* misfortune in that event, conſiſts intirely in the loſs which *I* have ſuſtained. Under the full influence of ſuch a perſuaſion, to indulge unreſtrained ſorrow would be a proof, not of a generous affection to one's friend, but of too intereſted a concern for one's ſelf. It is evident indeed, that the colour of Scipio's days has, in every view of it, proved truly bright and glorious. For tell me, my friends, is there a felicity, (unleſs he wiſhed never to die—a wiſh, I am confident, he was too wiſe to entertain) is there a ſingle article of human happineſs that can reaſonably be deſired, which he did not live to attain? The high expectations the world had conceived of him in his earlieſt youth, were more than confirmed in his riper years; " as his virtues ſhone forth with a

luſtre ſuperior even to the moſt ſanguine hopes of his country. He was twice, without the leaſt ſolicitation on his own part, elected Conſul: the firſt time, before he was legally qualified by his age to be admitted into that office; and the next, although not prematurely with reſpect to himſelf, yet it had well-nigh proved too late for his country. In both inſtances, however, ſucceſs attended his arms; and having levelled with the ground the capitals of two ſtates the moſt inveterately hoſtile to the Roman name, he not only happily terminated the reſpective wars, but ſecured us from all apprehenſion of future danger from the ſame powers.[12] I forbear to enlarge upon the affability of his manners; the affection he ſhewed to his mother; the generoſity he exerciſed towards his ſiſters; the kindneſs with which he behaved to the reſt of his family; and the unblemiſhed integrity that influenced every part of his conduct:[13] they were

were qualities in his exemplary and amiable character, with which you are perfectly well acquainted. It is equally unneceſſary to add, how ſincerely he was beloved by his country: the general concern that appeared at his funeral, renders it ſufficiently evident." What increaſe then could the addition of a few more years have made to the glory and happineſs of his life? For admitting that old-age does not neceſſarily bring on a ſtate of imbecility, (as Cato, I remember, maintained, in a converſation with Scipio and myſelf about a year before his death) it certainly impairs, at leaſt, that vigour and vivacity, which Scipio ſtill poſſeſſed at the time of his deceaſe.

Such then was the courſe of his happy and honorable days, that neither his felicity nor his fame could have received any farther increaſe: and as to his death, it was much too ſudden to have been attended with any ſenſible degree of

pain. By what cauſe that unexpected event was occaſioned, is by no means indeed clear: the general ſuſpicions concerning it, you well know.[15] One circumſtance, at leaſt, is unqueſtionable; that of all the many brilliant days he had enjoyed, the laſt of his life was the moſt completely illuſtrious. For it was on the very evening which preceded his death that he received the ſingular honour, at the breaking up of the ſenate, of being conducted to his houſe by all the members of that auguſt aſſembly, attended by the ſeveral ambaſſadors both from Latium and the allies of the Roman Commonwealth: ſo that he cannot, it ſhould ſeem, ſo properly be ſaid to have deſcended into the regions of the infernal deities, as to have paſſed at once from the ſupreme height of human glory, to the manſions of the celeſtial Gods.[16] For I am by no means a convert to the new doctrine which certain philoſophers have lately endeavoured to propagate;

propagate; who maintain that death extinguiſhes the whole man, and his ſoul periſhes with the diſſolution of his body.'[17] Indeed the practice of our anceſtors alone, abſtracted from the opinion of the antient ſages, weighs more with me than all the arguments of theſe pretended reaſoners: for certainly our fore-fathers would not ſo religiouſly have obſerved thoſe ſacred rites which have been inſtituted in honour of the dead, if they had ſuppoſed that the deceaſed were in no reſpect concerned in the performance of them. But the conviction ariſing from this conſideration is much ſtrengthened when I add to it the authority of thoſe great maſters of reaſon, who enlightened our country by the ſchools they eſtabliſhed in great Greece, during the flouriſhing ages of that now deſerted part of Italy[g]. And what has a ſtill farther influence in determining my perſuaſion is, the opinion

[g] See Rem. on Cato, p. 274. Rem. 73.

of that reſpectable moraliſt, who, in the judgment of Apollo himſelf, was declared to be the wiſeſt of mankind. This incomparable philoſopher, without once varying to the oppoſite ſide of the queſtion, (as his cuſtom was upon many other controverted ſubjects) ſteadily and firmly aſſerted, that the human ſoul is a divine and immortal ſubſtance; that death opens a way for its return to the celeſtial manſions; and that the ſpirits of thoſe juſt men who have made the greateſt progreſs in the paths of virtue, find the eaſieſt and moſt expeditious admittance. This alſo was the opinion of my departed friend: an opinion which you may remember, Scævola, he particularly enlarged upon in that converſation which, a very ſhort time before his death, he held with you and me in conjunction with Philus, Manilius, and a large company of his other friends, on the ſubject of government. For in the cloſe of that conference, which continued, you know,

during

during three ſucceſſive days, he related to us (as if he had been led into the topic by a kind of pre-ſentiment of his approaching fate) a diſcourſe which Africanus delivered to him in a viſion during his ſleep, concerning the ſoul's immortality.[18]

If it be true then, that the ſouls of good men, when enlarged from this corporeal priſon, wing their flight into the heavenly manſions with more or leſs eaſe, in proportion to their moral attainments; what human ſpirit can we ſuppoſe to have made its immediate way to the Gods with greater facility, than that of Scipio? To bewail therefore an event attended with ſuch advantageous conſequences to himſelf, would, I fear, have more the appearance of envy than of friendſhip. But ſhould the contrary opinion prove to be the fact; ſhould the ſoul and body really periſh together, and no ſenſe remain after our diſſolution: yet death, although it can-

not indeed, upon this ſuppoſition, be deemed a happineſs to my illuſtrious friend, can by no means however be conſidered as an evil. For if all perception be totally extinguiſhed in him; he is, with reſpect to every thing that concerns himſelf, in the ſame ſtate as if he had never been born. I ſay, "with reſpect to himſelf:" for it is far otherwiſe with regard to his friends and to his country; as both will have reaſon to rejoice in his having lived, ſo long as their own exiſtence ſhall endure.

In every view therefore of this event, conſidering it merely as it relates to my departed friend, it appears, as I obſerved before, to be a happy conſummation. But it is much otherwiſe with regard to myſelf; who, as I entered earlier into the world, ought, according to the common courſe of nature, to have ſooner departed out of it. Nevertheleſs, I derive ſo much ſatisfaction from reflecting on the friendſhip which

ſubſiſted

ſubſiſted between us, that I cannot but think I have reaſon to congratulate myſelf on the felicity of my life; ſince I have had the happineſs to paſs the greateſt part of it in the ſociety of Scipio. We lived under the ſame roof; paſſed together thro' the ſame military employments; and were actuated in all our purſuits, whether of a public or private nature, by the ſame common principles and views. In ſhort, and to expreſs at once the whole ſpirit and eſſence of friendſhip; our inclinations, our ſentiments, and our ſtudies, were in perfect accord. For theſe reaſons, my ambition is leſs gratified by that high opinion (eſpecially as it is unmerited) which Fannius aſſures me the world entertains of my wiſdom, than by the ſtrong expectations I have conceived that the memory of our friendſhip will prove immortal. I indulge this hope with the greater confidence, as there do not occur in all the annals of

of paſt ages, above three or four inſtances of a ſimilar amity: and future times, I truſt, will add the names of Scipio and Lælius to that ſelect and celebrated number.

FANNIUS.

Your expectations, Lælius, cannot fail of being realized. And now, as you have mentioned friendſhip, and we are entirely diſengaged; it would be extremely acceptable to me, (and I am perſuaded it would likewiſe be ſo to Scævola) if, agreeably to your uſual readineſs upon other occaſions of juſt inquiry, you would give us your opinion concerning the true nature of this connection; the extent of its obligations; and the maxims by which it ought to be conducted.

SCÆVOLA.

SCÆVOLA.

Fannius has prevented me in the requeſt I was intending to make: Your compliance therefore, will equally confer an obligation upon both of us.

LÆLIUS.

I ſhould very willingly gratify your deſires, if I thought myſelf equal to the taſk: for the ſubject is intereſting, and we are at preſent, as Fannius obſerved, intirely at leiſure. But I am too ſenſible of my own inſufficiency to venture, thus unprepared, upon the diſquiſition of a topic which requires much conſideration to be treated as it deſerves. Unpremeditated diſſertations of this kind can only be expected from thoſe Grecian geniuſes, who are accuſtomed to ſpeak on the ſudden upon any given

queſtion [b]: and to thoſe learned diſputants I muſt refer you, if you wiſh to hear the ſubject properly diſcuſſed. As for myſelf, I can only exhort you to look on friendſhip as the moſt valuable of all human poſſeſſions; no other being equally ſuited to the moral nature of man, or ſo applicable to every ſtate and circumſtance, whether of proſperity or adverſity, in which he can poſſibly be placed. But at the ſame time I lay it down as a fundamental axiom, that "true friendſhip can only ſubſiſt "between thoſe who are animated by "the ſtricteſt principles of honour and

[b] The antient Greek ſophiſts, thoſe literary quacks againſt whoſe arrogant claims to univerſal ſcience, Socrates ſo ſucceſsfully pointed the force of his irony, were accuſtomed to call upon their auditors to propoſe any philoſophic difficulty that embarraſſed them, which they declared they would inſtantly diſcuſs and reſolve. The manner in which Lælius mentions them in the preſent paſſage, ſeems to imply that he held no unfavourable opinion of their talents: but Cicero, in another part of his writings, ſpeaking in the perſon of Craſſus, treats theſe vain and ignorant pretenders with the contempt they ſo juſtly merited.—*See Cic. de Orat.* I.

"virtue."

" virtue." When I ſay this, I would not be thought to adopt the ſentiments of thoſe ſpeculative moraliſts, who pretend that no man can juſtly be deemed virtuous who is not arrived at that ſtate of abſolute perfection which conſtitutes, according to their ideas, the character of genuine wiſdom. This opinion may appear true, perhaps, in theory, but is altogether inapplicable to any uſeful purpoſe of ſociety; as it ſuppoſes a degree of virtue to which no mortal was ever capable of riſing. It is not therefore that notional ſpecies of merit which imagination may poſſibly conceive, or our wiſhes perhaps form, that we have reaſon to expect and require in a friend: it is thoſe moral attainments alone which we ſee actually realized among mankind. And, indeed, I can never be perſuaded to think that either Fabricius, or Coruncanius, or Curius [i], whom our forefathers juſtly revered for the ſuperior

[i] See Rem. on Cato, p. 172. No. 24.

rectitude

rectitude of their conduct, were ſages according to that ſublime criterion which theſe viſionary philoſophers have endeavoured to eſtabliſh. I ſhould be contented however to leave them in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of their arrogant and unintelligible notions of virtue, provided they would allow that the great perſons I have named, merited at leaſt the character of *good* men: but even This, it ſeems, they are not willing to grant; ſtill contending with their uſual obſtinacy, that *goodneſs* is an attribute which can only be aſcribed to their perfect ſage.'[9] I ſhall venture, nevertheleſs, to adjuſt my own meaſure of that quality by the humbler ſtandard of plain common ſenſe. In my opinion, therefore, whoever, like thoſe diſtinguiſhed models I juſt now mentioned, reſtrains his paſſions within the bounds of reaſon, and uniformly acts, in all the various relations of life, upon one ſteady conſiſtent principle of approved

proved honour, juſtice, and beneficence; That man is in reality, as well as in common eſtimation, ſtrictly and truely *good:* in as much as he regulates his conduct (ſo far, I mean, as is compatible with human frailty) by a conſtant obedience to thoſe beſt and ſureſt guides of moral rectitude, the ſacred laws of Nature[k]!

In tracing theſe laws, it ſeems evident, I think, That man, by the frame of his moral conſtitution, is diſpoſed to conſider himſelf as ſtanding in ſome degree of ſocial relation to the whole ſpecies in general; and that this principle acts with more or leſs vigour, according to the diſtance at which he is placed with reſpect to any particular community, or individual, of his kind. Thus it may be obſerved to operate with greater force between fellow-citizens of the ſame commonwealth, than in re-

[k] See Rem. on Cato, p. 157. No. 8.

gard

gard to foreigners; and between the ſeveral members of the ſame family, than towards thoſe among whom there is no common tie of conſanguinity. In the caſe of relations, indeed, this principle ſomewhat riſes in its ſtrength, and produces a ſort of inſtinctive amity; but an amity, however, of no great firmneſs or ſolidity. The inferiority of this ſpecies of natural connection, when compared with that which is the conſequence of voluntary choice, appears from this ſingle conſideration; that the former hath not the leaſt dependence upon the ſentiments of the heart, but continues the ſame it was in its origin, notwithſtanding every degree of cordiality between the parties ſhould be utterly extinguiſhed: whereas the kind affections enter ſo eſſentially into the latter, that where love does not exiſt, friendſhip can have no being. But what ſtill farther evinces the ſtrength and efficacy of friendſhip above all the numberleſs other ſocial

tendencies

tendencies of the human heart, is, that inſtead of waſting its force upon a multiplicity of divided objects, its whole energy is exerted for the benefit of only two or three perſons at the utmoſt."

Friendſhip may be ſhortly defined, "a perfect conformity of opinions "upon all religious and civil ſub-"jects," united with the higheſt de-"gree of mutual eſteem and affec-"tion:" and yet from theſe ſimple circumſtances, reſults the moſt deſirable bleſſing (virtue alone excepted) that the Gods have beſtowed on mankind. I am ſenſible that in this opinion I ſhall not be univerſally ſupported: health and riches, honours and power, have each of them their diſtinct admirers, and are reſpectively purſued as the ſupreme felicity of human life; whilſt ſome there are (and the number is by no means inconſiderable) who contend, that it is to

be found only in the ſenſual gratifications. But the latter place their principal happineſs on the ſame low enjoyments, which conſtitute the chief good of brutes: and the former, on thoſe very precarious poſſeſſions that depend much leſs on our own merit than on the caprice of fortune. They indeed who maintain, that the ultimate good of man conſiſts in the knowledge and practice of virtue, fix it, undoubtedly, upon its trueſt and moſt glorious foundation: but let it be remembered at the ſame time, that Virtue is at once both the *parent* and the *ſupport* of friendſhip.

I have already declared, that by *virtue* I do not mean, with the philoſophers before alluded to, that ideal ſtrain of perfection which is no where to be found but in the pompous language of enthuſiaſtic declamation; I mean only that attainable degree of moral

moral merit, which is underſtood by the term in common diſcourſe, and may be exemplified in actual practice. Without entering therefore into a particular inquiry concerning thoſe imaginary beings, which never have been realized in human nature; I think myſelf warranted in conſidering thoſe perſons as truely *good* men, who have always been ſo deemed in the general opinion of mankind; the Pauli, for inſtance, and the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios, and the Phili:[33] for with *ſuch* characters the world has reaſon to be well contented!

When friendſhip therefore is contracted between men, who poſſeſs a degree of virtue not inferior to that which adorned thoſe approved perſonages I have juſt named; it is productive of unſpeakable advantages. "Life "would be utterly *lifeleſs*" (as old

Ennius [l] expreſſes it) without a friend on whoſe kindneſs and fidelity one might confidently repoſe. Can there be a more real complacency indeed, than to lay open to another the moſt ſecret thoughts of one's heart, with the ſame confidence and ſecurity as if they were ſtill concealed in his own? Would not the fruits of proſperity loſe much of their reliſh, were there none who equally rejoiced with the poſſeſſor in the ſatisfaction he received from them? and how difficult muſt it prove to bear up under the preſſure of misfortunes, unſupported by a generous aſſociate who more than equally divides their

[l] See Rem. on Cato, p. 148. No. 2. We look up to Ennius, ſays the Roman critic, with that ſort of religious reverence with which we contemplate an antient conſecrated grove, where we admire the venerable oaks much leſs for their beauty than for their antiquity. *Ennium ſicut ſacros vetuſtate lucos adoremus, in quibus grandia et antiqua robora jam non tantam habent ſpeciem quantam religionem.* Quint. x. c. 1.

load?

load? In ſhort, the ſeveral occaſions to which friendſhip extends its kindly offices, are unbounded; while the advantage of every other object of human deſires, is confined within certain ſpecific and determinate limits, beyond which it is of no avail. Thus *wealth* is purſued for the particular uſes to which it is ſolely applicable; *power*, in order to receive worſhip; *honours*, for the ſake of fame; *ſenſual indulgencies*, on account of the gratifications that attend them; and *health*, as the means of living exempt from pain, and poſſeſſing the unobſtructed exerciſe of all our corporeal faculties. Whereas *friendſhip* (I repeat it again) is adapted by its nature to an infinite number of different ends; accommodates itſelf to all circumſtances and ſituations of human life; and can at no ſeaſon prove either unſuitable or inconvenient: in a word, not even fire and water (to uſe a proverbial illuſtration) are capable of be-

ing converted to a greater variety of beneficial purpoſes.

I deſire it may be underſtood, however, that I am now ſpeaking, not of that inferior ſpecies of amity which occurs in the common intercourſe of the world, (although this too is not without its pleaſures and advantages) but of that genuine and perfect friendſhip, examples of which are ſo extremely rare as to be rendered memorable by their ſingularity. It is this ſort alone, that can truly be ſaid to heighten the joys of proſperity, and mitigate the ſorrows of adverſity, by a generous participation of both. Indeed, one of the chief, among the many important, offices of this connexion, is exerted in the day of affliction; by diſpelling the gloom that over-caſts the mind, encouraging the hope of happier times, and preventing the depreſſed ſpirits from ſinking into a ſtate of weak and unmanly deſpondence.

Whoever

Whoever is in poſſeſſion of a true friend, ſees the exact counterpart of his own ſoul. In conſequence of this moral reſemblance between them, they are ſo intimately *one*, that no advantage can attend either, which does not equally communicate itſelf to both: they are ſtrong in the ſtrength, rich in the opulence, and powerful in the power of each other. They can ſcarcely indeed be conſidered, in any reſpect, as ſeparate individuals; and wherever the one appears, the other is virtually preſent. I will venture even a bolder aſſertion, and affirm that in deſpite of death, they muſt both continue to exiſt, ſo long as either of them ſhall remain alive. For the deceaſed may, in a certain ſenſe, be ſaid ſtill to live, whoſe memory is preſerved with the higheſt veneration and the moſt tender regret, in the boſom of the ſurvivor: a circumſtance which renders the former

happy in death, and the latter honoured in life. [m]

If that benevolent principle, which thus intimately unites two perſons in the bands of amity, were to be ſtruck out of the human heart, it would be impoſſible that either private families, or public communities, ſhould ſubſiſt; even the land itſelf would lie waſte, and deſolation overſpread the earth. Should this aſſertion ſtand in need of a proof; it will appear evident, by conſidering the ruinous conſequences which enſue from diſcord and diſſenſion. For what family is ſo

[m] "They who are the ſame to their friend when "he is in another country, or in another *world*, are "fit to preſerve the ſacred fire for eternal ſacrifices, "and to perpetuate the memory of thoſe exemplary "friendſhips of the beſt men, which have filled the "world with hiſtory and wonder.—He that is a friend "after death, hopes not for a recompence from his "friend, and makes no bargain either for fame or "love; but is rewarded with the conſcience and ſa-"tisfaction of doing bravely." *Biſhop Taylor's Treat. of Friend.*

ſecurely

ſecurely eſtabliſhed, or what government fixed upon ſo firm a baſis, that it would not be overturned and utterly deſtroyed, were a general ſpirit of enmity and malevolence to break forth amongſt its members? a ſufficient argument ſurely, of the ineſtimable benefits which flow from the kind and friendly affections!

I have been informed that a certain learned bard of Agrigentum publiſhed a philoſophic poem in Greek, in which he aſſerted that the ſeveral bodies which compoſe the phyſical ſyſtem of the univerſe, preſerve the conſiſtence of their reſpective forms, or are diſperſed into their primitive atoms, as a principle of *amity*, or of *diſcord*, becomes predominant in their compoſition. [24] It is certain at leaſt, that the powerful effects of theſe oppoſite agents in the moral world, is univerſally perceived and acknowledged. Agreeable to this general ſentiment, who is there,

when

when he beholds a man generouſly expoſing himſelf to certain danger, for the ſake of reſcuing his diſtreſſed friend, that can forbear expreſſing the warmeſt approbation? Accordingly, what repeated acclamations lately echoed through the Theatre, at the new play of my hoſt and friend Pacuvius, in that ſcene where Pylades and Oreſtes are introduced before the King; who being ignorant which of them was Oreſtes, whom he had determined to put to death, each inſiſts, in order to ſave the life of his aſſociate, that he himſelf is the real perſon in queſtion.[25] If the mere fictitious repreſentation of ſuch a magnanimous and heroic contention, was thus univerſally applauded by the ſpectators; what impreſſion muſt it have made upon their minds, had they ſeen it actually diſplayed in real life! The general effect produced upon this occaſion, clearly ſhews how deeply nature hath impreſſed on the human heart a ſenſe of moral beauty;

ſince

ſince a whole audience thus unanimouſly conſpired in admiring an inſtance of ſublime generoſity in another's conduct, which not one of them, perhaps, was capable of exhibiting in his own.

Thus far I have ventured to lay before you, my general notions concerning friendſhip. If aught remain to be added on the ſubject, (and much there certainly does) permit me to refer you to thoſe philoſophers who are more capable of giving you ſatisfaction.

FANNIUS.

That ſatisfaction, Lælius, we rather hope to receive from you. For although I have frequently applied to thoſe philoſophers to whom you would reſign me, and have been no unwilling auditor of their diſcourſes; yet I am perſuaded, you will deliver your ſentiments

ments upon this ſubject in a much more elegant and enlightening manner.

SCÆVOLA.

You would have been ſtill more confirmed in that opinion, Fannius, had you been preſent with us at the conference which we held not long ſince in the gardens of Scipio, upon the ſubject of government; when Lælius proved himſelf ſo powerful an advocate in ſupport of natural *juſtice*, by confuting the ſubtle arguments of the very acute and diſtinguiſhing Philus. [26]

FANNIUS.

To triumph in the cauſe of juſtice, could be no difficult taſk, certainly, to Lælius, who is, confeſſedly, one of the moſt juſt and upright of men!

SCÆVOLA.

SCÆVOLA.

And can it be leſs eaſy for *Him* who has deſervedly acquired the higheſt honour by his eminent conſtancy, affection and fidelity to his friend; to explain, with equal ſucceſs, the principles and duties of friendſhip?

LÆLIUS.

This is preſſing me beyond all power of reſiſtance: and indeed, it would be unreaſonable as well as difficult, not to yield to the deſires of two ſuch worthy relations, when they requeſt my ſentiments upon a point of ſo intereſting and important a nature.

Having frequently, then, turned my thoughts on this ſubject; the principal queſtion that has always occurred to me, is, whether friendſhip takes its riſe

riſe from the wants and weakneſſes of man, and is cultivated ſolely in order to obtain, by a mutual exchange of good offices, thoſe advantages which he could not otherwiſe acquire? Or whether nature, notwithſtanding this *beneficial* intercourſe is inſeparable from the connection, previouſly diſpoſes the heart to engage in it upon a nobler and more generous inducement? In order to determine this queſtion, it muſt be obſerved, that *love* is a leading and eſſential principle in conſtituting that particular ſpecies of benevolence which is termed amity[n]: and although this ſentiment may be feigned, indeed, by the followers of thoſe who are courted merely with a view to intereſt, yet it cannot poſſibly be produced by a motive of *intereſt* alone. There is a truth and ſimplicity in genuine friendſhip,

[n] *C'eſt une vertu*, ſays an ingenious writer, *que la raiſon ne peut faire, a moins que la paſſion n'en ſoit de moitie. Coſtar ap. Pens. ingen.* p. 154.

an

an unconſtrained and ſpontaneous emotion, altogether incompatible with every kind and degree of artifice and ſimulation. I am perſuaded therefore, that it derives its origin, not from the indigence of human nature, but from a diſtinct principle implanted in the breaſt of man: from a certain inſtinctive tendency, which draws congenial minds into union; and not from a cool calculation of the advantages with which it is pregnant. [27]

The wonderful force, indeed, of innate propenſities of the benevolent kind, is obſervable even among brutes, in that tender attachment which prevails, during a certain period, between the dam and her young. But their ſtrongeſt effects are more particularly conſpicuous, in the human ſpecies; as appears, in the firſt place, from that powerful endearment which ſubſiſts between parents and children, and which cannot be eradicated, or counteracted, without

without the moſt deteſtable impiety; and in the next, from thoſe ſentiments of ſecret approbation, which ariſe on the very firſt interview with a man whoſe manners and temper ſeem to harmonize with our own, and in whom we think we diſcover ſymptoms of an honeſt and virtuous mind. In reality, nothing is ſo beautiful as virtue; and nothing makes its way more directly to the heart: we feel a certain degree of affection even towards thoſe meritorious perſons whom we have never ſeen, and whoſe characters are known to us only from hiſtory. Where is the man that does not, even at this diſtance of time, find his heart glow with benevolence towards the memory of Fabricius, or Curius[o], though he certainly never beheld their perſons? On the contrary, who is there that feels not emotions

[o] Concerning Fabricius and Curius, (as alſo Mælius mentioned a little lower) ſee Rem. on Cato, p. 172, 243, 244.

of

of hatred and deteſtation when he reflects on the conduct of Tarquin, of Caſſius, [28] or of Mælius? Rome has twice contended for empire upon Italian ground, when ſhe ſent forth her armies to oppoſe the reſpective invaſions of Pyrrhus and of Hannibal: and yet, with what different diſpoſitions do we review the campaigns of thoſe hoſtile chiefs! The generous ſpirit of the former, very much ſoftens our reſentment towards him; while the cruelty of the latter, muſt render his character the abhorrence of every Roman. [29]

If the charms of virtue, then, are ſo captivating, as to inſpire us with ſome degree of affection towards thoſe approved perſons whom we never ſaw; or, which is ſtill more extraordinary, if they force us to admire them even in an enemy; what wonder is it, that in thoſe with whom we *live* and *converſe*, they ſhould affect us in a ſtill

more irreſiſtible manner? It muſt be acknowledged, however, that this firſt impreſſion is conſiderably ſtrengthened and improved, by a nearer intercourſe, by ſubſequent good offices, and by a general indication of zeal for our ſervice: cauſes, which, when they operate with combined force, kindle in the heart the warmeſt and moſt generous amity. To ſuppoſe that all attachments of this ſort, ſpring ſolely from a ſenſe of human imbecility, and in order to ſupply that inſufficiency we feel in ourſelves, by the aſſiſtance we hope to receive from others; is to degrade friendſhip to a moſt unworthy and ignoble origin. Indeed if this ſuppoſition were true, they who find in themſelves the greateſt defects, would be the moſt diſpoſed and the beſt qualified, to engage in this kind of connection: which is contrary to fact. For experience ſhews, that the more a man looks for his happineſs within himſelf, and the more firmly he ſtands ſupported by the conſciouſneſs

ſciouſneſs of his own intrinſic merit, the more deſirous he is to cultivate an intercourſe of amity, and the better friend he certainly proves. In what reſpect, let me aſk, had Scipio any occaſion for my ſervices? We neither of us, moſt aſſuredly, ſtood in need of the other's aid; but the ſingular virtues I admired in his character, together with the favourable opinion which in ſome meaſure, perhaps, he had conceived of mine, were the primary and prevailing motives of that affectionate attachment, which was afterwards ſo conſiderably increaſed by the habitudes of intimate and unreſerved converſe. For although many and great advantages accrued to both, from the alliance that was thus formed between us; yet ſure I am, that the hope of receiving thoſe reciprocal benefits, by no means entered into the original cauſe of our union. In fact, as generoſity diſdains to make a traffic of her favours; and a liberal mind confers obligations, not

from the mean hope of a return, but ſolely from that ſatisfaction which nature has annexed to the exertion of benevolent actions; ſo I think it is evident that we are induced to form friendſhips, not from a mercenary contemplation of their utility, but from that pure diſintereſted complacency, which reſults from the mere exerciſe of the affection itſelf.

That ſect of philoſophers who impute all human actions to the ſame motive which determines thoſe of brutes, and refer both to one common principle of ſelf-gratification; will be very far, I am ſenſible, from agreeing with me in the origin I have aſcribed to friendſhip. And no wonder: for nothing great and elevated can win the eſteem and approbation of a ſet of men, whoſe whole thoughts and purſuits are profeſſedly directed to ſo baſe and ignoble an end.

I ſhall

I ſhall take no farther notice, therefore, of their unworthy tenets; well-convinced as I am, that there is an implanted ſenſe in man, by which nature allures his heart to the charms of virtue, in whomſoever her lovely form appears. And hence it is, that they who find in themſelves a predilection for ſome particular object of moral approbation, are induced to deſire a nearer and more intimate communion with that perſon, in order to enjoy thoſe pure and mental advantages which flow from an habitual and familiar intercourſe with the good: I will add too, in order to feel the refined ſatisfaction of inſpiring equal and reciprocal ſentiments of affection, together with the generous pleaſure of conferring acts of kindneſs without the leaſt view of a return. A friendſhip placed upon this its proper and natural baſis, is not only productive of the moſt ſolid utility, but ſtands at the ſame time upon a firmer and more durable foundation, than if

it were raiſed upon a ſenſe of human wants and weakneſs. For if intereſt were the true and only medium to cement this connection; it could hold no longer than while intereſt, which is always fluctuating and variable, ſhould continue to be advanced by the ſame hand: whereas genuine friendſhip, being produced by the ſimple efficiency of nature's ſteady and immutable laws, reſembles the ſource from whence it ſprings, and is for ever permanent and unchangeable.

This may ſuffice concerning the riſe of friendſhip; unleſs you ſhould have any thing to object to the principles I have endeavoured to eſtabliſh.

FANNIUS.

Much otherwiſe: I will take the privilege, therefore, of ſeniority to anſwer for Scævola as well as for myſelf, by requeſting you in both our names to proceed.

SCÆVOLA.

SCÆVOLA.

Fannius has very juſtly expreſſed my ſentiments; and I join with him in wiſhing to hear what you have farther to obſerve, on the queſtion we have propoſed.

LÆLIUS.

I will lay before you then, my excellent young men, the reſult of frequent converſations which Scipio and I have formerly held together upon the ſubject. He uſed to ſay, that nothing is ſo difficult as to preſerve a laſting and unbroken friendſhip to the end of life. For it may frequently happen, not only that the intereſt of the parties ſhall conſiderably interfere, or their opinions concerning political meaſures widely differ; but age, infirmities, or misfortunes, are apt to produce very

extraordinary changes in the tempers and diſpoſitions of men. He illuſtrated this general inſtability of common friendſhips, by tracing the revolutions they are liable to undergo, from the earlieſt period in which this kind of connection can commence. Accordingly he obſerved, that thoſe ſtrong attachments, which are ſometimes formed in childhood, were generally renounced with the puerile robe. But ſhould a particular affection, contracted in this tender age, happen to continue to riper years; it is nothing unuſual to ſee it afterwards interrupted, either by rivalſhip in a matrimonial purſuit, or ſome other object of youthful competition, in which *both* cannot poſſibly ſucceed. If theſe common dangers, however, ſhould be happily eſcaped; yet others no leſs fatal may hereafter riſe up to its ruin; eſpecially if they ſhould become oppoſite candidates for the ſame dignities of the ſtate. For as with the generality

generality of mankind, an immoderate deſire of wealth, ſo among thoſe of a more liberal and exalted ſpirit, an inordinate thirſt of glory, is uſually the ſtrongeſt bane of amity; and each of them have proved the occaſion of converting the warmeſt friends into the moſt implacable enemies.

He added, that great and juſt diſſentions had ariſen alſo in numberleſs inſtances, on account of improper requeſts: where a man has ſolicited his friend to aſſiſt him, for example, in his lawleſs gallantries, or to ſupport him in ſome other act of equal diſhonour and injuſtice. A denial upon ſuch occaſions, though certainly laudable, is generally deemed by the party refuſed to be a violation of the rights of amity: and he will, probably, reſent it the more, as applications of this nature neceſſarily imply, that the perſon who breaks through all reſtraints in urging them, is equally diſpoſed to make the ſame

unwarrantable conceſſions on his own part. Diſagreements of this kind have not only cauſed irreparable breaches between the cloſeſt connections, but have even kindled unextinguiſhable animoſities. In ſhort, the common friendſhips of the world are liable to be broken to pieces by ſuch a variety of accidents; that Scipio thought it required a more than common portion, not only of good ſenſe, but of good fortune, to ſteer intirely clear of thoſe numerous and fatal rocks.[30]

Our firſt inquiry therefore, if you pleaſe, ſhall be, "how far the claims of friendſhip may reaſonably extend?" For inſtance; ought the boſom-friends of Coriolanus, (if any intimacies of that kind he had [p]) to have joined him

[p] The manner in which Cicero expreſſes himſelf in the text, ſeems to intimate that he did not look upon Coriolanus as a character likely to receive or to

him in turning his arms againſt his country;[31] or thoſe of Viſcellinus, or Spurius Mælius, to have aſſiſted them in their deſigns of uſurping the ſovereign power?

In thoſe public commotions which were raiſed by Tiberius Gracchus, it appeared that neither Quintus Tubero, [q] nor any other of thoſe perſons

to impreſs ſentiments of a warm amity: and it appears indeed, that his qualities rendered him more the object of admiration than of love. He poſſeſſed the heroic and civil virtues in the moſt eminent degree; but he had an imperiouſneſs in his manners, an obſtinacy and implacability in his temper, which repelled from any affectionate attachment to his perſon, even thoſe who acknowledged and eſteemed his military and political merit. *Plut. in vit.* CORIOLAN.

[q] He was a firm and inflexible friend to the conſtitutional liberties of the republic; but as eloquence was not his talent, he never roſe to any honour in the ſtate. He ſeems chiefly to have been diſtinguiſhed by his private virtues; for as he was a ſtoic by principle, his life correſponded with his tenets, and he is ſaid to have exceeded in his moral conduct even the rigid rules of that ſevere ſect. *Cic. in Brut.* 30.

with

with whom he lived upon terms of the greateſt intimacy, engaged in his faction;[32] one only excepted, who was related to your family, Scævola, by the ties of hoſpitality: I mean Bloſius, of Cumæ. This man, (as I was appointed an aſſeſſor with the two conſuls Lænas and Rupilius[r]) applied to me to obtain his pardon; alledging in his juſtification, that he entertained ſo high an eſteem and affection for Gracchus, as to hold himſelf obliged to concur with him in any meaſure he might propoſe. What! if he had even deſired you to ſet fire to the capitol?—"Such a requeſt, I am confident," replied Bloſius, "he never would have made." But admitting that he had; how would you have determined? "In that caſe," returned Bloſius, "I ſhould moſt certainly have complied." Infamous as this confeſſion was, he acted agreeably to it; or rather, indeed,

[r] They were conſuls in the Y. of R. 621.

his

his conduct exceeded even the impiety of his profeſſions.[33] For, not contented with encouraging the ſeditious ſchemes of Tiberius Gracchus, he actually took the lead in them; and was an inſtigator as well as an aſſociate, in all the madneſs of his meaſures. In conſequence of theſe extravagant proceedings, and alarmed to find that extraordinary judges were appointed for his trial[s]; he made his eſcape into Aſia: where entering into the ſervice of our enemies, he met with the fate he ſo juſtly merited, for the injuries he had done to the commonwealth.[34]

I lay it down then as a rule without exception, "that no degree of friendſhip can either juſtify, or excuſe, the commiſſion of a criminal action." For true amity being founded on an opinion

[s] The ordinary judges were the Prætors, but in delinquencies againſt which no particular law had provided, (as in the preſent inſtance) the cognizance of the charge was delegated to ſpecial judges.

of

of virtue in the object of our affection; it is ſcarcely poſſible that thoſe ſentiments ſhould remain, after an avowed and open violation of the principles which originally produced them.

To maintain that the duties of this relation require a compliance with every requeſt a friend ſhall offer, and give a right to expect the ſame unlimited conceſſions in return; would be a doctrine, I confeſs, from which no ill conſequences could enſue, if the parties concerned were abſolutely *perfect*, and incapable of the leaſt deviation from the dictates of virtue and good ſenſe. But in ſettling the principles by which our conduct in this reſpect ought to be regulated, we are not to form our eſtimate by fictitious repreſentations, but to conſider what hiſtory and experience teaches us that mankind truly are; and to ſelect for our imitation ſuch real characters as ſeem to have approached the *neareſt* to perfection.

Tradition

Tradition informs us, that Papas Æmilius and Caius Luſcinus,[35] who were twice colleagues in the conſular and cenſorial offices, were united alſo in the ſtricteſt intimacy: and that Manius Curius and Titus Coruncanius lived with *them*, and with each other, upon terms of the ſtricteſt and moſt inviolable friendſhip. It may well, therefore, be preſumed, (ſince there is not even the ſlighteſt reaſon to ſuſpect the contrary) that none of theſe illuſtrious worthies ever made a propoſal to his friend inconſiſtent with the laws of honour, or that fidelity he had pledged to his country. To urge, that "if any overtures of that nature "had ever been made, they would "certainly have been rejected, and "conſequently muſt have been con-"cealed from public notice;" is an objection by no means ſufficient to weaken the preſumption, when the ſanctity of manners which diſtinguiſhed theſe venerable perſons ſhall be duly conſider-

ed: for to be capable of making ſuch propoſals, would be no leſs a proof of depravity, than actually conſenting to them. Accordingly we find that both Carbo and Caius Cato,[36] the friends of Tiberius Gracchus, did not refuſe to take a part in his turbulent meaſures; as his brother Caius, although he was not indeed a very conſiderable actor in the ſcene at firſt, is now moſt zealouſly engaged in the ſame unworthy cauſe.

Let it be eſtabliſhed, therefore, as one of the moſt ſacred and indiſpenſable laws of this connection, "never either "to make, or to grant, a requeſt which "honour and virtue will not juſtify." To alledge in any inſtance of deviation from moral rectitude, that one was actuated by a warmth of zeal for his friend; is in every ſpecies of criminal conduct, a plea altogether ſcandalous and inadmiſſible, but particularly in tranſactions that ſtrike at the peace and welfare

welfare of the ſtate. I would the more earneſtly inculcate this important maxim, as from the preſent complexion of the times, it ſeems peculiarly neceſſary to guard againſt introducing principles which may hereafter be productive of fatal diſturbances in the republic: and, indeed, we have already ſomewhat deviated from that political line, by which our wiſer anceſtors were wont to regulate their public conduct.

Thus Tiberius Gracchus, who aimed at ſovereign power, or rather indeed who actually poſſeſſed it, during the ſpace of a few months;[37] opened a ſcene ſo totally new to the Roman people, that not even tradition had delivered down to them any circumſtance in former times which reſembled it. Some of the friends and relations of this man, who had concurred with him in his life time, continued to ſupport the ſame factious meaſures after his death: and I cannot reflect on the cruel part they

acted towards Scipio Naſica, without melting into tears.[38] I will confeſs at the ſame time, that in conſideration of the puniſhment which Tiberius Gracchus has lately ſuffered, I have protected his friend Carbo as far as it was in my power.[39] As to the conſequences we have reaſon to expect from the tribunate of Caius Gracchus;[40] I am unwilling to indulge conjecture: but this I do not ſcruple to ſay, that when once a diſtemper of this kind has broken out in a commonwealth, the infection is apt to ſpread; and it generally gathers ſtrength the wider it extends. In conformity to this obſervation, the change which was made by the Gabinian law in the manner of voting, was two years afterwards, you know, carried ſtill farther by the law which Caſſius propoſed and obtained. And I cannot but propheſy, that a rupture between the people and the ſenate, will be the reſult of both; as the moſt important affairs of the commonwealth will hereafter be

conducted

conducted by the caprice of the multitude." It is much eaſier, indeed, to diſcover the ſource from which theſe diſorders will ariſe, than to point out a remedy for the miſchief they will occaſion.

I have thrown out theſe reflections, as well knowing that no public innovations of this pernicious kind are ever attempted, without the aſſiſtance of ſome ſelect and confidential aſſociates. It is neceſſary therefore to admoniſh thoſe who mean well to the conſtitution of their country, that if they ſhould inadvertently have formed an intimacy with men of a contrary principle, they are not to imagine themſelves ſo bound by the laws of amity, as to lie under an indiſpenſable obligation to ſupport them in attempts injurious to the community. Whoſoever diſturbs the peace of the commonwealth, is a juſt object of public indignation: nor is that man leſs deſerving

of puniſhment, who acts as a ſecond in ſuch an impious cauſe, than the principal. No perſon ever poſſeſſed a greater ſhare of power, or was more eminently diſtinguiſhed among the Grecian ſtates, than Themiſtocles. This illuſtrious general, who was commander in chief of the Grecian forces in the Perſian war, and who by his ſervices upon that occaſion delivered his country from the tyranny with which it was threatened; having been driven into exile by the jealouſy his great talents had raiſed, did not acquieſce under the ingratitude of his fellow-citizens with the ſubmiſſion he ought: on the contrary, he acted the ſame traiterous part under this unmerited perſecution, as Coriolanus did amongſt us about twenty years before. But neither the one nor the other found a coadjutor among their reſpective friends: in conſequence of which juſt dereliction, they each of them periſhed by their own deſperate hands.[42]

It appears, then, from the principles I have laid down, that theſe kinds of wicked combinations under the pretended obligations of friendſhip, are ſo far from being ſanctified by that relation, that on the contrary they ought to be publicly diſcouraged by the ſevereſt puniſhments; leſt it ſhould be thought an allowed maxim, that a friend is to be ſupported in every outrage he may commit, even though he ſhould take up arms againſt his country. I am the more earneſt to expoſe the error of this dangerous perſuaſion, as there are certain ſymptoms in the preſent times which give me reaſon to fear, that at ſome future period the impious principle I am combating, may actually be extended to the caſe I laſt mentioned: and I am no leſs deſirous that the peace of the republic ſhould be preſerved after my death, than zealous to maintain it during my life.[43]

The firſt and great axiom therefore in the laws of amity, ſhould invariably be; "never to require from a friend "what he cannot grant without a breach "of his honour; and always to be rea-"dy to aſſiſt him upon every occaſion "conſiſtent with that principle." So long as we ſhall act under the ſecure guard of this ſacred barrier, it will not be ſufficient merely to yield a ready compliance with all his deſires; we ought to anticipate and prevent them. Another rule likewiſe of indiſpenſable obligation, upon all who would approve themſelves true friends, is; "to be ever "ready to offer their advice, with an "unreſerved and honeſt frankneſs of "heart." The counſels of a faithful and friendly monitor, carry with them an authority which ought to have great influence[t]: and they ſhould be urged not

[t] "There is as much difference," ſays Lord Bacon, "between the counſel that a friend giveth, and "*that* a man giveth himſelf, as there is between the "counſel

not only with freedom, but even with ſeverity, if the occaſion ſhould appear to require it.

I am informed that certain Greek writers (*philoſophers*, it ſeems, in the opinion of their countrymen) have advanced ſome very extraordinary poſitions relating to the ſubject of our preſent inquiry; as, indeed, what ſubject is there, which theſe ſubtle geniuſes have not tortured with their ſophiſtry? The authors to whom I allude, diſſuade their diſciples from entering into any ſtrong attachments, as unavoidably creating ſupernumerary diſquietudes to thoſe who engage in them: and as every man has more than ſufficient to call forth his ſolicitude, in the courſe of his own affairs; it is a weakneſs, they contend, anxiouſly

"counſel of a friend and a *flatterer*: for there is no "ſuch flatterer as a man's ſelf; and there is no ſuch "remedy againſt the flattery of a man's ſelf, as the "liberty of a friend.—The beſt preſervative to keep "the mind in health—the beſt receipt (beſt, I ſay, to "work, and beſt to take) is the admonition of a "friend." *Eſſay on Friendſh.*

to involve himſelf in the concerns of others. They recommend it alſo in all connections of this kind, to hold the bands of union extremely looſe; ſo as always to have it in one's power to ſtraiten or relax them, as circumſtances and ſituations ſhall render moſt expedient. They add, as a capital article of their doctrine, that "to live "exempt from cares, is an eſſential in- "gredient, to conſtitute human happi- "neſs: but an ingredient, however, "which he who voluntarily diſtreſſes "himſelf with cares in which he has no "neceſſary and perſonal intereſt, muſt "never hope to poſſeſs." [44]

I have been told likewiſe, that there is another ſet of pretended philoſophers of the ſame country, whoſe tenets concerning this ſubject, are of a ſtill more illiberal and ungenerous caſt: and I have already, in the courſe of this converſation, ſlightly animadverted upon their principles. The propoſition they attempt to eſtabliſh, is, that

"friendſhip

" friendſhip is an affair of ſelf-intereſt " intirely, and that the proper motive " for engaging in it, is, not in order to " gratify the kind and benevolent affec- " tions, but for the benefit of that aſſiſt- " ance and ſupport which is to be " derived from the connection." [45] Accordingly they aſſert, that thoſe perſons are moſt diſpoſed to have recourſe to *auxiliary* alliances of this kind, who are leaſt qualified by nature, or fortune, to depend upon their own ſtrength and powers; the weaker ſex, for inſtance, being generally more inclined to engage in friendſhips, than the male part of our ſpecies *; and thoſe who are depreſt by indigence, or labouring under miſfortunes,

* It would be an invidious taſk, perhaps, to eſtimate the comparative qualities and diſpoſitions of the two ſexes, with reſpect to the connection mentioned in the text; but let it be remembered, for the honour of the fairer part of the creation, that one of the ſtrongeſt and moſt affecting inſtances of a faithful attachment to be met with in hiſtory, occurs in the friendſhip which ſubſiſted between two females. The inſtance alluded to, is recorded in the Jewiſh annals, and moſt pathetically related by one of the ſacred penmen.

fortunes, than the wealthy and the proſperous.

men. The reader need not be told, that Naomi, together with her huſband and their two ſons, being compelled by a general famine which deſolated the land of Judea, to ſeek for ſuſtenance in a more plentiful country, retired into the kingdom of the Moabites. Naomi had not been there long, before ſhe had the misfortune to bury not only her huſband, but her two ſons; the latter, however, before their deaths, had taken "*them wives of the daughters of* "*Moab.*" In proceſs of time, being informed that the famine was ceaſed which had driven her from her native country, ſhe determined to return: and ſetting out for that purpoſe, her two daughters-in-law affectionately conducted her part of the way. But when they arrived at the place where it was intended they ſhould take leave of each other, the faithful Ruth could by no perſuaſions be prevailed upon to undergo the pain of a final ſeparation. Neither difference of religion, nor the powerful ties of country, or family-attachments, were equally ſtrong with thoſe which the moſt cordial amity had formed in her heart. "Intreat me not," ſaid this amiable woman to her beloved friend and mother-in-law, "in-"treat me not to leave thee: for whither thou goeſt, "I will go; and where thou lodgeſt, I will lodge. "Thy people ſhall be my people; and thy God, "my God. Where thou dieſt, will I die; and "there will I be buried: the Lord do ſo to me, and "more alſo, if aught but death part thee and me."

Excellent

Excellent and obliging ſages theſe, undoubtedly! To ſtrike out the friendly affections from the moral world, would be like extinguiſhing the ſun in the natural; each of them being the ſource of the beſt and moſt grateful ſatisfactions that the Gods have conferred on the ſons of men. But I ſhould be glad to know what the real value of this boaſted exemption from care, which they promiſe their diſciples, juſtly amounts to? an exemption flattering to ſelf-love, I confeſs; but which, upon many occurrences in human life, ſhould be rejected with the utmoſt diſdain. For nothing, ſurely, can be more inconſiſtent with a well-poiſed and manly ſpirit, than to decline engaging in any laudable action, or to be diſcouraged from perſevering in it, by an apprehenſion of the trouble and ſolicitude with which it may probably be attended. Virtue herſelf, indeed, ought to be totally renounced, if it be right to avoid every poſſible means that may be pro-

ductive of uneaſineſs: for who that is actuated by her principles, can obſerve the conduct of an oppoſite character, without being affected with ſome degree of ſecret diſſatisfaction? Are not the juſt, the brave, and the good, neceſſarily expoſed to the diſagreeable emotions of diſlike and averſion, when they reſpectively meet with inſtances of fraud, of cowardice, or of villainy? It is an eſſential property of every well-conſtituted mind, to be affected with pain, or pleaſure, according to the nature of thoſe moral appearances that preſent themſelves to obſervation.

If ſenſibility, therefore, be not incompatible with true wiſdom; (and it ſurely is not, unleſs we ſuppoſe that philoſophy deadens every finer feeling of our nature) what juſt reaſon can be aſſigned, why the ſympathetic ſufferings which may reſult from friendſhip, ſhould be a ſufficient inducement for baniſhing that generous affection from

from the human breaſt? Extinguiſh all emotions of the heart, and what difference will remain, I do not ſay between man and brute, but between man and a mere inanimate clod? Away then with thoſe auſtere philoſophers, who repreſent virtue as hardening the ſoul againſt all the ſofter impreſſions of humanity! The fact, certainly, is much otherwiſe: a truly good man is upon many occaſions extremely ſuſceptible of tender ſentiments; and his heart expands with joy, or ſhrinks with ſorrow, as good or ill fortune accompanies his friend. Upon the whole then, it may fairly be concluded, that as in the caſe of virtue, ſo in that of friendſhip, thoſe painful ſenſations which may ſometimes be produced by the one, as well as by the other, are equally inſufficient for excluding either of them from taking poſſeſſion of our boſoms.

There is a charm in virtue, as I have already had occaſion to remark, that by

by a ſecret and irreſiſtible bias, draws the *general* affection of thoſe perſons towards each other, in whom it appears to reſide; and this inſtantaneous good-will is mutually attended with a deſire of entering into a nearer and more intimate correſpondence: ſentiments which, at length, by a natural and neceſſary conſequence, give riſe to particular friendſhips. Strange indeed would it be, that exalted honours, magnificent manſions, or ſumptuous apparel, not to mention other ſplendid objects of general admiration, ſhould have power to captivate the greater part of our ſpecies; and that the beauty of a virtuous mind, capable of meeting our affection with an equal return, ſhould not have ſufficient allurements to inſpire the moſt ardent paſſion! I ſaid, "capable of meeting our affection with "an equal return:" For nothing, ſurely, can be more delightful, than to live in a conſtant interchange and viciſſitude of reciprocal good offices. If we add

to

to this, as with truth we may, that a ſimilitude of manners is the moſt powerful of all attractions; it muſt be granted, that the virtuous are ſtrongly impelled towards each other, by that moral tendency and natural relationſhip which ſubſiſts between them.

No propoſition therefore can be more evident, I think, than that the virtuous muſt neceſſarily, and by an implanted ſenſe in the human heart, receive impreſſions of good-will towards each other; and theſe are the natural ſource, from whence genuine friendſhip can only flow. Not that a good man's benevolence is by any means confined to a ſingle object: he extends it to every individual. For true virtue, incapable of partial and contracted exceptions to the exerciſe of her benign ſpirit, enlarges the ſoul with ſentiments of univerſal philanthropy. How, indeed, could it be conſiſtent with her character, to take whole *nations* under her protection;

tection; if even the loweſt ranks of mankind, as well as the higheſt, were not the proper objects of beneficence?"

But to return to the more immediate object of our preſent conſideration.—They who inſiſt that, "utility is the "firſt and prevailing motive, which "induces mankind to enter into parti-"cular friendſhips," appear to me to diveſt the aſſociation of its moſt amiable and engaging principle. For to a mind rightly compoſed, it is not ſo much the benefits received, as the affectionate zeal from which they flow, that gives them their beſt and moſt valuable recommendation. It is ſo far indeed from being verified by fact, that a ſenſe of our wants is the original cauſe of forming theſe amicable alliances; that, on the contrary, it is obſervable, that none have been more diſtinguiſhed in their friendſhips than thoſe whoſe power and opulence, but above all, whoſe ſuperior virtue, (a much firmer ſupport)

port) have raiſed them above every neceſſity of having recourſe to the aſſiſtance of others. Perhaps, however, it may admit of a queſtion, whether it were deſirable that one's friend ſhould be ſo abſolutely ſufficient for himſelf, as to have no wants of any kind to which his own powers were not abundantly adequate. I am ſure, at leaſt, I ſhould have been deprived of a moſt exquiſite ſatisfaction, if no opportunity had ever offered to approve the affectionate zeal of my heart towards Scipio, and he had never had occaſion, either in his civil or military tranſactions, to make uſe of my counſel, or my aid.

The true diſtinction, then, in this queſtion is, that "although friendſhip "is certainly productive of utility, yet "utility is not the primary motive of "friendſhip." Thoſe ſelfiſh ſenſualiſts, therefore, who lulled in the lap of luxury, preſume to maintain the reverſe, have ſurely no claim to atten-

tion; as they are neither qualified by *reflection*, nor *experience*, to be competent judges of the ſubject [w].

Good Gods! is there a man upon the face of the earth, who would deliberately accept of all the wealth and all the affluence this world can beſtow, if offered to him upon the ſevere terms of his being unconnected with a ſingle mortal whom he could love, or by whom he ſhould be beloved? This would be to lead the wretched life of a deteſted tyrant, who, amidſt perpetual ſuſpicions and alarms, paſſes his miſerable days a ſtranger to every tender ſentiment, and utterly precluded from the heart-felt ſatisfactions of friendſhip. For who can love the man he fears? or how can affection dwell with a conſciouſneſs of being feared?

[w] "Luxury," as an ingenious writer well obſerves, "confining a man's whole views to himſelf, "admits not of friendſhip, and ſcarcely of any other "ſocial paſſion."—*Sketches of the Hiſtory of Man*, I. 271.

He

He may be flattered, indeed, by his followers with the ſpecious ſemblance of perſonal attachment: but whenever he falls (and many inſtances there are of ſuch a reverſe of fortune)[47] it will appear how totally deſtitute he ſtood of every genuine friend. Accordingly it is reported, that Tarquin uſed to ſay in his exile, that "his misfortunes had "taught him to diſcern his real from "his pretended friends, as it was now "no longer in his power to make either "of them any returns." I ſhould much wonder, however, if, with a temper ſo inſolent and ferocious, he ever had a ſincere friend.

But as the haughtineſs of Tarquin's imperious deportment, rendered it impoſſible for him to know the ſatisfaction of enjoying a faithful attachment; ſo it frequently happens, that the being advanced into exalted ſtations, equally proves the occaſion of excluding the great and the powerful from poſſeſſing

that ineſtimable felicity. Fortune, indeed, is not only blind herſelf, but is apt to affect her favourites with the ſame infirmity. Weak minds, elated with being diſtinguiſhed by her ſmiles, are generally diſpoſed to aſſume an arrogant and ſupercilious demeanour; and there is not in the whole compaſs of nature a more inſufferable creature, than a proſperous fool. Proſperity, in truth, has been obſerved to produce wonderful transformations even in perſons who before had always the good ſenſe to deport themſelves in a modeſt and unaſſuming manner; and their heads have been ſo turned by the eminence to which they were raiſed, as to look down with neglect and contempt on their old friends, while their new connections entirely engaged all their attention and favour. But there cannot, ſurely, be a more flagrant inſtance of weakneſs and folly, than to employ the great advantages of extenſive influence and opulent poſſeſſions in the purchaſe

of

of brilliant equipages, gaudy rayment, elegant vaſes, together with every other faſhionable decoration which wealth and power can procure; and yet neglect to uſe the means they afford of acquiring that nobleſt and moſt valuable ornament of human life, a worthy and faithful friend! The abſurdity of this conduct is the more amazing, as after all the baſe ſacrifices that may have been made to obtain theſe vain and oſtentatious embelliſhments, the holding of them muſt ever be precarious. For whoever ſhall invade them with a ſtronger arm, to *him* they will infallibly belong*: whereas a true friend is a treaſure which no power, how formidable ſoever, can be ſufficient to wreſt from the happy poſſeſſor.[48] But admitting that the favours of fortune were in their nature permanent and irrevocable; yet how joyleſs and inſipid

* When Cræſus ſhewed Solon his riches, the latter told him, that whoever ſhould come with better *iron* would ſoon be maſter of his *gold*.

muſt they prove, if not heightened and endeared by the ſociety and participation of a boſom friend!

But not to purſue reflections of this ſort any farther; let me rather obſerve, that it is neceſſary to ſettle ſome fixed ſtandard or meaſure, by which to regulate and adjuſt the kind affections in the commerce under conſideration. To this intent, three different criterions, I find, have been propoſed. The firſt is, "that "in all important occurrences, we "ſhould act towards our friend preciſe-"ly in the ſame manner as if the caſe "were our own:" the ſecond, "that "our good offices ſhould be exactly "dealt out, both in degree and value, "by the meaſure and merit of thoſe "we receive from him:" and the laſt, "that our conduct in relation to all his "concerns, ſhould be governed by the "ſame kind of ſentiments with which "he appears to be actuated in reſpect "to them himſelf."

Now there is not one of theſe ſeveral rules, to which I can entirely give my approbation. The firſt is by no means, I think, juſt; becauſe there are many things I would undertake on my friend's account, which I ſhould never prevail with myſelf to act on my own. For inſtance; I would not ſcruple on his behalf to ſolicit, nor even to ſupplicate, a man of a mean and worthleſs character; nor to repel, with peculiar acrimony and indignation, any affront or injury that might be offered to him. And this conduct, which I could not hold without blame in matters that merely concerned myſelf, I very laudably might in thoſe which relate to my friend[y].

Add

[y] "The beſt way to repreſent to the life the manifold *uſe* of friendſhip, is to caſt and ſee how many things there are which a man cannot do himſelf: and then it will appear that it was a ſparing ſpeech of the antients, that *a friend is another himſelf*; for a friend is far more than *himſelf*.—How many things are there which a man cannot with any force or comelineſs ſay or do himſelf! He can ſcarce alledge

Add to this, that there are many advantages which a generous mind would willingly forego, or ſuffer himſelf to be deprived of, that his friend might enjoy the benefit of them."

With regard to the ſecond criterion, which determines the meaſure of our affection and good offices, by exactly proportioning them to the value and quality we receive of each; it degrades the connection into a mere mercantile account between debtor and creditor. True friendſhip is animated by much too liberal and enlarged a ſpirit, to diſtribute her beneficence with a careful and penurious circumſpection, leſt ſhe

" his own merits with modeſty, much leſs extol them;
" —cannot ſometimes brook to ſupplicate or beg,
" &c. So, again, a man's perſon hath many proper
" relations which he cannot put off. He cannot ſpeak
" to his ſon but as a father; to his wife but as a huſ-
" band; to his enemy but upon terms: whereas a
" friend may ſpeak as the caſe requires, and not as it
" ſorteth with the perſon."—*Lord Bacon's Eſſays.*

ſhould

ſhould beſtow more abundantly than ſhe receives: ſhe ſcorns to poize the balance ſo exactly equal, that nothing ſhall be placed in the one ſcale, without its equivalent in the other *.

The third maxim is ſtill leſs admiſſible than either of the two former. There are ſome characters who are apt to entertain too low an opinion of their perſonal merit, and whoſe ſpirits are frequently much too languid and depreſſed, to exert themſelves with proper vigour and activity for the promotion of their own intereſt or honours. Under circumſtances of this kind, ſhall the zeal of a friend riſe no higher than one's own, but cautiouſly be reſtrained within the ſame humble level? On the contrary, he ought to endeavour, by every means in his power, to diſpel the

* "Comme il y a des rivieres," ſays the ingenious Balzac, "qui ne font jamais tant de bien que "quand elles ſe débordent; de meſme, l'amitié n'a "rien de meilleur que l'exces."

gloom

gloom that overcaſts the mind of his deſponding aſſociate, and animate his hopes with livelier and more ſanguine expectations.

And now, having pointed out the inſufficiency of the ſeveral criteria I have mentioned; it is neceſſary I ſhould produce ſome other, more adequate and ſatisfactory. But before I deliver my own opinion in reſpect to this article, ſuffer me previouſly to obſerve, that Scipio uſed frequently to ſay, there never was a caution advanced more injurious to the principles of true amity, than the famous precept which adviſes, "ſo to regulate your affection towards "your friend, as to remember that the "time may poſſibly come when you ſhall "have reaſon to hate him." He could never, he ſaid, be perſuaded that Bias, a man ſo diſtinguiſhed for wiſdom as to be ranked among the ſeven celebrated ſages of Greece, was really the author, as he is generally ſuppoſed, of ſo unworthy

unworthy a precaution.[49] It was rather the maxim, he imagined, of ſome ſordid wretch, or perhaps of ſome ambitious ſtateſman, who, a ſtranger to every nobler ſentiment of the human heart, had no other object in forming his connections, but as they might prove conducive to the increaſe or eſtabliſhment of his power. It is impoſſible, certainly, to entertain a friendſhip for any man of whom you cheriſh ſo unfavourable an opinion, as to ſuppoſe he may hereafter give you cauſe to become his enemy. In reality, if this axiom were juſtly founded, and it be right to ſit thus looſe in our affections; we ought to wiſh that our friend might give us frequent occaſions to complain of his conduct; to lament whenever he acted in a laudable manner; and to envy every advantage that might attend him; leſt unhappily he ſhould lay too ſtrong a hold on our heart. This unworthy rule, therefore, whoever was the author of it, is evidently calculated for the

the utter extirpation of true amity. The more rational advice would have been, as Scipio remarked, to be always ſo cautious in forming friendſhips, as never to place our eſteem and affections where there was a probability of their being converted into the oppoſite ſentiments. But at all events, if we ſhould be ſo unfortunate as to make an improper choice; it were wiſer, he thought, not to look forward to *poſſible* contingencies, than to be always acting upon the defenſive, and painfully guarding againſt future diſſentions.

I think, then, the only meaſures that can be properly recommended reſpecting our *general* conduct in the article of friendſhip, is, in the firſt place, to be careful that we form the connection with men of ſtrict and irreproachable manners; and in the next, frankly to lay open to each other all our thoughts, inclinations, and purpoſes, without the leaſt

leaſt caution, reſerve, or diſguiſe. I will venture even to add, that in caſes in which the life, or good fame, of a friend is concerned, it may be allowable to deviate a little from the path of ſtrict right, in order to comply with his deſires; provided, however, that by this compliance our own character be not materially affected.[30] And this is the largeſt conceſſion that ſhould be made to friendſhip: for the good opinion of the public ought never to be lightly eſteemed; nor the general affection of our fellow-citizens conſidered as a matter of little importance, in carrying on the great affairs of the world. Popularity, indeed, if purchaſed at the expence of baſe condeſcenſions to the vices or the follies of the people, is a diſgrace to the poſſeſſor: but when it is the juſt and natural reſult of a laudable and patriotic conduct, it is an acquiſition which no wiſe man will ever contemn.

But

But to return to Scipio. Friendſhip was his favourite topic; and I have frequently heard him remark, that there is no article in which mankind uſually act with ſo much negligence, as in what relates to this connection. Every one, he obſerved, informs himſelf with great exactneſs of what numbers his flocks and his herds conſiſt; but who is it that endeavours to *aſcertain* his real friends, with the ſame requiſite preciſion! Thus likewiſe, in chooſing the former, much caution is commonly uſed, in order to diſcover thoſe ſignificant marks which denote their proper qualities; whereas, in ſelecting the latter, it is ſeldom that any great attention is exerted to diſcern thoſe moral ſignatures, which indicate the qualifications neceſſary to conſtitute a friend.

One of the principal ingredients to form that character, is a "ſteadineſs "and conſtancy of temper." This virtue, it muſt be confeſſed, is not very generally

generally to be found among mankind: nor is there any other mean to diſcover in whoſe boſom it reſides, than experience. But as this experience cannot fully be acquired, till the connection is already formed; affection is apt to take the lead of judgment, and render a previous trial impoſſible. It is the part of prudence, therefore, to reſtrain a predilection from carrying us precipitately into the arms of a new friend, before we have, in ſome degree at leaſt, put his moral qualifications to the teſt. A very inconſiderable article of money, may be ſufficient to prove the levity of ſome men's profeſſions of friendſhip; whilſt a much larger ſum in conteſt will be neceſſary, to ſhake the conſtancy of others. But ſhould there be a few, perhaps, who are actuated by too generous a ſpirit, to ſuffer any pecuniary intereſt to ſtand in competition with the claims of amity; yet where ſhall we find the man, who will not readily ſurrender his friendſhip to his ambition,

when

when they happen to interfere? Human nature is, in general, much too weak to reſiſt the charms which ſurround theſe glittering temptations; and men are apt to flatter themſelves, that although they ſhould acquire wealth or power by violating the duties of friendſhip, the world will be too much dazzled by the ſplendor of the objects, to take notice of the unworthy ſacrifice they make to obtain them. And hence it is, that real, unfeigned amity is ſo ſeldom to be met with among thoſe who are engaged in the purſuit, or poſſeſſion, of the honours and the offices of the common-wealth."

To mention another ſpecies of trial, which few likewiſe have the firmneſs to ſuſtain.—How ſevere is it thought by the generality of mankind, to take a voluntary ſhare in the calamities of others! And yet it is in the hour of adverſity, as Ennius well obſerves, that friendſhip muſt principally prove her

her truth and ſtrength. In ſhort, the deſerting of a friend in his diſtreſs, and the neglecting of him in one's own proſperity, are the two teſts which diſcover the weakneſs and inſtability of moſt connections of this nature. To preſerve, therefore, in thoſe ſeaſons of probation, an immoveable and unſhaken fidelity, is a virtue ſo exceedingly rare, that I had almoſt called it more than human.[52]

The great ſupport and ſecurity of that invariable conſtancy and ſteadineſs which I require in a friend, is a ſtrong and delicate ſenſe of honour: for there can be no reliance upon any man, who is totally uninfluenced by that principle, or in whom it operates but faintly. It is eſſential alſo, in order to form a permanent connection, that the object of our choice ſhould not only have the ſame general turn of mind with our own, but poſſeſs an open, artleſs, and ingenuous temper: for where any one

of thoſe qualities are wanting, vain would it be to expect a laſting and faithful attachment. True friendſhip, indeed, is abſolutely inconſiſtent with every ſpecies of artifice and duplicity: and it is equally impoſſible it ſhould be maintained between perſons whoſe diſpoſitions and general modes of thinking, do not perfectly accord. I muſt add, as another requiſite for that ſtability I am ſpeaking of, that the party ſhould neither be capable of taking an ill-natured ſatisfaction in reprehending the frailties of his friend, nor eaſily induced to credit thoſe imputations, with which the malice of others may aſperſe him.

Theſe reflections ſufficiently confirm that poſition I ſet out with in this converſation, when I aſſerted that "true "friendſhip can only be found among "the virtuous." For in the firſt place, ſincerity is ſo eſſential a quality in forming a good, or, if you pleaſe, a

wiſe, man, (for they are convertible terms) that a perſon of that character would deem it more generous to be a declared enemy, than to conceal a rancorous heart under a ſmooth brow: and in the next, the ſame generous ſimplicity of heart would not only induce him to vindicate his friend againſt the accuſation of others, but render him incapable of cheriſhing in his own breaſt that little ſuſpicious temper, which is ever apt to take offence, and perpetually diſcovering ſome imaginary violation of amity.

Add to this, that his converſation and addreſs ought to be ſweetened with a certain eaſe and politeneſs of language and manners, that wonderfully contribute to heighten and improve the reliſh of this intercourſe. A ſolemn, ſevere demeanour, may be very proper, I confeſs, in certain characters, to give them their proper impreſſion; but friendſhip ſhould wear a more pleaſing aſpect, and

at all times appear with a complacent, affable, and unconſtrained countenance.

And here, I cannot forbear taking notice of an extraordinary queſtion, which ſome, it ſeems, have conſidered as not altogether without difficulty. It has been aſked, "is the pleaſure of acquiring a "new friend, ſuppoſing him endued "with virtues which render him de-"ſerving our choice, preferable to the "ſatisfaction of poſſeſſing an old one?" On the ſame account, I preſume, as we prefer a young horſe to one that is grown old in our ſervice: for never, ſurely, was there a doubt propoſed, more unworthy of a rational mind! It is not with friendſhips as with acquiſitions of moſt other kinds, which after frequent enjoyment are generally attended with ſatiety; on the contrary, the longer we preſerve them, like thoſe ſorts of wine that will bear age, the more reliſhing and valuable they become. Accordingly, the proverb juſtly ſays, that "one muſt eat "many

" many a peck of ſalt with a man, be-
" fore he can have ſufficient opportu-
" nities to approve himſelf a thorough
" friend." Not that new connections are to be declined, provided appearances indicate that, in due time, they may ripen into the happy fruits of a well-contracted amity. Old friendſhips, however, certainly have a claim to the ſuperior degree of our eſteem, were it for no other reaſon than from that powerful impreſſion which antient habitudes of every kind naturally make upon the human heart. To have recourſe once more to the ludicrous inſtance I juſt now ſuggeſted: who is there that would not prefer a horſe whoſe paces he had been long accuſtomed to, before one that was new and untrained to his hand? Even things inanimate lay a ſtrong hold on the mind, by the mere force of cuſtom; as is obſervable in that rooted affection we bear towards thoſe places, though never ſo wild and uncultivated, in which a con-

ſiderable part of our earlier days have been paſſed.

It frequently happens that there is a great diſparity between intimate friends, both in point of rank and talents. Now under theſe circumſtances, "he who "has the advantage, ſhould never ap- "pear ſenſible of his ſuperiority." Thus Scipio, who ſtood diſtinguiſhed in the little group, if I may ſo call it, of our ſelect aſſociates, never diſcovered in his behaviour the leaſt conſciouſneſs of his pre-eminence over Philus, Rupilius, Memmius, or any other of his particular connections, who were of ſubordinate abilities or ſtation. And with regard to his brother Q. Maximus, who, although a man of great merit, and his ſenior, was by no means comparable with Scipio; he always treated him with as much deference and regard, as if he had advanced as far beyond him in every other article as in point

point of years. In ſhort, it was his conſtant endeavour to raiſe all his friends into an equal degree of conſequence with himſelf: and his example well deſerves to be imitated. Whatever excellencies, therefore, a man may poſſeſs, in reſpect to his virtues, his intellectual endowments, or the accidental favours of fortune; he ought generouſly to communicate the benefits of them with his friends and family. Agreeably to theſe principles, ſhould he happen to be deſcended from an obſcure anceſtry, and ſee any of his relations in diſtreſſed circumſtances, or that require the aſſiſtance of his ſuperior power or abilities; it is incumbent upon him to employ his credit, his riches, and his talents, to ſupply their reſpective deficiencies, and reflect back upon them every honour and advantage they are capable of receiving. Dramatic writers, when the fabulous hero of their play, after having been educated under ſome poor ſhepherd, ignorant of his

true parent, is diſcovered to be of royal lineage, or the offspring, perhaps, of ſome celeſtial divinity; always think it neceſſary to exhibit the noble youth as ſtill retaining a grateful affection for the honeſt ruſtic to whom he had ſo long ſuppoſed himſelf indebted for his birth: but how much more are theſe ſentiments due to Him, who has a legitimate claim to his filial tenderneſs and reſpect! In a word, the moſt ſenſible ſatisfaction that can reſult from advantageous diſtinctions of every ſort, is in the pleaſure a well-conſtituted mind muſt feel, by exerting them for the benefit of every individual to whom he ſtands related, either by the ties of kindred or amity.

But if He who, on account of any of thoſe ſuperiorities which I have mentioned, appears the moſt conſpicuous figure in the circle of his friends, ought by no means to diſcover, in his behaviour towards them, the leaſt apparent

ſenſe

ſenſe of the eminence on which he ſtands: ſo neither ſhould *they*, on the other hand, betray ſentiments of envy or diſſatisfaction in ſeeing him thus exalted above them. It muſt be acknowledged, however, that in ſituations of this kind, the latter are tooapt to be unreaſonable in their expectations; to complain that their friend is not ſufficiently attentive to their intereſt; and ſometimes even to break out into open remonſtrances; eſpecially if they think they are entitled to plead the merit of any conſiderable ſervices, to ſtrengthen their reſpective claims. But to be capable of reproaching a man with the obligations you have conferred upon him, is a diſpoſition exceedingly contemptible and odious: it is *his* part, indeed, not to forget the good offices he has received; but ill, certainly, would it become his friend to be the monitor for that purpoſe.

It is not ſufficient, therefore, merely to behave with an eaſy condeſcenſion towards thoſe friends who are of leſs conſiderable note than one's ſelf; it is incumbent upon him to bring them forward, and, as much as poſſible, to raiſe their conſequence. The apprehenſion of not being treated with ſufficient regard, ſometimes creates much uneaſineſs in this connection: and thoſe tempers are moſt liable to be diſquieted by this ſuſpicion, that are inclined to entertain too low an opinion of their own merit. It is the part therefore of a generous and benevolent mind, to endeavour to relieve his friend from the mortification of theſe humiliating ſentiments, not only by profeſſions, but by eſſential ſervices.

The proper meaſure by which theſe ſervices ought to be regulated, muſt be taken partly from the extent of our own power, and partly from what the perſon who is the object of our particular

ticular affection, has abilities to ſuſtain. For how unlimited ſoever a man's authority and influence might be, it would be impoſſible to raiſe indiſcriminately all his friends by turns into the ſame honourable ſtations. Thus Scipio, although he had ſufficient intereſt to procure the conſular dignity for Publius Rutilius, could not perform the ſame good office for Lucius, the brother of that conſul. But even admitting that you had the arbitrary diſpoſal of every dignity of the ſtate; ſtill it would be neceſſary well to examine, whether your friend's talents were equal to his ambition, and ſufficiently qualified him to diſcharge the duties of the poſt in queſtion, with credit to himſelf and advantage to the public.

It is proper to obſerve, that in ſtating the duties and obligations of friendſhip, thoſe intimacies alone can juſtly be taken into conſideration, which are formed at a time of life when men's characters

characters are decided, and their judgments arrived at maturity. As to the aſſociates of our early years, the companions and partners of our puerile pleaſures and amuſements; they can by no means, ſimply on that account, be deemed in the number of friends. Indeed, if the firſt objects of our affection had the beſt claim to be received into that rank; our nurſes and our pedagogues would, certainly, have a right to the moſt conſiderable ſhare of our regard. Some degree of it is unqueſtionably due to them; but of a kind, however, far different from that which is the ſubject of our preſent inquiry. The truth is, were our early attachments the juſt foundation of amity, it would be impoſſible that the union ſhould ever be permanent. For our inclinations and purſuits take a different turn, as we advance into riper years: and where theſe are no longer ſimilar, the true cement of friendſhip is diſſolved. It is the total diſparity between

tween the diſpoſition and manners of the virtuous and the vicious, that alone renders their coalition incompatible.

There is a certain intemperate degree of affection towards one's friends, which it is neceſſary to reſtrain; as the indulging of it has frequently, and in very important ſituations, proved extremely prejudicial to their intereſt. To exemplify my meaning by an inſtance from antient ſtory: Neoptolemus would never have had the glory of taking Troy, had his friend Lycomedes, in whoſe court he had been educated, ſucceeded in his too warm and earneſt ſolicitations not to hazard his perſon in that famous expedition." There are numberleſs occaſions, which may render an abſence between friends highly expedient: and to endeavour, from an impatience of ſeparation, to prevent it, betrays a degree of weakneſs inconſiſtent with that firm and manly ſpirit, without which it is impoſ-

ſible

ſible to act up to the character of a true friend. And this is a farther confirmation of the maxim I before inſiſted upon, that "in a commerce of friendſhip, "mutual requeſts or conceſſions ſhould "neither be made, nor granted, without "due and mature deliberation."

But to turn our reflections from thoſe nobler alliances of this kind, which are formed between men of eminent and ſuperior virtue, to that lower ſpecies which occurs in the ordinary intercourſe of the world. — In connections of this nature, it ſometimes unfortunately happens, that circumſtances ariſe which render it expedient for a man of honour to break with his friend. Some latent vice, perhaps, or concealed ill-humour, unexpectedly diſcovers itſelf in his behaviour either towards his friends themſelves, or towards others, which cannot be overlooked without participating his diſgrace. The moſt adviſeable and prudent conduct in

in ſituations of this kind, is to ſuffer the intimacy to wear out by ſilent and inſenſible degrees; or, to uſe a ſtrong expreſſion, which I remember to have fallen from Cato upon a ſimilar occaſion, "the bands of friendſhip ſhould be "gradually *untied*, rather than ſuddenly "*cut* aſunder!" always ſuppoſing, however, that the offence is not of ſo atrocious a nature, as to render an abſolute and immediate alienation indiſpenſably requiſite for one's own honour.

As it is not unuſual, (for I am ſtill ſpeaking of common friendſhips) that diſſentions ariſe from ſome extraordinary change of manners or ſentiments, or from ſome contrariety of opinions with reſpect to public affairs; the parties at variance ſhould be much upon their guard, leſt their behaviour towards each other ſhould give the world occaſion to remark, that they have not only ceaſed to be cordial friends, but are become inveterate enemies: for nothing

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is more indecent than to appear in open war with a man, with whom one has formerly lived upon terms of familiarity and good fellowſhip.

Scipio eſtranged himſelf from Quintus Pompeius, you well know, ſolely upon my account; as the diſſentions which aroſe in the republic alienated him alſo from my collegue Metellus." But in both inſtances he preſerved the dignity of his character, and never ſuffered himſelf to be betrayed into the leaſt improper warmth of reſentment.

Upon the whole, then, the firſt great caution in this commerce ſhould be, ſtudiouſly to avoid all occaſions of diſcord: but if any ſhould neceſſarily ariſe; the next is, to manage the quarrel with ſo much temper and moderation, that the flame of friendſhip ſhall appear to have gently ſubſided, rather than to have been violently extinguiſhed.

ed. But above all, whenever a diſſention happens between the parties, they ſhould be particularly on their guard againſt indulging a virulent animoſity; as a ſpirit of this exaſperated kind, when unreſtrained, is apt to break forth into expreſſions of the moſt malevolent contumely and reproach. In a caſe of this nature, if the language ſhould not be too inſulting to be borne, it will be prudent, in conſideration of their former friendſhip, to receive it without a return: for by this forbearance the reviler, and not the reviled, will appear the perſon that moſt deſerves to be condemned.

The ſure, and indeed the *only* ſure, means to eſcape the ſeveral errors and inconveniencies I have pointed out, is, in the firſt place, "never haſtily to engage in friendſhips;" and in the next, "not to enter into them with thoſe "who are unworthy of the connec-"tion."[56] Now he alone is worthy,

whoſe perſonal merit, independent of all other conſiderations, renders him the juſt object of affection and eſteem. Characters of this ſort, it muſt be confeſſed, are extremely rare, as indeed every other ſpecies of excellence generally is; nothing being more uncommon than to meet with what is perfect in its kind, in any ſubject whatſoever. But the misfortune is, that the generality of the world have no conception of any other *merit*, than what may be turned to intereſt: they love their friends upon the ſame principle, and in the ſame proportion, as they love their flocks and their herds; giving juſt ſo much of their regard to each, as is equal to the *profits* they reſpectively produce.

Hence it is, they are for ever ſtrangers to the ſweet complacencies of that generous amity, which ſprings from thoſe natural inſtincts originally impreſſed upon the human ſoul; and is ſimply deſirable for its own abſtracted and intrinſic

intrinſic value. To convince them, however, of the poſſible exiſtence at leaſt, and powerful efficacy, of an affection utterly void of all mercenary motives; they need only be referred to what paſſes in their own boſoms. For the love which every man bears to himſelf, does not, certainly, flow from any expected recompence or reward, but ſolely from that pure and innate regard which each individual feels for his own perſon. Now if the ſame kind of affection be not transferred into friendſhip, it will be in vain to hope for a true friend; as a true friend is no other, in effect, than a ſecond *ſelf*.[57]

To theſe reflections we may add, that if two diſtinct principles univerſally prevail throughout the whole animal creation; in the firſt place, that love of ſelf which is common to every ſenſitive being; and in the next, a certain degree of ſocial affection, by which every individual of the ſame ſpecies is led to

herd with its kind; how much more ſtrongly has nature infuſed into the heart of man, together with a principle of ſelf-love, this herding diſpoſition! By the latter he is powerfully impelled, not only to unite with his ſpecies in general, but to look out for ſome particular aſſociate, with whom he may be ſo intimately blended in ſentiments and inclinations, as to form, I had almoſt ſaid, one ſoul in two bodies?

The generality of mankind are ſo unreaſonable, not to ſay arrogant, as to require that their friends ſhould be formed by a more perfect model than themſelves are able, or willing, to imitate:[58] whereas the firſt endeavour ſhould be, to acquire yourſelf thoſe moral excellencies which conſtitute a virtuous character, and then to find an aſſociate whoſe good qualities reflect back the true image of your own. Thus would the fair fabric of friendſhip be erected upon that immoveable baſis,

which I have ſo repeatedly recommended in the courſe of this inquiry. For what ſhould endanger its ſtability, when a mutual affection between the parties is blended with principles that raiſe them above thoſe mean paſſions, by which the greater part of the world are uſually governed? Being equally actuated by a ſtrong ſenſe of juſtice and equity, they will at all times equally be zealous to exert their utmoſt powers in the ſervice of each other; well aſſured that nothing will ever be required, on either ſide, inconſiſtent with the dictates of truth and honour. In conſequence of theſe principles, they will not only love, but *revere*, each other. I ſay *revere*; for where reverence does not dwell with affection, amity is bereaved of her nobleſt and moſt graceful ornament.

It is an error, therefore, that leads to the moſt pernicious conſequences, to imagine that the laws of friendſhip ſu-

perſede thoſe of moral obligation, and juſtify a participation with licentiouſneſs and debauchery. Nature has ſown the ſeed of that ſocial affection in the heart of man, for purpoſes far different; not to produce confederates in vice, but auxiliaries in virtue. Solitary and ſequeſtered virtue is indeed incapable of riſing to the ſame height, as when ſhe acts in conjunction with an affectionate and animating companion of her generous efforts. They who are thus leagued in reciprocal ſupport and encouragement of each other's moral ambition, may be conſidered as ſetting out together, in the beſt company, and ſureſt road, towards thoſe deſirable objects in which nature has placed the ſupreme felicity of man.[59] Yes, my friends, I will repeat it again; an amity ennobled by theſe exalted principles, and directed to theſe laudable purpoſes, leads to honour and to glory; and is productive, at the ſame time, of that ſweet ſatisfaction and complacency of mind,

mind, which, in conjunction with the two former, eſſentially conſtitute real happineſs. He, therefore, who means to acquire theſe great and ultimate beatitudes of human life, muſt receive them from the hands of virtue; as neither friendſhip, or aught elſe deſervedly valuable, can poſſibly be obtained without *her* influence and intervention. For they who perſuade themſelves that they may poſſeſs a true friend, at leaſt, where moral merit has no ſhare in producing the connection, will find themſelves miſerably deceived, whenever ſome ſevere misfortune ſhall give them occaſion to make the deciſive experiment.

It is a maxim, then, which cannot too frequently nor too ſtrongly be inculcated, that in forming the attachment we are ſpeaking of, "we ſhould "never ſuffer *affection* to take root in "our hearts before *judgment* has time "to interpoſe:" for in no circumſtance

of our lives can a haſty and inconſiderate choice be attended with more fatal conſequences. But the folly is, that we generally forbear to deliberate till conſideration can nothing avail: and hence it is, that after the aſſociation has been habitually formed, and many good offices, perhaps, have been mutually interchanged, ſome latent flaw becomes viſible; and the union which was precipitately cemented is no leſs ſuddenly diſſolved. Now this inattention is the more blame-worthy and aſtoniſhing, as friendſhip is the only article, among the different objects of human purſuits, the value and importance of which is unanimouſly, and without any exception, acknowledged. I ſay the *only* article: For even virtue herſelf is not univerſally held in eſteem; and there are many who repreſent all her high pretenſions as mere affectation and oſtentatious parade. There are, too, whoſe moderate deſires are ſatisfied with humble meals and lowly roofs,

and

and who look upon riches with ſovereign contempt. How many are there who think, that thoſe honours which inflame the ambition of others, are of all human vanities the moſt frivolous! In like manner, throughout all the reſt of thoſe ſeveral objects which divide the paſſions of mankind; what ſome admire, others moſt heartily deſpiſe. Whereas, with reſpect to friendſhip, there are not two different opinions: the active and the ambitious, the retired and the contemplative, even the ſenſualiſt himſelf (if he would indulge his appetites with any degree of refinement) unanimouſly acknowledge that, without friendſhip, life can have no true enjoyment. She inſinuates herſelf, indeed, by I know not what irreſiſtible charm, into the hearts of every rank and claſs of men, and mixes in all the various modes and arrangements of human life. Were there a man in the world of ſo moroſe and acrimonious a diſpoſition, as to ſhun (agreeably to what

what we are told of a certain Timon of Athens) all communication with his ſpecies; even ſuch an odious miſanthropiſt could not endure to be excluded from one aſſociate, at leaſt, before whom he might diſcharge the whole rancour and virulence of his heart.[60] The truth is, if we could ſuppoſe ourſelves tranſported by ſome divinity into a ſolitude, replete with all the delicacies which the heart of man could deſire, but ſecluded at the ſame time from every poſſible intercourſe with our kind; there is not a perſon in the world of ſo unſocial and ſavage a temper, as to be capable, under theſe forlorn circumſtances, of reliſhing any enjoyment. Accordingly, nothing is more true than what Archytas of Tarentum [a], if I miſtake not, is reported to have ſaid, "That were a man to be "carried up into heaven, and the "beauties of univerſal nature diſ-

[a] See Rem. on Cato, p. 210. No. 46.

"played

"played to his view; he would re-
"ceive but little pleaſure from the
"wonderful ſcene, if there were none
"to whom he might relate the glories
"he had beheld." Human nature, indeed, is ſo conſtituted as to be incapable of lonely ſatisfactions: man, like thoſe plants which are formed to embrace others, is led by an inſtinctive impulſe to recline on his ſpecies; and he finds his happieſt and moſt ſecure ſupport in the arms of a faithful friend. But although in this inſtance, as in every other, nature points out her tendencies by a variety of unambiguous notices, and proclaims her meaning in the moſt emphatical language; yet, I know not how it is, we ſeem ſtrangely blind to her cleareſt ſignals, and deaf to her loudeſt voice!

The offices of friendſhip are ſo numerous, and of ſuch different kinds, that many little diſguſts may ariſe in the exerciſe of them, which a man of true good

good ſenſe will either avoid, extenuate, or be contented to bear, as the nature and circumſtances of the caſe may render moſt expedient. But there is one particular duty which may frequently occur, and which he will at all hazards of offence diſcharge; as it is never to be ſuperſeded conſiſtently with the truth and fidelity he owes to the connection; I mean the duty of admoniſhing, and even reproving, his friend: an office which, whenever it is affectionately exerciſed, ſhould be kindly received. It muſt be confeſſed, however, that the remark of my dramatic friend is too frequently verified, who obſerves in his Andria, that "obſequiouſneſs conciliates friends, but "truth creates enemies." [61] When truth proves the bane of friendſhip, we may have reaſon, indeed, to be ſorry for the unnatural conſequence; but we ſhould have cauſe to be more ſorry, if we ſuffered a friend, by a culpable indulgence, to expoſe his character to juſt reproach.

proach. Upon theſe delicate occaſions, however, we ſhould be particularly careful to deliver our advice, or reproof, without the leaſt appearance of acrimony or inſult. Let our *obſequiouſneſs* (to repeat the ſignificant expreſſion of Terence) extend as far as gentleneſs of manners, and the rules of good breeding require; but far let it be from ſeducing us to flatter either vice or miſconduct: a meanneſs unworthy, not only of every man who claims to himſelf the title of friend, but of every liberal and ingenuous mind. Shall we live with a friend, upon the ſame cautious terms we muſt ſubmit to live with a tyrant? Deſperate indeed muſt that man's moral diſorders be, who ſhuts his ears to the voice of truth, when delivered by a ſincere and affectionate monitor! It was a ſaying of Cato (and he had many that well deſerve to be remembered) that "ſome men were more "obliged to their inveterate enemies, "than to their complaiſant friends;

"as

"as they frequently heard the truth "from the one, but never from the "other." In ſhort, the great abſurdity is, that men are apt, in the inſtances under conſideration, to direct both their diſlike and their approbation to the wrong object. They hate the admonition, and love the vice: whereas they ought, on the contrary, to hate the vice, and love the admonition.

As nothing therefore is more ſuitable to the genius and ſpirit of true friendſhip, than to give and receive advice; to give it, I mean, with freedom, but without rudeneſs [b], and to receive it, not only without reluctance, but with patience; ſo nothing is more injurious

[b] There are few, ſays Plutarch, who have the inclination or courage to reprove the miſconduct of a friend, and ſtill fewer who know how to exerciſe that kindly office at a ſeaſonable time and in a proper manner; the generality of thoſe who have the fidelity to interpoſe their advice upon ſuch occaſions, being apt to miſtake rude reprehenſion, and ſevere invective, for an honeſt and laudable freedom.

to the connection than flattery, compliment, or adulation. I multiply theſe equivalent terms, in order to mark with ſtronger emphaſis the deteſtable and dangerous character of thoſe pretended friends, who, ſtrangers to the dictates of truth, conſtantly hold the language which they are ſure will be moſt acceptable. But if counterfeit appearances, of every ſpecies, are baſe and diſhoneſt attempts to impoſe upon the judgment of the unwary; they are more peculiarly ſo in a commerce of amity, and abſolutely repugnant to the vital principle of that ſacred relation: for, without ſincerity, friendſhip is a mere name, that has neither meaning or efficacy. It is the eſſential property of this alliance, to form ſo intimate a coalition between the parties, that they ſeem to be actuated, as it were, by one common ſpirit: but it is impoſſible that this unity of mind ſhould be produced, when there is one of them in which it does not ſubſiſt

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even in his own perſon; who, with a duplicity of ſoul which ſets him at perpetual variance from himſelf, aſſumes oppoſite ſentiments and opinions, as is moſt convenient to his preſent purpoſe. Nothing in nature, indeed, is ſo pliant and verſatile as the genius of a flatterer; who always acts and pretends to think in conformity, not only to the will and inclination, but even to the looks and countenance, of another. Like Gnatho in the play, he can prevail with himſelf to ſay either *yes* or *no*, as beſt ſuits the occaſion; and he lays it down as his general maxim, never to diſſent from the company.[62]

Terence expoſes this baſeneſs of ſoul, in the perſon of a contemptible paraſite; but how much more contemptible does it appear, when exhibited in the conduct of one who dares uſurp the name of friend! The miſchief is, that there are many Gnathos, of a much ſuperior rank and conſequence,

to

to be met with in the commerce of the world: and it is from this claſs of flatterers that the greateſt danger is to be apprehended; as the poiſon they adminiſter receives additional ſtrength and efficacy, from the hand that conveys it. Nevertheleſs, a man of good ſenſe and diſcernment, if he will exert the requiſite attention, will always be able to diſtinguiſh the *complaiſant* from the *ſincere* friend, with the ſame certainty that he may, in any other ſubject, perceive the difference between the counterfeit and the genuine. It is obſervable in the general aſſemblies of the people, compoſed as they are of the moſt ignorant part of the community, that even the populace know how to diſcriminate the ſoothing inſidious orator, whoſe only aim is to acquire popularity, from the firm, inflexible, and undeſigning patriot. A remarkable inſtance of this kind lately appeared, when Caius Papirius propoſed a law to enable the Tribunes, at the expira-

tion of their office, to be re-elected for the enſuing year: upon which he employed every inſinuating art of addreſs, to ſeduce and captivate the ears of the multitude. Not to mention the part I took myſelf upon that occaſion; it was oppoſed by Scipio with ſuch a commanding flow of eloquence, and invincible ſtrength of reaſon, that this popular law was rejected by the very populace themſelves.[63] But you were preſent at the debate; and his ſpeech is in every body's hands. I cannot forbear giving you another inſtance, likewiſe, although it is one particularly relating to myſelf. You may remember that in the conſulate of Lucius Mancinus, and Quintus Maximus the brother of Scipio, a very popular law was moved by Caius Licinius; who propoſed that the privilege of electing to the ſacerdotal offices, ſhould be transferred from the reſpective colleges to the general aſſemblies of the people: and let me remark by the way, it was upon this occaſion that

that Licinius, in complaiſance to the people, firſt introduced the practice of addreſſing them with his back turned upon the ſenate-houſe.[64] Nevertheleſs, the pious reverence which is due to every circumſtance that concerns the worſhip of the immortal Gods, together with the arguments by which I expoſed the impropriety of his motion, prevailed over all the ſpecious colourings of his plauſible oratory. This affair was agitated during my prætorſhip; and I was not choſen conſul till five years afterwards: ſo that it is evident I owed my ſucceſs more to the force of truth, than to the influence of ſtation.

Now if in popular aſſemblies, a ſcene, of all others, in which fiction and fallacious repreſentations have the greateſt ſcope, and are uſually employed with the moſt ſucceſs; Truth, when fairly ſtated and properly enforced, could thus prevail; with how much more

reaſon may ſhe expect to be favourably heard in an intercourſe of friendſhip, the very eſſence whereof depends upon ſincerity! In a commerce of this nature, indeed, if you are not permitted to ſee into the moſt hidden receſſes of your friend's boſom, and do not with equal unreſerve, lay open to him the full expoſure of your own; there can be no juſt ground for confidence on either ſide, nor even ſufficient evidence that any affection ſubſiſts between you.[65] With reſpect, however, to that particular deviation from truth, which is the object of our preſent conſideration; it muſt be acknowledged, that, noxious as flattery is, no man was ever infected by it, who did not love and encourage the offering. Accordingly, there is no turn of mind ſo liable to be tainted by this ſort of poiſon, as a diſpoſition to entertain too high conceit of one's own merit. I muſt confeſs at the ſame time, that conſcious virtue cannot be void of ſelf-eſteem; as well knowing her own worth,

worth, and how amiable her form appears. But the *pretenders* to virtue are much more numerous than the really virtuous: and it is of the former only that I am now ſpeaking. Men of that character are particularly delighted with adulation, as confirming their title, they imagine, to the merit they ſo vainly claim [e].

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[e] Plutarch has written an ingenious tract concerning the marks by which a flatterer may be diſtinguiſhed from a friend; and among many excellent precepts for that purpoſe, he particularly adviſes his reader to be upon his guard againſt the ſelf-deluſions of vanity. For there is no turn of mind that lays a man ſo open and expoſed to the inſidious practices of thoſe who mean to take advantages of his weakneſs, as to entertain an over-weening opinion of his own merit. But into ſnares of this kind, continues the admirable moraliſt, thoſe men can never fall, who, in obedience to the famous oracle, ſtudy "to know "themſelves." They will diſcover ſuch a mixture of frailties, follies and vices blended with their virtues, and will find, upon a review of their conduct, ſo many humiliating occaſions of ſelf-condemnation, as cannot fail of rendering them firm and inacceſſible againſt the dangerous approaches of adulation. It

It appears then, that genuine friendſhip cannot poſſibly exiſt, where one of the parties is unwilling to hear truth, and the other is equally indiſpoſed to ſpeak it. Friends of this kind are by no means uncommon in the world: and indeed, there would be neither propriety nor humour in the character of a paraſite as exhibited by our comic writers, were a vain-glorious ſoldier, for example, never to be met with in real life. When the braggart Captain in the play aſks Gnatho, "Did Thais re-"turn me many thanks, ſay you?" An artleſs man would have thought it ſufficient to anſwer "many;" but the cunning ſycophant replies, "*immenſe*, *innumerable*;" for a ſkilful flatterer per-

was from this juſt ſenſe of human imperfections that Alexander uſed to ſay, his animal appetites, together with his conſtantly ſtanding in need of being *repaired* by ſleep, were two circumſtances that ſufficiently ſecured him from the flattery of thoſe baſe courtiers, who endeavoured to perſuade him he was more than man.

fectly

fectly well knows, that a pleaſing circumſtance can never be too much exaggerated, in the opinion of the perſon upon whom he means to practiſe.

But although flattery chiefly operates on thoſe whoſe vanity encourages and invites the exerciſe of it; yet theſe are not the only ſort of men upon whom it may impoſe. There is a delicate and refined ſpecies of adulation, againſt which even better underſtandings may not improperly be cautioned. Groſs and open *obſequiouſneſs* can deceive none but fools: but there is a latent and more enſnaring manner of inſinuation, againſt which a man of ſenſe ought to be particularly on his guard. A flatterer of this inſidious and concealed kind, will frequently gain his point even by oppoſition: he will affect to maintain opinions which he does not hold, and diſpute in order to give you the credit of a victory. But nothing is more humiliating than to be thus egregiouſly

duped! It is neceſſary, therefore, to exert the utmoſt attention againſt falling into theſe covert ſnares, leſt we ſhould have reaſon to ſay, with one of the characters in the *Heireſs* [d], "Never was "old dotard on the ſtage ſo finely play-"ed upon, as I have been by you to-"day." This indeed would be to exhibit the mortifying perſonage of one of thoſe ridiculous old men in our comedies, who liſten with eaſy faith, to every ſpecious tale contrived to impoſe on their credulity [e].—But I have inſenſibly wandered from the principal object I had in view; and inſtead of proceeding to conſider friendſhip as it appears in *perfect* characters, (perfect, I mean, as far as is conſiſtent with the frailty of human nature) I am talking of it as it is ſeen in the vain and frivolous connections of the world. I

[d] A Comedy ſo called, written by Cæcilius. See Cato, p. 37. Note [d].

[e] See Cato, p. 54, Note [b].

return

return therefore to the original ſubject of our converſation, and which it is now time to draw towards a concluſion.

It is Virtue,—yes, let me repeat it again; it is Virtue alone that can give birth, ſtrength, and permanency to friendſhip. For Virtue is an uniform and ſteady principle, ever acting conſiſtently with itſelf. They whoſe ſouls are warmed by its generous flame, not only improve their common ardor by communication, but naturally kindle into that pure affection of the heart towards each other, which is diſtinguiſhed by the name of amity, and is wholly unmixed with every kind and degree of ſelfiſh conſiderations. But altho' genuine friendſhip is ſolely the offſpring of pure good-will, and no motive of advantage or utility has the leaſt ſhare in its production; yet many very beneficial conſequences reſult from it, how little ſoever thoſe conſequences

are

are the objects primarily in view. Of this diſintereſted nature was that affection which, in the earlier ſeaſon of my life, united me with thoſe venerable old men, Paulus, Cato, and Gallus, as alſo with Naſica, and Gracchus, the father-in-law of my late honoured and lamented friend.[66] That the principle I have aſſigned, is really the leading motive of true friendſhip, becomes ſtill more evident, when the connection is formed between men of equal years; as in that which ſubſiſted between Scipio, Furius, Rupilius, Mummius, and myſelf. Not that old men may not alſo find a generous ſatisfaction in living upon terms of diſintereſted intimacy with the young; as I have the happineſs to experience in the friendſhip I enjoy, not only with both of you and Q. Tubero, but even with Publius Rutilius and Aulus Virginius, who are much your juniors. One would wiſh indeed, to preſerve thoſe friends through all the ſucceſſive periods of our days, with whom we

we firſt ſet out together in this our journey through the world. But ſince man holds all his poſſeſſions by a very precarious and uncertain tenure, we ſhould endeavour, as our old friends drop off, to repair their loſs by new acquiſitions; leſt one ſhould be ſo unhappy as to ſtand in his old age, a ſolitary, unconnected individual, bereaved of every perſon whom he loves, and by whom he is beloved. For without a proper and particular object upon which to exerciſe the kind and benevolent affections, life is deſtitute of every enjoyment that can render it juſtly deſirable.

As to the loſs I have myſelf ſuſtained by the death of Scipio, who was ſo ſuddenly and ſo unexpectedly ſnatched from me; He is ſtill preſent in my mind's eye, and preſent he will ever remain. For it was his virtues that endeared him to my heart; and his virtues can never die. But not by me only,

who had the happineſs to enjoy a daily intercourſe with them, will they be held in perpetual remembrance; his name will be mentioned with honour to the lateſt poſterity: and no man will hereafter either meditate or execute any great and laudable atchievement, without propoſing to himſelf the conduct of Scipio, as his brighteſt and moſt animating exemplar. For my ſelf; among all the bleſſings for which I am indebted either to nature, or to fortune, there is not one upon which I ſet ſo high a value, as the friendſhip in which I lived with Scipio. In him I found a conſtant aſſociate in public affairs, a faithful counſellor in private life, and upon all occaſions the confidential friend from whom my ſoul received her trueſt and moſt ſolid ſatisfactions. I am not conſcious of ever having given him even the ſlighteſt cauſe of offence: and ſure I am, that I never heard a word proceed from his lips, which I had reaſon to be ſorry he had

had uttered. We not only lived under the ſame roof, and eat at the ſame frugal table,[67] but advanced together through the ſeveral military ſervices; and even in our travels, as well as during our receſs into the country, were conſtant and inſeparable companions: not to mention that we were equally animated with the ſame ardent love of ſcience, and jointly paſſed every hour of our privacy and leiſure, in one common purſuit of uſeful knowledge. If the power of recollecting theſe pleaſing circumſtances had become extinct in me at the ſame time that he expired, it would have been impoſſible that I could have ſupported the loſs of a man whom I ſo tenderly loved, and with whom I was ſo intimately united: but they are indelibly ſtamped upon my mind, and the oftener they recur to my thoughts, the more lively is the impreſſion they leave behind them. But were I totally deprived of theſe ſoothing reflections, my age, however, would afford me

great conſolation; as I cannot, by the common courſe of nature, long be ſeparated from him: and ſhort pains, how ſevere ſoever they may prove, may well be endured.

I have thus laid before you all that occurs to me on the ſubject, concerning which you deſired my ſentiments. Let me only again exhort you to be well perſuaded, that there can be no real friendſhip which is not founded upon virtuous principles, nor any acquiſition, *virtue* alone excepted, preferable to a true friend.[68]

REMARKS

REMARKS

ON

LÆLIUS:

OR, AN

ESSAY ON FRIENDSHIP.

JUVAT INTEGROS ACCEDERE FONTEIS,
ATQUE HAURIRE.

LUCRET.

REMARKS

ON

LÆLIUS, &c.

(1) THE ſurname of Quintus Mucius was, Scævola; and it is by the latter appellation he is diſtinguiſhed in the following conference. Having paſſed through the previous honours of the ſtate with the greateſt reputation, he was elected conſul in the year of R. 636. At the expiration of his pretorſhip, he ſucceeded to the government of the republic's territories in Aſia; where he exerciſed his autho-

rity with ſuch uncommon equity and moderation, that the inhabitants inſtituted an anniverſary feſtival to commemorate the happineſs they had enjoyed under his adminiſtration: an honour never conferred before on any Roman governor, and one of the nobleſt, as well as moſt ſingular memorials ever exhibited by a grateful people, in teſtimony of public virtue. But it was not only in the more exalted ſpheres of political life, that his ſuperior merit was conſpicuous: his mind was enlarged by ſcience, and adorned with the elegant arts; inſomuch that it was remarked by his contemporaries, that he was "the greateſt *orator* among the Civilians, and the greateſt *Civilian* among the orators" of his time. Thus diſtinguiſhed by his genius, his talents and his virtues, his houſe was frequented by the moſt illuſtrious citizens of Rome; who daily reſorted to him either for the benefit

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of his advice, or the advantage of his converſation.

He married Lælia, the eldeſt daughter of Lælius: a lady whoſe virtues and cultivated underſtanding, rendered her an honour to her ſex, and one of the principal ornaments of Rome. She poſſeſſed the elegancies of her native language in ſo eminent a degree, and delivered her ſentiments in converſation, with ſo remarkable a purity and correctneſs of expreſſion, that the firſt orators of the age were ambitious of being admitted into her company; eſteeming the graces of her natural and unſtudied elocution, as the moſt perfect model by which to form or improve their own. It is probable, that Cicero was in the number of thoſe who thus profited by the privilege of converſing with her: it is certain at leaſt, that in ſeveral of his rhetorical writings, he ſpeaks of her ſingular talents in this re-

ſpect with particular admiration and applauſe.

To the reſpected conſort of this accompliſhed matron, the venerable Quintus Mucius, full of years, of dignity, and of wiſdom, Cicero was introduced by his father at the age of ſeventeen: a period, at which the Roman youths were ſolemnly inveſted with the manly robe; and when they entered alſo upon a mode of inſtruction moſt happily calculated to form them, with the greateſt advantage, for the future parts they were deſigned to act upon the theatre of the world. There is no article, indeed, in which the wiſdom of the antients may more juſtly be held forth as an example to modern times, than the judicious method they purſued at this critical ſeaſon of every young man's life, to improve his mind and qualify him for public action.

It was cuſtomary with the Romans, as the finiſhing part of education, to recommend their ſons to the patronage and protection of ſome reſpectable perſonage, eminent for his public and private virtues. From that time the young man, not only attended his illuſtrious guide and exemplar, in the public diſcharge of his civil functions both in the ſenate and the aſſemblies of the people; but was permitted alſo to be preſent at the domeſtic conferences he occaſionally held with his ſelect friends, upon any article of intereſting, or uſeful diſcuſſion. Men of the firſt rank and diſtinction in the republic, gloried in being thus ſingled out as conductors of the riſing generation; and the greateſt characters that ever dignified the annals of any age or country, were proud of appearing in the ſtreets of Rome, accompanied by a train of theſe honourable diſciples. The lectures they delivered, were far other than the *verba otioſorum ſenum ad imperitos*

juvenes: they were the animating leſſons of patriotic ſages, riſing from the life, and impreſſed by the occaſion. A young perſon thus trained to uſeful knowledge and manly habits, amidſt the important and inſtructive ſcenes of public debate in the forum and the ſenate [a], was undoubtedly taking a much ſurer and ſhorter road towards rendering himſelf a beneficial and reſpectable citizen, than by wandering through the labyrinths of metaphyſical diſputation, or gleaning the follies and the faſhions of foreign courts.

Nor did the wiſer antients defer the great buſineſs of education, to the period above mentioned: they may in ſome degree be ſaid to have entered upon it, from the very moment of birth. Accordingly, they never truſted the new-

[a] *Magnus ex hoc uſus, multum conſtantiæ, plurimum judicii juvenibus ſtatim contingebat, in media* luce *ſtudentibus et inter ipſa* diſcrimina. *Auct. de caus. cor. eloq.* 33.

born

born infant to the care of unfeeling and mercenary nurſes; on the contrary, every woman, how high ſoever her ſtation might be, conſidered it as an indiſpenſable duty, to ſuckle her child at her own breaſt. But as demands of that tender kind, might happen to riſe too quick upon the virtuous mother, to admit of her giving proper attention to the elder branches of her little family; it was uſual, under thoſe circumſtances, to conſign the latter to the care of ſome female relation or friend: who not only formed their minds during that ſoft and ductile age, but ſuperintended even their playful hours, and guarded them againſt every *impropriety* both of language [b] and manners. And this province, as well as

[b] Thus Cicero obſerves, *magni intereſt quos quiſque* audiat *quotidie* domi; *quibuſcum loquatur a puero*; *quemadmodum patres*, *pædagogi*, matres *etiam* loquantur. *Legimus epiſtolas* Corneliæ, *matris Gracchorum: apparet* filios *non tam in gremio educatos*, *quam in* ſermone *matris*. *De clar. orator.*

that which was undertaken at a more advanced time of life, by the other ſex, was deemed an employment of ſo much credit and dignity, that ladies of the firſt rank and character did not diſdain to be engaged in it. Thus we find the names of thoſe venerable matrons, Cornelia, Aurelia, and Attia, the reſpective mothers of the Gracchi, Julius Cæſar, and Auguſtus, mentioned in the liſt of theſe honourable Governeſſes.

But, — *proh! curia inverſique mores!* —when the Romans had loſt the virtues together with the liberties of the antient republic; theſe generous cares, with every other rational and laudable attention, gave way to the faſhionable diſſipations of thoſe degenerate days. The little child was now conſigned to the care of ſome paltry *Greek* female, in conjunction with two or three other ignorant and vicious domeſtics, equally unqualified and indiſ-

poſed

poſed for the important office of tuition. From the idle tales and groſs manners of this low and illiberal tribe, the ſoft and ductile mind was ſuffered to receive its earlieſt, and deepeſt impreſſions. The parents themſelves indeed, far from training their young families in the principles of virtue and knowledge, were the firſt to lead them, by their own encouragement and example, into the moſt luxurious indulgencies and moſt unprincipled licentiouſneſs of manners. A paſſion for horſe-races, theatrical entertainments, and gladiatorial ſhews, the favourite *occupations* of that frivolous age, was ſown even in the very womb: and when once the ſeeds of theſe contemptible and unmanly pleaſures have early taken root in the heart, they neceſſarily overrun and deſtroy every affection of nobler growth. The author from whom the general purport of this melancholy repreſentation is taken, was a living and lamenting witneſs of the manners

manners he deſcribes [c]: and he complains, that all converſation was ſo univerſally infected with topics of this unworthy nature, that they were the conſtant ſubjects of diſcourſe, not only amongſt the youth in their ſeminaries, but even of their tutors themſelves. For it was not, he remarks, by ſtricter morals, or ſuperior genius, that this order of men gained diſciples; it was by the meaneſt compliances with their pupils, and the moſt ſervile adulation of their patrons.

[c] *Auctor Dialog. de cauſ. corrupt. eloquent.* To the ſame purpoſe likewiſe the admirable Quinctilian: *Utinam liberorum noſtrorum mores, non ipſi perderemus! Infantiam ſtatim deliciis ſolvimus.—Quid non adultus concupiſcet, qui in purpuris repit? Nondum prima verba exprimit, et jam coccum intelligit, jam conchylium expoſcit. Anté palatum eorum quam os inſtituimus.—verba ne Alexandrinis quidem permittenda deliciis, riſu et oſculo excipimus. Nec mirum; nos docuimus, ex nobis audierunt: noſtras amicas, noſtros concubinos vident. Omne convivium obſcœnis canticis ſtrepunt; pudenda dictu ſpectantur. Fit ex his conſuetudo, deinde natura. Diſcunt hæc miſeri antequam ſciant vitia eſſe.* Inſt. orat. I. chap. 2.

Whether

Whether this picture of degenerate Rome, bears a ſtriking reſemblance in all its features to thoſe of more modern days, is left to the reader's conſideration: and his own reflections cannot fail of reminding him, that by this total depravation of morals, and conſequent neglect of education, the fair fabric of civil liberty, which had been raiſed by the manly principles of their brave anceſtors, was gradually undermined, till it fell into total ruin. Thus the once virtuous Romans ſinking into a race of abandoned voluptuaries, became the worthy ſlaves of the moſt execrable ſucceſſion of tyrants that ever diſgraced human nature! *Pighii an.* III. *Cic. Brut.* 53. *de ſenect.* 9. *de orator.* I. 45.

(2) Quintus Mucius Scævola, diſtinguiſhed from the former by his office of *chief Pontiff*, was couſin german to the *augur*. Cicero has taken occaſion, in ſeveral parts of his writings, to celebrate the characters of both theſe truely great

men: and indeed, the advantages he received in the early part of his life by their guidance and example, were powerful demands upon his gratitude to tranſmit their names with honour to poſterity. But although he appears to have holden the virtues and abilities of each in peculiar eſtimation; he ſeems to have conſidered the *chief Pontiff* as meriting his ſuperior veneration. Accordingly, having occaſion to take notice in one of his orations, of the conſulate of Mucius Scævola[d] the Pontiff; he declares, that of all the men whom he remembered to have ſeen in the exerciſe of that ſupreme dignity, Scævola, the high prieſt, had given the moſt unqueſtionable proofs of conſummate prudence and wiſdom. At the expiration of his conſular office, he went governor into the ſame province over which his relation the augur, had formerly preſided: and, like him, he diſcharged

[d] He was elected conſul in the Y. of R. 653.

that

that important truſt with ſuch a firm and ſpotleſs integrity, that his example, (by a particular clauſe which the ſenate annually inſerted for that purpoſe in their decrees) was expreſsly recommended to his ſeveral ſucceſſors, as the beſt rule of their adminiſtrations. *Pigh. an.* II. 167. *Cic. Orat. pro Cornelio. Val. Max.* VIII. *c.* 15. N° 6.

(3) Publius Sulpicius was connected with Atticus, by a family-alliance; the brother of the former having married the couſin german of the latter. Pompeius was conſul, and Sulpicius tribune, in the year of R. 665, at which time the oppoſite factions of Sylla and Marius occaſioned great diſturbances in the republic. The quarrel alluded to in the text, aroſe from their having taken different ſides in thoſe civil commotions: and each loſt their lives in the ſanguinary contentions of thoſe deſtructive factions, before the expiration of their reſpective magiſ-

magiſtracies. *Cornel. Nep. in vit. At. 2. Pigh. an.* III. 230.

(4) There is ſtudied jingle in the original, which would be treated as an unpardonable puerility in a modern writer upon a grave ſubject: for thus the text runs; *ut tum ad* ſenem ſenex *de* ſenectute, *ſic hoc libro ad* amicum amiciſſimus *de* amicitia *ſcripſi.* Another inſtance of the ſame kind occurs in the preſent treatiſe: *Quis tam eſſet* ferreus *qui eam vitam* ferre *poſſet, cuique non* auferret, &c. In authors of a comic character, and ſubjects of a burleſque caſt, theſe little tricks may claim, perhaps ſome indulgence, as a ſpecies of low humour. Thus the "*non potuit paucis plura plane proloqui,*" being put into the mouth of a ſlave in Plautus, may poſſibly raiſe a ſmile, as a ſort of witticiſm perfectly well ſuited to the taſte and talents of the perſon by whom it is delivered. Some critics, however, have not ſcrupled to juſtify,

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in certain inſtances, theſe *literal* conceits even in the higher ſpecies of compoſition. Thus the χυντο χαμαι χολαδες of Homer, and the *neu patriæ validas in viſcera vertite vires* of Virgil, are pretended to be a deſigned cacophony; in the former inſtance, to expreſs the diſagreeable image of "*guſhing entrails ſmoaking on the ground,*" as Pope tranſlates it; and in the latter, the horrors of a civil war. It may be ſo: certain, nevertheleſs, it is, that theſe little tinkling conſonancies of letters and ſyllables, where the ſound can have no relation to the idea, occur much too frequently in the beſt claſſic authors not to render it evident, that they were conſidered as real and independent beauties [k]. *Clerici Hom. Ill.* IV. 526.

(5) Fannius married the youngeſt daughter of Lælius. He made a cam-

[k] See Rem. on Cicero's Letters, vol. I. p. 403. n. 1.

paign

paign or two in the early part of his life; and, in due time, was advanced to the dignity of Prætor: but he ſeems principally to have raiſed himſelf into notice, as a citizen of the republic of letters. Cicero mentions, with particular commendation, a hiſtory he compoſed: and it was ſo highly eſteemed by Brutus, that he deigned to employ ſome of his leiſure hours in abridging it. What the ſubject was, is uncertain; but it may be conjectured, from ſome obſcure intimations, that it related to the laſt Carthaginian war: during ſome part of which, Fannius ſerved under Scipio. It was written in Greek; a taſte for the Grecian language and literature having been introduced among the Romans, a few years before the times in which this hiſtorian flouriſhed.

Cato the cenſor, whoſe ſimplicity of manners revolted againſt exotic importations of every kind; endeavoured, upon all occaſions, to rally this prevailing

ing affectation out of countenance: and one of his ſarcaſms for that purpoſe has been handed down to us. Aulus Albinus, a man of conſular dignity, had publiſhed, it ſeems, a hiſtory in Greek; and in the preface ſolicited the reader's indulgence for any inaccuracy of expreſſion he might have committed, upon the plea of having compoſed his work in a foreign language. This drew from Cato the ſevere obſervation, that "the author was certainly a very plea-"ſant fellow, to prefer the *mortification* "of aſking pardon, to the *honour* of not "wanting one." But folly and affectation have ever proved an over-match for wit, in all ages; and Greece, in ſpite of Cato's well-directed ſatire, ſoon became to the Romans what France is to the Engliſh: a nation they affected to deſpiſe, yet condeſcended to imitate. It is well, however, that in one inſtance at leaſt, the parallel will not hold: for although ſome writers of a certain claſs, ſeem ambitious of larding their meagre compo-

ſitions with French terms, where the Engliſh ones are, at leaſt, as expreſſive; authors of a more reſpectable rank, have not yet been ſo unwiſe as to give up the cultivation of our own language, in order to diſtinguiſh themſelves in that of our neighbours.

This foppery infected their earlier poets, as well as hiſtorians; and even in a ſtill more inexcuſable manner: for, by a moſt abſurd mixture, they blended the two languages together; and interwove patches of Greek into the motley texture of their Latin verſes. This glaring incongruity did not eſcape the powerful ridicule of Horace, and he has expoſed it, with his uſual genteel and elegant turn of raillery, in that admirable ſatire in which he defends, againſt his cenſurers, the judgment he had paſſed in a former poem upon the ſtyle of Lucilius.

It may be alledged, perhaps, that Cicero has juſtified by his example this

mode of writing; as he not only ſprinkles every letter to Atticus with Greek phraſes, but drew up the memoirs of his own conſulate in that faſhionable language. But it ſhould be conſidered, that in the firſt inſtance, he was addreſſing in a private correſpondence, a moſt intimate friend; who having paſſed much of his time in Athens, ſpoke the language with ſuch ſingular facility and elegance, as to have acquired the ſurname by which he was diſtinguiſhed: and as to his memoirs, He drew them up in Greek, partly at the requeſt of ſome of his Athenian friends, but principally, it ſhould ſeem, in order to ſpread the fame of his celebrated adminiſtration with greater facility into Greece. Upon other occaſions, however, he was ſo cautious not to adulterate his native language with a *foreign* infuſion, that in his letters on public affairs, or to his common acquaintance, he ſcarcely ever employs a Greek expreſſion. It is obſervable

likewiſe, that in his philoſophic pieces, though derived from the treaſures of Greek erudition, and abounding with ſcientific terms, for which it was not eaſy to find equivalents in Latin; yet he rather choſe to employ a *circumlocution*, than diſgrace the powers of his own language by having recourſe to foreign aid [e]. *Cic. in Brut. paſſim. Pigh. ann.* III. *Plut. in vit. Grac. Hor. Sat.* I. 10. *Ad Att.* xii. 52.

(6) Lælius ſeems to have united in his character, whether conſidered in a moral, a civil, or a philoſophical view, all thoſe talents of the mind and qualities of the heart, that could juſtly recommend him to the general eſteem of his own times, and tranſmit his name with honour to poſterity. He was initiated in the doctrine of the Stoics, by Diogenes; one of thoſe three celebrated phi-

[e] *Dicam ſi potero* Latiné; *ſcis enim me* Græcé *loqui in* Latino ſermone *non ſolere.* Tuſc. diſp. I. 3.

loſophers whom the Athenians ſent as their ambaſſadors to Rome, upon an occaſion that has been already mentioned in the Remarks on Cato *f*. He was afterwards more fully inſtructed and confirmed in their principles, by Panætius, a moſt eminent and reſpectable profeſſor of the ſame ſect and nation: to whoſe writings Cicero acknowledges himſelf much indebted, in compoſing his admirable treatiſe upon *moral duties*. But although Lælius adopted the general ſyſtem of the Stoics, and formed his conduct by their nobleſt precepts; he was far from following them in thoſe paradoxical tenets which diſgraced their philoſophy, and inſtead of mending the heart, tended to render it callous to all the more generous feelings of human nature. On the contrary, a tenderneſs and benignity of diſpoſition, was in the number of thoſe ſocial virtues which particularly endeared this

f See Rem. on Cato, p. 191.

accompliſhed friend of Scipio, to his contemporaries. There was a politeneſs and affability in his addreſs, a ſprightlineſs and vivacity in his converſation, together with a conſtant equality in his temper, that wonderfully recommended him to all thoſe with whom he had any connection; inſomuch that what was obſerved of Socrates, was equally remarked in Lælius, that "he always appeared with a ſerene and placid countenance."

To the advantages of theſe captivating manners, were added the ornaments of a moſt cultivated and improved underſtanding: he was not only one of the fineſt gentlemen, but of the firſt orators and the moſt elegant ſcholars of the age. Lælius and Scipio indeed, united as they were by genius and talents no leſs than by eſteem and affection, equally conſpired in refining the taſte and encouraging the literature of their countrymen. They were

the

the patrons, after having been the diſciples, of Panætius and Polybiüs; and both the philoſopher and the hiſtorian had the honour and the happineſs of conſtantly ſharing with them thoſe hours, that were not devoted to the public ſervice. But the ſeverer Muſes did not entirely engroſs thoſe intervals of leiſure, which theſe illuſtrious friends occaſionally ſnatched from the great buſineſs of the ſtate: Terence and Lucilius were frequently admitted into theſe parties; where wit and wiſdom jointly conſpired, to render the converſations at once both lively and inſtructive.

With reſpect to his political conduct, Lælius appears to have been deſervedly placed high in the roll of thoſe admired citizens of antient Rome, whoſe memories have been moſt revered for a warm and diſintereſted love of their country. He gave a ſignal proof of his being truely actuated by that generous

ſpirit, in a very critical ſituation relating to the Agrarian law. Being elected Tribune *g*, he projected meaſures in order to revive and carry into execution, that juſt but neglected ordinance. But the firſt ſteps he took for that purpoſe, immediately ſpread an alarm among the moſt opulent and powerful members of the commonwealth; and they prepared to oppoſe his ſcheme, with all their intereſt, their influence, and their authority. Finding therefore, from the temper of the times, that it would be impoſſible for him to prevail, without producing greater evils than thoſe he meant to redreſs; he wiſely preferred the peace of the republic, to an act of ſtrict, indeed, but *unſeaſonable* juſtice: and with equal prudence and good policy relinquiſhed his deſign. The moderate and judicious conduct he held upon this occaſion, was ſo generally approved and applauded, that

g In the Y. of R. 602.

he

he was ever afterwards diſtinguiſhed by the title of the *ſage* Lælius. *Pater.* I. 13. *Plut. in vit. Grac.*

(7) Scipio Africanus, the ſecond of that name, was the ſon of Paulus Æmilius[b], but being adopted by the ſon of the firſt Scipio Africanus, he was diſtinguiſhed by the united appellations of the two families, and called Scipio Æmilianus. The title of *Africanus* was conferred upon him, in honour of the ſignal ſucceſs of his arms in the laſt Carthaginian war. The admiration in which his character was held by his country, and the glowing colours in which the antient hiſtorians have painted it to poſterity, exhibit him as one of the brighteſt ornaments of the illuſtrious age in which he flouriſhed. Cicero never mentions his name but with expreſſions of the warmeſt veneration; according to Plutarch, he

[b] See Rem. 9.

was

was the firſt of Romans in *virtue* as well as in authority [i]; and if Paterculus has not flattered his memory, he never uttered a ſentiment, or performed an action, that was not worthy of applauſe [k].

His claim to theſe exalted eulogies ſeems to have remained unimpeached, till a late very elegant and ingenious writer of the Roman ſtory, entered his proteſt againſt admitting it without great abatements. In Mr. Hooke's opinion, "Cicero's praiſes of Scipio, "are to be conſidered as the lan-"guage of one party zealot extolling "another of the ſame party [l]." Rollin, on the contrary, ſubſcribes without reſerve to thoſe encomiums that have been ſo unanimouſly conferred upon him by the antients [m]. To form a true judgment of Scipio's real cha-

[i] In vit. Æmil. [k] Paterc. I. 12.
[l] Rom. Hiſt. II. [m] Roll. H. Rom. IX. 74.

racter,

racter, it may not be ſafe, perhaps, to truſt entirely to the opinion of either of theſe juſtly celebrated moderns: as the *French* hiſtorian, by not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhing between antient and modern ideas of virtue, ſeems to have exalted his hero's qualities ſomewhat too high; and the *Engliſh* hiſtoriographer, by having conſidered them in a *comparative* view, appears to have equally depreſſed them too low. But in determining the merit of diſtinguiſhed characters among the antients; it is neither juſt, nor candid, to examine them by thoſe rules of moral conduct, which, if known, were at leaſt not admitted in the ſame purity and extent, to which they have ſince been refined and enlarged, by the clearer diſcoveries and ſtronger authority of divine revelation. If the general complexion of Scipio's actions derived their colour from thoſe lights, how comparatively imperfect ſoever they might have been, by which all who were deemed *virtuous* in the

times

times in which he lived, were profeſſedly guided; it would be unreaſonable to queſtion his title to thoſe praiſes with which his memory has been honoured through ſo many ſucceeding generations. Nevertheleſs, in bringing ſome few articles of his *public* conduct to the teſt of this equitable criterion, it will appear, perhaps, that he cannot entirely eſcape cenſure: and one or two inſtances of that kind will be pointed out, in the farther progreſs of theſe Remarks. In the mean while, taking his character in a general view, it may be aſſerted, it ſhould ſeem, with truth, that as a citizen, a ſoldier, and a ſtateſman; in the accompliſhments of his mind, and the virtues of his heart; he ſtands conſpicuous among the moſt eminent of thoſe celebrated perſonages who were held in the higheſt *honour* by antient Rome. In ſhort, what a great genius of a neighbouring nation ſaid of a much greater of our own, may with equal

equal truth, by the change of a ſingle word, be applied to Scipio; *ſes vertus etaient a lui, ſes fautes etaient a ſon ſiecle* [n].

(8) There is great diverſity of opinion among the antient writers, concerning the number of theſe famous ſages, and the particular qualifications by which they merited that flattering diſtinction. Some of the Greek authors who had inveſtigated this queſtion, raiſed them to ſeventeen, whilſt others, (and they ſeem to have formed a conſiderable majority) reduced them to Thales, Bias, Pittacus and Solon. This conſtellation of geniuſes are ſaid to have enlightened Greece at the ſame period of time, and about 640 years before the birth of Chriſt. In the opinion of Plutarch they acquired their particular deſignation, ſolely on account of thoſe political benefits which their ſuperior wiſdom and ſagacity had ſeverally

[n] Voltaire.

rendered

rendered to the reſpective ſtates in which they reſided. It is probable, however, that Thales derived this characteriſtic deſignation, from the great talents he diſcovered in natural and mathematical knowledge; as he was the firſt who introduced thoſe important ſciences into Greece. *Diog. Laert. in vit. Thal. Plut. in vit. Solon.*

(9) Paulus Æmilius was father of the ſecond Scipio Africanus whoſe death gave occaſion to the preſent conference. The manner in which he ſuſtained the domeſtic loſs alluded to in the text, proved the ſtrength and firmneſs of his mind by a trial the moſt ſevere and deciſive. For it was in the midſt of the moſt brilliant and ſeductive ſcenes of triumphant ambition:

Lorſque ſur cette mer on vogue à pleines voiles,
Qu'on croit avoir pour ſoy les vents et les etoiles,
Il eſt bien malaiſe de regler ſes deſirs:
Le plus ſage ſ' endort ſur la foy des zephirs.

It

It was while he was enjoying theſe flattering gales of proſperous fortune, ſo happily deſcribed by the French poet, that Paulus Æmilius was ſuddenly deprived of two ſons; *one* as he was preparing to make his triumphal entry into Rome on account of the glorious victory he had obtained over the Macedonian Prince; and the *other* immediately after [9]. But altho' he felt, with all the ſenſibility of a moſt affectionate parent, the full weight of this complicated calamity; he ſupported himſelf under its preſſure, with that well-poiſed equanimity of ſoul, which no change of fortune could ever deſtroy.

He remarkably preſerved indeed, this firm equality of mind, upon an occaſion which afforded a ſtill ſtronger proof perhaps, of his being invincibly actuated by a truely heroic ſpirit; in the firſt warm moments of a victory, the moſt glorious to the commander and the moſt important to

[9] See Rem. on Cato, p. 233.

the

the republic, that ever was obtained by Roman arms. When the unfortunate Perſeus ſurrendered himſelf priſoner of war, on the total overthrow of his army; Paulus Æmilius immediately retired to his tent, accompanied by ſome of his principal officers, together with his two eldeſt ſons, Fabius and Scipio; the latter of whom was then about ſeventeen years of age. The magnanimous conqueror appeared for ſome time wrapped in profound meditation, without uttering a ſingle word; when, at length, breaking through his ſilence, he particularly addreſſed himſelf to the two youths, in terms to the following effect: "You "have," ſaid the illuſtrious chief, "in "the ſcene which has juſt now paſſed "before you, an exemplary inſtance "of the mutability of human affairs. "Let it teach every one of you, but "particularly you my ſons, never to "ſuffer the exultation of victory, to be-"tray you into a cruel, or inſulting, "behaviour towards the vanquiſhed;

"always

" always bearing in mind, that the " good graces of fortune are ſo abſo- " lutely precarious, that the favours " ſhe confers in the morning may poſ- " ſibly be reverſed before night. Re- " member, therefore, my ſons, that He " alone is truely great, who in all the " viciſſitudes of human events, ſteadily " preſerves the equal balance of his " mind; and is neither *elated* with " proſperity, nor *depreſſed* by adverſity." *Exemplum inſigne cernitis, inquit, mutationis rerum humanarum! vobis hoc præcipué dico, Juvenes: Ideo ſecundis rebus nihil in quemquam ſuperbé ac violenter conſulere decet, nec præſenti credere fortunæ; quum quid veſper ferat incertum eſt. Is demum vir erit, cujus animum nec proſpera flatu ſuo efferet, nec adverſa infringet.* *Liv.* XLV. 8.

(10) Cicero does not ſeem to do ſtrict juſtice to the comparative characters of the two celebrated perſonages contraſted in the text, when he repre-

ſents them as ſtanding in direct oppoſition to each other: for Socrates diſtinguiſhed himſelf by *action* as well as ſpeculation; and Cato united the *philoſopher* with the ſtateſman. The only difference in the merit of theſe truely great men, appears to have been, that in the former, philoſophy was the *predominant*, and in the latter, the *ſubordinate* excellency. The truth is, Socrates diſtinguiſhed himſelf both as a ſoldier and a citizen: he ſerved in the army from the thirty-ſeventh to the fiftieth year of his age; and ſignalized not only his courage but his conduct, in ſeveral actions during the Peloponneſian war. He was afterwards elected into the Athenian ſenate.

Being joined in a commiſſion with ſome other members of that aſſembly, to inquire into the conduct of certain officers in a naval engagement with the Lacedæmonians; he gave a memorable inſtance, both of his ſpirit and his

probity. The parties accuſed, although they had obtained a ſignal victory over the enemy, were charged with having neglected to perform the funeral rites over the dead bodies of thoſe brave men, who were ſlain in the action. The proſecution appeared to be altogether malicious and groundleſs: but notwithſtanding the cleareſt proofs of their innocence, all the judges, except Socrates, influenced by private and perſonal motives, pronounced them guilty. The populace, whoſe paſſions had been artfully excited, became clamorous for having the ſentence carried into execution: and Socrates was threatened with a proſecution in his turn, if he continued to oppoſe the deciſion of his colleagues. But he reſolutely refuſed to withdraw his proteſt; no conſideration of his own ſafety, or intereſt, being ſufficient to prevail with him to join in condemning the innocent. This inflexible magiſtrate and moſt juſtly revered of philo-

ſophers, was ſixty-three years of age at the time of the preſent tranſaction: and although from this period, he does not ſeem to have engaged in any civil functions, yet he ſtill continued to ſuſtain the character of a zealous and patriotic citizen. For when all regular government was overturned by the uſurpation of the thirty tyrants, and they were exerciſing the moſt unbounded cruelties, in ſupport of their unjuſt dominion; Socrates, inſtead of cautiouſly providing for his own ſafety by retiring from Athens, continued, at the imminent hazard of his life, to exert all his credit and influence to excite and encourage his deſpairing fellow-citizens, to unite in proper meaſures for the recovery of their common liberties.

Thus it appears that the ſpeculative and the active virtues, met together in the characters of theſe eminently philoſophic patriots. Nor was it by any means

means a ſingular union: inſtances of the ſame kind were far from being uncommon among the moſt diſtinguiſhed perſonages, both of antient Greece and Italy. Epaminondas, Scipio, the laſt Brutus, the two Catos, Cicero, Marcus Antoninus, are names that will particularly occur upon this occaſion, to every reader in the leaſt acquainted with antient hiſtory. Nor are more modern ages wholly deſtitute of ſimilar examples. To look no farther than our *own* country; Sir Thomas More, Lord Bacon, Sir Walter Raleigh, Sir William Temple, and a few others, were in their reſpective generations, ſhining ornaments both of the active and the contemplative world. *Sen. Ep.* 104. *de Tranq.* c. 3. *Charpentier vie de Socrat,* p. 127.

(11) Although Scipio was but ſeventeen years of age, when he made the glorious campaign under his father, mentioned in a foregoing remark;

yet he gave ſuch uncommon proofs of military ſkill and valour, that in the judgment of the whole army, he was thought qualified, even at that early period of his life, to act as commander in chief. *Plut. in vit. Æmil.*

(12) Scipio was advanced to his firſt conſulate, in the thirty-ſeventh year of his age; five years ſooner than he was legally capable of being elected into that office. The republic was at that time engaged in the third Punic war; in the commencement of which, having ſerved as military tribune with great reputation, he returned to Rome in order to preſent himſelf as a candidate for the Ædileſhip. The war not having been hitherto carried on with the ſucceſs there was reaſon to expect; and the people being diſſatisfied with the conduct of their generals, they looked up to Scipio as moſt capable of retrieving the honour of their arms. Accordingly, inſtead of creating him Ædile,

Ædile, they unanimouſly conferred on him the conſular dignity: and he was immediately appointed to take the command of the troops before Carthage. The event, it is well known, ſufficiently juſtified the opinion his fellow-citizens had entertained of his ſuperior conduct and abilities; and this great captain happily terminated the war, by a total extinction of the Carthaginian commonwealth.

Scipio's ſecond conſulate, was in the year of R. 619. At this time, the republic was engaged in hoſtilities with the brave Numantines: a people of Spain, who with forces much inferior to thoſe of the enemy, defended the liberties of their country with ſuch uncommon ſpirit and vigour, as to alarm Rome for the event. At length, however, after a moſt obſtinate and gallant reſiſtance, it was their misfortune to be totally overpowered by Scipio: and he laid the walls of Numantia, as he

had thoſe of Carthage, level with the ground.

Nothing ſeems to have been wanting to complete the glory of Scipio's triumphant arms, in each of the foregoing inſtances, but to have proved himſelf the hero and the conqueror in a better cauſe: for both the reſpective wars were confeſſedly entered into by the republic, in defiance of every principle of national juſtice and honour. With reſpect to the *former*; Paterculus acknowledges it was declared againſt the Carthaginians, not becauſe they had given any *juſt* cauſe for hoſtilities, but ſolely from jealouſy of a rival ſtate *p*. And as to the *latter*; Florus does not ſcruple to confeſs, there was not even a colourable pretence to render it juſtifiable *q*. One might naturally expect, that the hiſtorians who thus ſaw and condemned the iniquity of

p Paterc. I. 12. *q* Flor. II. 13.

the

the national councils, muſt equally have perceived and cenſured the unworthy conduct of Scipio, in not refuſing to be the executor of ſuch impious commiſſions. But not the ſlighteſt blame is even hinted, by either of thoſe authors: on the contrary, he is held forth by both, as a finiſhed and perfect model of true heroiſm; and Paterculus, in particular, as has been mentioned in a former remark, repreſents his whole life as one uninterrupted ſeries of virtuous and praiſe-worthy actions. But what increaſes the wonder is, that in Cicero's political dialogues concerning government, written after the concluſion of both theſe wars; Scipio, as appears from a fragment ſtill exiſting, is introduced as maintaining, that "it is ſo far from being a true "maxim, that the policy of ſtates can-"not be carried on without injury to "others; that, on the contrary, nothing "is more certainly true, than that it "cannot be properly adminiſtered "without

" without a conſtant and inviolable " obſervance of the ſtricteſt *juſtice*[r]." It is remarkable, likewiſe, that Florus, notwithſtanding his expreſs acknowledgment, that the Numantines had given the Roman ſtate no real cauſe of complaint, yet in cloſing his ſummary relation of this war, does not ſcruple to include it within that period in which he deſcribes the national character of the Romans, as meriting the higheſt encomiums: *Hactenus*, ſays the hiſtorian, *Populus Romanus, pulcher, egregius, pius*, ſanctus, *atque magnificus*. It ſhould ſeem therefore, in the judgment of theſe writers, that neither the ſtate which commences an unjuſt war, nor the chief who conducts it, derogate from the general *ſanctity* of their reſpective characters. Nevertheleſs, all their moraliſts, and Cicero in particular,

[r] *Non modó* falſum *eſſe illud*, ſine injuria *non poſſe*, *ſed hoc veriſſimum*, *ſine* ſumma juſtitia *Rempublicam regi non poſſe*.

lay

lay down the moſt equitable maxims, when they are ſtating the motives upon which a war may juſtly be declared. This, it is true, was the philoſophic foundation upon which their idea of public juſtice was erected in theory: but their practice was governed by motives of a far different nature. An ardent love of their country was a paſſion too heroic, they ſeem to have thought, to be reſtrained within the more confined limits of ſpeculative morality; and *thoſe* were deemed the trueſt *patriots*, who moſt contributed to gratify the popular ambition of univerſal ſovereignty. But it is not only in the annals of Rome, that the public councils with reſpect to foreign ſtates, are at variance with their *profeſſed* principles. There is ſcarcely a page of antient or modern hiſtory relating to the ſubject of national contentions, but will furniſh proofs of theſe glaring inconſiſtencies. The melancholy truth is, that the *law of nations*, although

founded

founded upon the cleareſt principles of natural obligation, and univerſally acknowledged in *theory* by every civilized ſtate, ſeems to be equally diſregarded by all of them in practice. Intereſt, or ambition, too generally appears to be the governing motive of all public communities, in reſpect of their conduct towards each other: and nothing, perhaps, can be more true than the obſervation of an antient philoſopher, that "if every people were "to reſtore the territories they had un-"juſtly uſurped, they would each of "them be reduced to their original "huts." The Roman boundaries, at leaſt, would have been wonderfully contracted; as no conſideration of a moral kind, ſeems ever to have reſtrained their inſatiable thirſt of dominion. *Regere imperio Populos,* was the invariable object of their politics; and the meaſures by which they purſued it, were perfectly agreeable to what the poet adds; "*parcere* ſubjectis *et debellare*

lare ſuperbos." That their empire was deſtined to everlaſting duration, and pre-ordained to be extended over the whole globe; was a perſuaſion coeval with the earlieſt period of their conſtitution; inculcated by the eſtabliſhment of a religious anniverſary[s]; and confirmed by pretended prophecies[t]. Every ſtate, therefore, that oppoſed the licentious progreſs of their unbounded ambition, was conſidered as rebels to the decrees of Heaven; and had nothing to expect, but the *pious* ſeverity of their exterminating vengeance. That this is no unfair repreſentation of the principle upon which Rome enlarged her dominion, appears, among other notorious proofs, by that relentleſs havoc which was made at the two

[s] Thus Ovid:

Gentibus eſt aliis tellus data limite certo;
Romanæ ſpatium eſt urbis et orbis idem.

Faſt. II. 683. ſee alſo Faſt. III. 345. et ſeqq.

[t] Æn. VI. 781. et ſeqq.

famous ſieges which gave occaſion to the preſent remark. It is impoſſible, indeed, to reflect on the cruelties that were exerciſed in the deſtruction of thoſe unhappy cities, eſpecially of Numantia, without being ſtruck with peculiar indignation and horror. The unexampled bravery of the latter, ought to have recommended them to the eſteem of a generous enemy; but, on the contrary, it rendered them the objects of a moſt baſe reſentment, indulged without meaſure and without mercy. Appian indeed affirms, that Scipio, by totally deſtroying Numantia, acted beyond his *orders*; but as this aſſertion ſtands unſupported by any of the hiſtorians who lived nearer to the times of the tranſaction; candour will be inclined to look upon it, as a groundleſs charge; and conſider Scipio as no otherwiſe to be perſonally condemned, than as executing the ſanguinary inſtructions of his Roman maſters. *Appian in Iber.* p. 311. *Ed. Toll.*

(13) If

(13) If ſome parts of Scipio's public tranſactions, ſeem by no means ſtrictly unexceptionable; his private conduct appears, not only free from reproach, but worthy of all commendation. He paſſed the early ſeaſon of his youth, untainted by thoſe vices to which that period is particularly expoſed: and he preſerved his more advanced years from that epidemical *profuſion* and *avarice*, which at this time ſo univerſally prevailed in Rome, that a contemporary hiſtorian informs us, acts of generoſity and beneficence, were looked upon as prodigies of the moſt extraordinary kind. The following inſtances therefore, alluded to in the text, of Scipio's liberal and munificent ſpirit, cannot but render his character the more juſtly an object of eſteem and admiration.

Having, as heir to Æmilia (the wife of the firſt Africanus, and conſequently

quently Scipio's mother by adoption) become poſſeſſed of all her effects to a conſiderable value, he preſented the whole to his own mother Papiria; who being divorced by Paulus Æmilius, was in circumſtances ill ſuited to her rank and character. Part of the marriage portion likewiſe of his two ſiſters by adoption, amounting in the whole to between ſeven and eight thouſand pounds ſterling, having been unpaid in the life-time of their mother; ſhe charged the ſame upon her eſtate. By the Roman law, the heir was allowed to clear off incumbrances of this nature, by three annual inſtalments: but Scipio ſcorned to avail himſelf of the indulgence; and immediately advanced to the huſbands of the young ladies, their intire fortunes. A few years afterwards, his father Paulus Æmilius died, and left his eſtate to be equally divided between his two ſons, Fabius and Scipio. But the latter, in purſuance

purſuance of the ſame enlarged principles which he had exerted towards his family upon the former occaſion, relinquiſhed to his brother his own moiety, which was valued at about eleven thouſand ſix hundred and twenty-five pounds of our money; as upon the death of his mother, he divided all her effects among his ſiſters, although they were not legally entitled to any part.

Theſe extraordinary inſtances of Scipio's munificence, are recorded by his friend and inſtructor Polybius; who appeals for the truth of them, to living witneſſes well acquainted with Scipio's actions, and who would not fail, he obſerves, to convict him publicly of falſehood, if he dared to advance as facts what it was in their power ſo eaſily to diſprove. *Polyb. excerp. Vales.*

(14) Scipio's obſequies were honoured by the nobleſt and moſt unqueſtion-

able of all panegyrics; for it was delivered from the mouth of a man who had always been in the number of his political enemies, and was himſelf eſteemed one of the principal ornaments of the times: *Go*, ſaid Mebellus, addreſſing himſelf to his ſons, *Go, and attend the funeral of* Scipio; *for never will you follow the remains of a greater man* [t]*!*

(15) The revival of the Agrarian law by the Gracchi (a particular account of which will be given in a ſubſequent note) being warmly and ſtrenuouſly oppoſed by a numerous and powerful party, occaſioned great commotions in the republic. Scipio ſupported the oppoſition with diſtinguiſhed zeal; particularly in an animated debate in the ſenate with Fulvius Flaccus, one of the perſons appointed to carry the

[t] *Ite, filii, celebrate exequias: nunquam civis majoris funus videbitis.* Plin. H. N. VII. 44.

law

law into execution. The next morning, Scipio was found dead in his bed: and there were certain circumſtances attending this cataſtrophe which raiſed a ſuſpicion, that he had been aſſaſſinated by ſome of the partizans of the Gracchi.

As the antient hiſtorians are much divided concerning the truth of this charge; it is no wonder that two very judicious modern compilers of the Roman ſtory, ſhould equally be found at variance. Monſ. Rollin thinks there can be no doubt, that it was the work of the party in the intereſt of the Gracchi. Mr. Hooke, on the contrary, is perſuaded, "from the variety "of reports about the violence done to "Scipio, that prejudice and party ſpirit "invented the whole, and that he truely died a natural death; which, according to Paterculus," he ſays, "was "the opinion of moſt authors." It ſhould be obſerved however, that the

Roman hiſtorian acknowledges, there appeared upon the corpſe marks of his having been ſtrangled; and that, contrary to the uſual cuſtom, he was carried to his funeral with his face *covered*. To theſe ſuſpicious circumſtances may be added, that there was a deſign in agitation of creating Scipio Dictator; which, by inveſting him with abſolute power, as it would have totally defeated the hopes of the partizans of the Gracchi, it was much their intereſt to prevent. It ſhould be farther remarked likewiſe, that although Cicero in the preſent paſſage declares no opinion of his own; yet in another part of his writings, he expreſsly charges ſome of Scipio's relations with being perpetrators of his murder. When the weight therefore of theſe united conſiderations are thrown into the ſcale, it ſeems rather to incline on that ſide which the French hiſtorian has taken in this queſtion. *Pigh. Annal.* III. 23. *Somn. Scip. No.* 2. *Rollin, H. R.* IX. 65.

65. *Hooke's R. H.* II. 546. *Paterc.* II. 64.

(16) Cicero alludes to an article in the vulgar creed, concerning the general receptacle of departed ſpirits. According to the popular belief, the ſoul at the inſtant of death, was conducted to the infernal regions, ſituated in the loweſt depth of this terreſtrial globe; where, after having undergone a previous examination by the appointed judges, ſhe was dealt with according to the part ſhe had acted during her reſidence in the body. This domain of the infernal deities, was repreſented as being divided into three diſtinct manſions; the *one* appropriated to thoſe malignant ſpirits, whoſe moral depravation being utterly incurable, were conſigned to everlaſting puniſhment; the *other*, prepared for the reception of leſs criminal tranſgreſſors, whoſe moral defilements being of ſuch a na-

ture as to admit of purification, were ſentenced to undergo certain temporary inflictions in a purgatorial ſtate. *Theſe*, after being thoroughly cleanſed from the ſpots and ſtains they had contracted in the preſent life, paſſed into the *third* diviſion, and reſided in the *læta arva*, as the poet ſtyles them, the happy regions of *Elyſium*. Some few, however, among mankind, were deemed ſo perfectly immaculate, and ſo eminently beneficial to their reſpective generations, in the double capacity of ſtateſmen and philoſophers, as to ſtand in no need of a previous purification, but to be qualified immediately at their departure out of the body, to enter the celeſtial manſions of perfect and permanent beatitude. In this latter claſs, Lælius intimates that his illuſtrious friend might juſtly be numbered [u].

[u] Vid. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. II. 17.

But

But although, in order to impreſs this important doctrine of future rewards and puniſhments, with the greater force and energy on the minds of the people; legiſlators and philoſophers held forth to their groſſer imaginations, the *fictitious* ſcenery of *Tartarus* and *Elyſium*; yet the latter were always careful in their diſcourſes calculated for more improved underſtandings, to diſclaim all pretenſions of being able to diſcover the *preciſe mode*, by which theſe equitable retributions would hereafter be made. It was abundantly ſufficient, they juſtly thought, for every moral purpoſe, to be aſſured, that "glorious was the prize "reſerved for victorious virtue, and "firmly grounded her animating hopes "of one day receiving it [w]." This was the expreſs declaration of Socrates, in the converſation he held with his friends

w Καλον γαρ το αθλον, και η ελπις μεγαλη. *Phæd. Platon.* p. 304. *Ed. Forſt.*

on the morning of his execution. Agreeably to theſe ſentiments, Plutarch compares the moral ſtate of man in the preſent world, to that of an athletic combatant; whoſe reward, or puniſhment, will hereafter be proportioned to his merit, or demerit, in the conflict. "But by what means," continues this very ſenſible and judicious author, "the ſoul in another life "ſhall be affected with happineſs or "miſery, is totally concealed from hu-"man penetration." It ſeems highly probable, that it was likewiſe in conformity with this way of thinking in reſpect to the popular creed, that the Roman poet, after having conducted his hero through the ſeveral manſions of departed ſpirits, leads him back again into theſe upper regions through the portal——*quâ*—

—*falſa ad cælum mittunt inſomnia manes*;

and by no means as intending to intimate, that the belief of a general ſtate

of retribution in another life, was equally vain and viſionary. *Plut. de iis qui tard. de Numin. Cor.*

(17) The doctrine of Epicurus appears to have been firſt introduced to the *general* acquaintance of the Romans, about this period*: and it is probable that Amafinius, an author occaſionally mentioned by Cicero in different parts of his works, was one of thoſe philoſophers to whom he alludes in the text; he ſeems, at leaſt, to have been the earlieſt Latin writer who publiſhed a treatiſe on the Epicurean ſyſtem†. Geniuſes of this *benevolent* kind have ariſen, indeed, in every age; who ſeem to think they cannot perform a greater ſervice in their generation, than to deliver the minds of men from thoſe uneaſy apprehenſions concerning their deſtination in a future pe-

* See Rem. (n Cat.), p. 217. n. 49.

† Vid. Tuſc. Diſp. IV. 3.

riod

riod of exiſtence which will occaſionally intrude, in ſpite of every *artificial* bar to oppoſe their entrance. But whatever the motive may be that kindles the zeal of theſe Epicurean *miſſionaries*, it is but too *evident* that they do not preach in vain. It is equally certain, that the converts they made in Rome, increaſed with the greateſt rapidity. And no wonder: for the doctrine they laboured to propagate, was moſt conveniently adapted to the morals of an age, when the nobler hopes and principles which actuated their illuſtrious forefathers, were daily growing more and more out of faſhion. Happily, however, there were not wanting men of ſuperior abilities and more enlightened underſtandings, to oppoſe its progreſs: and among the moral arguments they employed for that intereſting purpoſe, thoſe which Cicero has put into the mouth of Lælius, are by no means of inconſiderable weight. For the inſtituting of certain

certain rites to the memory of departed friends and relations, being a cuſtom that ſeems to have prevailed throughout all ages and nations of the world, ſavage no leſs than civilized; the nature of theſe ſepulchral ceremonies neceſſarily imply, a *general* perſuaſion that the deceaſed were *perſonally* concerned in them: and of this kind, in particular, were thoſe anniverſaries among the Romans termed *feralia*, ſo agreeably deſcribed in Ovid's poetical calendar [z]. If to this preſumptive proof

[z] *Eſt honor et tumulis: animas placate paternas,*
Parvaſque in extructas munera ferte pyras.
Parva petunt Manes: pietas pro divite grata eſt
Munere; non avidos Styx habet ima Deos, &c.
Ovid. Faſt. II. 533.

Tombs have their honours too: our parents crave
Some ſlender preſent to adorn their grave.
Slender the preſent which the ghoſts we owe;
Theſe powers obſerve not what we give, but how.
Kennet's Tranſl. R. A. p. 93.

be

be joined the additional conſideration inſiſted upon in the text, ariſing from the ſame belief having been firmly entertained by the beſt and moſt ſagacious reaſoners that have ever dignified the human underſtanding; the argument riſes in its ſtrength and preſſes with increaſing force. For what other cauſe can be aſſigned for the belief of the ſoul's exiſtence after death, being thus the common faith not only of all nations, but of the wiſeſt philoſophers, in every age of the world; but that it is a tenet perfectly agreeable to the moſt improved *reaſon*, as well as to the general *expectation*, of mankind? *vid. Senec. Ep.* 117.

(18) Nothing remains of this treatiſe except a few fragments, the moſt conſiderable part of which is the concluding viſion mentioned in the text. From theſe remains, however, it appears to have been, as the learned and ingenious writer of Cicero's life obſerves, "one

" one of his capital pieces, where all " the important queſtions of politics " and morality were diſcuſſed, with " the greateſt elegance and accuracy." This valuable performance was brought from Italy into England about the year 1420, by a monk of Canterbury; where, to the irreparable loſs of the literary world, it was, among other manuſcripts, deſtroyed by fire. *Mid. L. of* Cicero, II. p. 94. *Wharton's Hiſt. of ant. Poet. Diſſert.* II. *in not.*

(19) The ſtoical *ſage* to which Cicero alludes, being repreſented by the philoſophers of that ſect, as a character of ſpotleſs virtue, unſullied by the leaſt ſpeck or taint of moral depravation; has given occaſion for much ridicule to be thrown on the diſciples of Zeno, both by antient and modern writers: but ſurely without reaſon. It is true, indeed, that the real exiſtence of ſuch perfection is abſolutely incompatible with the preſent ſtate of human nature;

nature; nevertheleſs, the founder of this celebrated ſchool ſeems to have acted wiſely in holding it up to his followers, as their conſtant and invariable model: for although it cannot be *equalled*, it may be *imitated*. Indeed, what the Roman critic obſerves with reſpect to eloquence and the fine arts, holds equally true in morals, and every other laudable object of human endeavours; *evenit non nunquam ut aliquid grande inveniat, qui ſemper quærit quod nimium eſt*[a]. No man, perhaps, ever advanced as far as his powers would lead him, who was not warmed in his purſuit by an idea of perfection, far beyond the poſſibility of his actual attainment. Accordingly Zeno's noble diſciple, well juſtifies his great maſter againſt the pretended abſurdity charged upon this article of his doctrine, when he aſks, *Quid mirum, ſi non aſcendunt in altum, ardua aggreſſi? ſed Viros*

[a] *Quinct. Inſt.* II. 12.

ſuſpice,

ſuſpice, etiamſi decidunt, magna conantes. Generoſa res eſt,—conari alta, tentare et mente majora concipere, quam quæ etiam ingenti animo adornatis effici poſſint [b]. Experience had abundantly ſupported the validity of Seneca's reaſoning: for it is certain, that the moſt virtuous characters in the moſt virtuous times of the Roman annals, were formed in the ſchools, and acted upon the principles, of the Athenian porch. The expreſſion, therefore, of the preſident Monteſquieu in his famous *Eſprit des Loix*, ſeems by no means too ſtrong, when he declares, *ſi je pouvois un moment ceſſir de penſer que je ſuis chrêtien, je ne pourrois m'empechir de mettre le deſtruction de la ſecte de Zenon, au nombre des malheurs du genre humain* [c]. Happily, however, for mankind, that *deſtruction* has been more than *repaired*, by the

[b] *Sen. de Vit. Beat.* c. 20.

[c] *L'Eſprit des Loix, tom.* II. p. 161.

Chriſtian revelation: which not only exhorts to virtue, upon motives far more ſuitable to the moral conſtitution and circumſtances of human nature, but ſupplies, in the perſon of its ſacred author, that *real* and animating example of *conſummate* perfection, which the diſciples of Zeno could only form to themſelves in *imagination*.

(20) Montagne aſſigns a whimſical reaſon why connections ariſing from conſanguinity, cannot be productive of *genuine* friendſhip: *á meſure*, ſays he, *que ce ſont amitiez que la loy et l'obligation naturelle nous commande, il y a d'autant moins de noſtre choix et liberté voluntaire. Et noſtre liberté voluntaire, n'a point de production qui ſoit plus proprement ſienne, que celle de l'affection et amitié.* But this lively writer is giving a reaſon for a fact, which does not exiſt: for the relation *itſelf* is not *friendſhip*, nor in any reſpect *neceſſarily*

ly implied by it. When a particular attachment, therefore, ſubſiſts between two perſons of the ſame blood; their *moral* union is, undoubtedly, as much the reſult of a *free*, unconſtrained, choice of the will, as if there had been no previous *natural* connection between them. A learned prelate of the laſt century has ſtated this matter with great preciſion, and placed it in its true light: "He who loves "me," ſays Biſhop Taylor, "*only* be- "cauſe I am his brother, loves me for "that which is no worthineſs: and I "muſt love him for as much as that "comes to, and for as little reaſon. "—But whether *choice*, and union "of ſouls, and worthineſs of man- "ners, and greatneſs of underſtanding, "and uſefulneſs of converſation, and "the benefits of counſel, and all thoſe "endearments which make our lives "pleaſant and our perſons dear, are "not better and greater reaſons of "*love*, than to be born of the ſame

" fleſh; I think, among wiſe perſons, " needs no great inquiry [d]."

It muſt be acknowledged, however, that the reflections of an antient writer, upon this point, are equally well founded; who has enumerated ſuch a variety of conciliating circumſtances ariſing from this relationſhip, peculiarly favourable to the growth of amity, that there may be ſome reaſon, perhaps, for ſurprize, that it ſhould but ſeldom take root in a ſoil ſo happily prepared for its production. " What an abundant " ſource of endearing conſiderations " (obſerves the ſenſible author alluded " to) does the reflection afford, to have " occupied, even before one came into " the world, the ſame common man- " ſion; paſſed the ſtate of infancy in " the ſame cradle; looked up for pro- " tection to the ſame parents; to have " been equally the object of the ſame

[d] *Taylor's offices and meaſures of friendſhip*, p. 32.

" tender

" tender vows, and equally heir to " the ſame common honour reflected " from their virtues [e]."

Where theſe early and endearing *participations* produce the effect, which might naturally be expected from them, friendſhip, certainly, appears in her moſt amiable form: and let it be remembered, for the honour of the muſes, that this pleaſing union was never more remarkably exhibited than in the perſons of two ingenious poets, the one a Roman, and the other a Briton, With what affecting tenderneſs does Catullus lament the death of a beloved brother!

- - - - O! miſero Frater adempte mihi!
Tu mea, tu moriens fregiſti commoda frater:

[e] *Quam copioſæ ſuavitatis illa recordatio eſt! in eodem domicilio antequam naſcerer habitavi; in iiſdem incunabulis infantiæ tempora peregi; eoſdem appellavi parentes; eadem pro me vota excubuerunt; parem ex majorum imaginibus gloriam traxi!* Val. Max. V. c. 5.

Tecum una tota eſt noſtra ſepulta domus.
Omnia tecum una perierunt gaudia noſtra,
Quæ tuus in vita dulcis alebat amor.
Cujus ego interitu tota de mente fugavi
Hæc ſtudia, atque omnes delicias animi.—

Alloquar? audiero nunquam tua verba loquentem!
Nunquam ego te vita, Frater amabilior,
Adſpiciam poſthac! at certe ſemper amabo.

Ah, me! what ſorrows did my heart invade,
When Thou wert wrap'd in death's eternal ſhade!
With thee the glory of our race expir'd,
Life's deareſt joys, and all my ſoul admir'd.
Her wonted aid the muſe attempts in vain;
Tuneleſs her lyre, and impotent her ſtrain!

Far more than life to my fond boſom dear,
Ne'er ſhall thy converſe charm my liſt'ning ear!
Ne'er ſhall my arms enfold thee to my breaſt!
Yet *there*, ſtill faithful to its earlieſt gueſt,
There thy lov'd form ſhall ever dwell impreſt.

And in the following tribute of cordial affection addreſſed by the late Dr. Goldſmith to his brother, one ſcarcely knows which to admire moſt, the ſentiments of the man, or the numbers of the poet:

Remote,

Remote, unfriended, melancholy, ſlow,
Or by the lazy Scheld, or wandering Po,
Or onward where the rude Carinthian boor
Againſt the houſeleſs ſtranger ſhuts the door,
Or where Campania's plain forſaken lies,
A weary waſte expanding to the ſkies;
Where'er I roam, whatever realms I ſee,
My heart, untravelled, fondly turns to thee:
Still to my Brother turns with ceaſeleſs pain,
And drags, at each remove, a lengthen'd chain.
Eternal bleſſings crown my earlieſt friend,
And round his dwelling guardian ſaints attend!

Goldſmith's Traveller.

(21) Although Cicero ſeems to admit, that *perfect* friendſhip does not abſolutely exclude more than two perſons; yet both experience and the nature of the connection, appear rather to confine it to a ſtrict duality. We do not find the name of a third perſon mentioned, in the hiſtory of thoſe celebrated amities which were contracted between Theſeus and Perithous, Jonathan and David, Achilles and Patroclus, Niſus and Euryalus, Pylades

and Oreſtes, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, &c. Indeed, the variety and importance of thoſe offices which an alliance of this generous kind indiſpenſably demands, together with the ardency of affection and zeal requiſite to ſupport the exertion of them, ſeem neceſſarily to confine the ſphere of its activity within the ſhorteſt poſſible limits. For "ſince our faculties," as an ingenious writer obſerves [b], "are "of *finite* energy, it is impoſſible our "love can be very intenſe when di-"vided: the rays muſt be *contracted* "to make them *burn*."

(22) The preciſe uniformity of opinions, both civil and religious, required in *terms* at leaſt, by this propoſition, as neceſſary to conciliate true friendſhip, ſeems to have been the unanimous doctrine of all the antient writers upon this ſubject: and Cicero, in laying it down, does but literally tranſcribe

[b] Norris.

from

from Theophraſtus, as appears by a fragment of his treatiſe preſerved in Aulus Gellius *f*.

If the maxim were to be taken, however, in its largeſt ſenſe, and without any *reſtriction*; one might juſtly be aſtoniſhed that the Roman philoſopher ſhould, in this inſtance at leaſt, have implicitly followed the Grecian as his guide: for if the principle were ſtrictly true, the celebrated connection between himſelf and Atticus, muſt have been altogether fictitious and inſincere. It is well known, that no two men could differ more widely in their ſpeculative tenets, than theſe illuſtrious friends; the one embracing the opinions of the academic ſect, and the other being a profeſſed Epicurean. There is reaſon to believe too, that their political notions were not leſs at variance; at leaſt if we may fairly infer their reſpective ſentiments upon

Noct. Att. I. 3.

that article, from the very different conduct they held in thoſe civil commotions, which terminated in the diſſolution of the republic. In order therefore to reconcile Cicero both to himſelf and to truth, it is neceſſary to take the words of this paſſage as importing nothing more, than a *general* agreement of opinion "with reſpect to "the *fundamental* principles of the "civil and religious conſtitution of "their country."—It is in this ſenſe that the Civilians underſtand a ſimilar expreſſion of Ulpian, when he repreſents the qualification of a lawyer, to conſiſt in a knowledge *omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum*; meaning only the civil and eccleſiaſtical laws of the empire.

If indeed it were true, that there could be no *real* union of hearts without an *exact* conformity of opinions; friendſhip would be a connection incompatible

compatible with the nature of the human mind. Never were two underſtandings, perhaps, ſo commenſurate with each other, as to poſſeſs preciſely the ſame equal capacity. The human intellect, like the human countenance, is compoſed, indeed, of the ſame common features in every man; yet there is a certain diſcriminating *ſeity* (as the ſchool-men called it) no leſs in the one than in the other, which, to an attentive obſerver, cannot fail of marking a very ſenſible difference in each individual. This being evidently the caſe, no two men, exerciſing their mental faculties upon complicated queſtions of a political or theological nature, will ever, perhaps, be found to terminate their reaſonings in perfectly ſimilar concluſions. To require therefore, as an eſſential qualification of genuine friendſhip, that the parties ſhould *think* alike, is juſt as poſſible to be complied with, as if the condition

had been that they ſhould *look* alike. If the axiom can hold true in any inſtance, it can only be with reſpect to men of the moſt weak and illiberal minds. Perſons of this character, not having the power, or the ſpirit, to think for themſelves, and neceſſarily forming their opinions (if a mere *paſſive* perſuaſion can be called an opinion) by certain preſcribed models, could not fail of finding them tally with each other in moſt exact coincidence. Minds of this narrow and contracted caſt, will undoubtedly be affected with ſentiments of love, or averſion, towards thoſe perſons with whom they converſe, in proportion as they ſhall appear to receive, or reject, their *aſſumed* tenets. To ſuch therefore the propoſition contained in the text is ſtrictly applicable; and to ſuch *only*. But to extend it farther, and repreſent it of *univerſal* influence, is to lay the foundation of one of the moſt refined and generous propenſities

penſities of the human heart, in one of its meaneſt and moſt ſelfiſh weakneſſes.

Happily, however, for the credit of the connection, the propoſition in its moſt contracted and illiberal ſenſe, is neither agreeable to truth, nor to the leading principle which Cicero himſelf inculcates, as the ſure ground upon which an honourable and permanent amity can *alone* be raiſed. This, he juſtly and repeatedly contends, is *Virtue*; including in that comprehenſive term, every public and private affection which raiſes and dignifies the human heart. In that *eſſential* article, indeed, their ſentiments muſt ſtrictly and *indiſpenſably* unite: in all the reſt, *diverſity* of opinion is not only conſiſtent with the moſt cordial friendſhip, but in the number of its principal prerogatives. It gives ſcope to a variety of uſeful diſquiſitions, calls into action one of the moſt pleaſing exerciſes of the mental powers, and eminently contributes

butes to enlarge and enlighten the underſtanding. Truth is beſt ſtruck out by a *colliſion* of opinions: and ſhe is never more ſucceſsfully inveſtigated, than in the ſecure freedom of unreſerved and amicable debate. In a word, genuine friendſhip ſhould take for her device the famous Selden's excellent motto; περι παντος ελευθεριαν, "above all "things perfect freedom of thinking:" for minds are never in truer *harmony*, than when each may ſafely diſſent from the other, without the leaſt diminution of their mutual eſteem and good-will.

(23) Some account has been given in the Remarks on Cato, of each of the ſeveral perſons, except Philus, mentioned in the text[ε]. The company in which Cicero has here placed the latter, cannot but raiſe the higheſt idea of his character: there are, however, but very few particulars to be traced

ε See Rem. on Cato, N° 27, 56, 75, and alſo in the preſent Remarks, N° 9.

concerning

concerning him. One remarkable circumſtance, indeed, of his conduct is recorded, which proves him to have been actuated by an uncommon greatneſs of mind. At the expiration of his conſulate [i], he was ſent to command the army then acting againſt the Numantines: and although Metellus and Pompeius were his declared and warmeſt enemies, he named thoſe very perſons to attend him as his lieutenants into Spain. There cannot be a ſtronger proof of his poſſeſſing a truely magnanimous ſpirit, than thus ſacrificing his private reſentments to the public ſervice, and from a conſciouſneſs of his own integrity and abilities, chooſing to ſubmit his operations to the ſcrutiny of two inſpectors, who he was ſure would be leaſt diſpoſed to conceal, or extenuate, any errors he might commit. Valerius Maximus, (from whoſe elegant and informing compilation this ſingular fact is taken)

[i] In the Y. of R. 617.

was

was ſo ſtruck with this uncommon inſtance of a truely great mind, that he could not forbear to expreſs his ſenſe of it, in the following warm but juſt exclamation: *O! fiduciam non ſolum fortem, ſed pene etiam temerariam; qua duobus acerrimis odiis latera ſua cingere eſt auſus, uſumque miniſterii vix tutum amicis, e ſinu inimicorum petere ſuſtinuit!* *Pigh. An.* II. 499. *Val. Max.* III. c. 7. N° 5.

(24) The Poet alluded to, is Empedocles, a native of Agrigentum (now called Gergenti) in Sicily, who flouriſhed about 450 years before the Chriſtian æra. He was one of the moſt celebrated diſciples of Pythagoras, and compoſed a didactic poem, in which he explained and ſupported the phiſiological principles of his great maſter; as Lucretius in a Latin poem, ſome centuries afterwards, did thoſe of his admired Epicurus. The two founders of theſe famous ſchools, although

they raiſed their reſpective ſyſtems upon the ſame common principle, yet the conſequences they deduced from it were widely different; the former leading to Theiſm, and the latter to Atheiſm. Nevertheleſs, Lucretius, at the ſame time that he oppoſes the tenets, warmly acknowledges the abilities, of the Grecian poet; repreſenting him as a genius of ſo ſuperior an order,

Ut vix humana videatur ſtirpe creatus.

As nothing remains of this famous Greek poem, except a few ſcattered fragments occaſionally cited by the antient writers, it is altogether conjectural what Empedocles, or more properly, perhaps, Pythagoras, meant by thoſe phyſical powers which he expreſſed under the moral ideas of *friendſhip* and *diſcord*. It has been ſuppoſed by ſome writers, both antient and modern, that he alluded to the doctrine of two diſtinct, independent, intellectual agents,

the

the reſpective authors of all the good and evil, which prevails in the world: but the very learned and judicious Cudworth has ſhewn, by the moſt convincing evidence, that he is by no means chargeable with this abſurd hypotheſis [a].

The efficient cauſe of the oppoſite phænomena in queſtion, has in all ages engaged the attention, and divided the opinions, of curious inquirers into thoſe latent ſprings by which the wonderful machinery of nature is performed. The ſagacious Mr. Lock acknowledges himſelf equally incapable of comprehending, "by what ſecret power the parts of "bodies are made to *cohere*, as how the "mind performs the act of thinking, "or can move our bodies by thought." But Sir Iſaac Newton ſeems to have ſolved the difficulty, in a very ſatisfac-

[a] See *Intellect. Syſt.* paſſim, particularly vol. I. p. 151, 4to. ed.

tory

tory manner, by aſſigning his *univerſal* principle of *attraction*, as abundantly adequate to both thoſe contrary effects. Perhaps, if the poem under conſideration were extant, it would afford an additional inſtance to thoſe that already occur in the hiſtory of antient philoſophy, that the modern ſyſtem of phyſics, in ſome of its fundamental articles, is not ſo much a new theory as a revival and confirmation of the old. For although the Sicilian philoſopher has aſſigned *two* diſtinct powers for the appearances in queſtion; whereas our illuſtrious countryman accounts for the ſame, by the aſſiſtance of one ſimple, concealed cauſe; yet it is poſſible, if we could trace the Grecian bard through the ſeveral links of his ſyſtem, it might be found, perhaps, that thoſe highly allegorical images he has employed, when reduced into plain language, would not prove at very conſiderable variance with the doctrine of Sir Iſaac Newton upon this ſubject. For that

plaſtic nature maintained by Empedocles, as the inſtrumental, unconſcious, incorporeal agent, in the concretion and ſecretion of the ſeveral forms which compoſe the viſible creation, bears a ſtrong reſemblance, in many of its features, to Sir Iſaac Newton's *univerſal* principle. In one reſpect, at leaſt, they evidently agree; both of them being repreſented as the action of ſome ſubordinate, immaterial cauſe, which perpetually moves and governs matter, according to certain laws originally preſcribed by the ſupreme Architect. It ſhould ſeem, too, that if our immortal Britiſh Philoſopher had choſen to veil the fundamental principles of his ſyſtem in figurative alluſions, he could not have found two metaphors more expreſſive of the *different* effects of that *energetic* power, which he has proved to pervade all the works of nature, than thoſe of *Friendſhip* and *Diſcord*. *Laert. in vit. Emped. Lucret.* I. 734. *Stanley's L. of the Philoſ. p.* 577. *Lock's*

Eſſay on H. U. II. *c.* 23. N° 23, *et ſeqq.* *Clerk's Rohault, Vol.* I. p. 54. *in note.*

(25) Pacuvius, who flouriſhed about the Y. of R. 590, was one of the earlieſt as well as one of the moſt celebrated of the Roman dramatic poets. In the judgment of Horace, he rivalled, if not eclipſed, the poetical reputation of Ennius; to whom he was not more nearly related by genius, than by birth. The epitaph he made for himſelf, and ordered to be inſcribed on his tomb, is preſerved in Aulus Gellius [a], and affords a ſtriking ſpecimen of that expreſſive ſimplicity, which ſo remarkably diſtinguiſhes the antient inſcriptions of every kind, from thoſe of modern compoſition:

Adoleſcens, tamen etſi properas, hoc te ſaxum rogat
Utei ad ſe adſpicias; deinde quod ſcriptu'ſt legas:
Hic ſunt poetæ MARCEI PACUVIEI *ſita*
Oſſa. Hoc volebam neſcius ne oſſes, vale.

[a] A. Gel. I. 24.

Tho' haſte, O youth! ſhould urge thy deſtin'd way,
Yet let this verſe thy ſteps one moment ſtay:
Entomb'd within theſe monumental ſtones,
Securely reſts the bard Pacuvius' bones.
And, now thou knoweſt what I wiſh'd to tell,
Purſue thy road, and ever fare thee well.

The play to which Cicero refers, was founded on the ſtory of Oreſtes, the ſon of Agamemnon and Clytemneſtra. His mother, during the abſence of her hero at the ſiege of Troy, having admitted Ægyſtus to her bed; Oreſtes, fired with indignation at her perfidy, in a tranſport of rage ſtabbed her to the heart. When his paſſion had ſubſided, and reflection ſucceeded to reſentment, he was ſtruck with horror of the crime he had committed; and in the anguiſh of his mind, had recourſe to the oracle of Apollo, in order to be informed by what means he might expiate the guilt of his parricide. The atonement required, was, that he ſhould carry off the ſtatue of Diana, from her impious temple in Taurica Cherſoneſus:

ſus: where, with more than ſavage barbariſm, the cruel cuſtom prevailed of immolating upon her ſanguinary altars, every ſtranger that happened to come into the country. Oreſtes was accompanied in this propitiatory pilgrimage, by the faithful and generous Pylades. As ſoon as theſe celebrated friends were arrived, they concealed themſelves in a cave, in order to wait a proper opportunity of executing the object of their expedition; but being diſcovered by ſome ſhepherds, they were ſeized and brought before Thoas, the king of this infamous and inhoſpitable land[b]. The ſequel of this ſtory is variouſly related; but it ſhould ſeem, that in the Roman tragedy, Oreſtes alone was the deſtined victim.

The place of Ovid's exile, was in the neighbourhood of the country where

[b] Hygin. Fab. 121.

fabulous hiſtory has laid the ſcene of theſe deteſtable rites. Accordingly the poet, who too ſenſibly experienced in his misfortunes, how little thoſe connections are to be relied upon, which in the language of the world paſs under the proſtituted name of amity; takes occaſion, in one of his plaintive epiſtles from Pontus, to ſhame his pretended friends into an exertion of their good offices in his behalf, by repreſenting to them the impreſſion which a narrative of this ſtory made even upon the barbarians, among whom it was his unhappy lot to paſs his life:

Mirus amor juvenum, quamvis abiere tot anni,
In Scythia magnum nunc quoque nomen habet.
Fabula narrata eſt poſtquam vulgaris ab illo,
Laudarunt omnes facta piamque fidem.
Scilicet hac etiam, quâ nulla ferocior, orâ,
Nomen amicitiæ barbara corda movet:
Quid facere Auſoniâ *geniti debetis in* urbe,
Cum tangant diros *talia facta* Getas [c]?

[c] Ep. ex Pont. III. 2.

Tho'

Tho' many an age has o'er the ſtory roll'd,
With rapture ſtill their honour'd faith is told:
Still Scythia's ſons (than whom a fiercer race
Ne'er did the form of human kind diſgrace)
Their glorious ſtrife with ceaſeleſs praiſe admire,
And bleſs the force of friendſhip's ſacred fire.
In this rude clime, where ruder natives ſwarm,
If thus the deed their ſavage ſouls can charm;
Say ye, in Latium's happier regions born,
Whom manners poliſh, and whom arts adorn,
What finer feelings ſhould *your* boſoms know,
How far more warm with gen'rous friendſhip glow!

(26) It was one of the tenets maintained in the ſchool of Epicurus, that *Juſtice* is altogether the creature of poſitive inſtitution; there being no principle, it was aſſerted, in human nature, which leads to the practice of this virtue, independent of the laws eſtabliſhed by civil compact. The Stoics and Peripatetics, on the contrary, contended, agreeably to truth and the real conſtitution of the moral world, that man being *evidently* formed for the ſocial ſtate, it neceſſarily followed, that the principle denied by

the Epicureans, muſt equally be wrought into the compoſition of his nature: becauſe without the latter, the former could not ſubſiſt. The Epicureans, however, endeavoured to evade this argument, by denying that a ſtate of ſociety is the *natural* ſtate of man. There is a fine paſſage preſerved by Arrian, in which the admirable Epictetus confutes this doctrine, by the practice of the philoſopher himſelf. "Epicurus," ſays this celebrated Stoic, "acts upon the very principle he "labours to overthrow, when he at-"tempts to prove, that man is not "naturally inclined to ſociety. For "upon what motive, let me aſk, does he "give himſelf all this concern to bring "us over to his opinion? what can "induce him to trim his midnight "lamp, and waſte his ſpirits in labo-"rious vigils for the inſtruction of "mankind? As he diſclaims all *natu-*"*ral* connection with his ſpecies,

"what

" what intereſt can he have in any " thing that relates to them? It is " evident that the *ſocial inſtinct*, the " moſt powerful of all principles, inſti- " gated him in theſe lucubrations for " the ſuppoſed benefit of mankind; " and compelled him to obey the die- " tates of his ſociable nature, in the " very act by which he meant to prove " that man is not by nature ſociable."

The noble author of the character-iſtics, hath taken up this argument and applied it, with equal force and propriety, to a modern diſciple of the Epicurean ſchool, the celebrated ſage of Malmſbury. " An able and witty phi- " loſopher of our nation," ſays this polite and ingenious moraliſt, " as ſa- " vage and unſociable as he would " make himſelf and all mankind appear " by his philoſophy, took the utmoſt " pains to ſhew us, that both in reli- " gion and morals we were impoſed " upon

" upon by our governors; that there was
" nothing which by *nature* inclined us
" either way; nothing which naturally
" drew us to the love of what was *with-*
" *out*, or beyond *ourſelves*: tho' the love of
" ſuch great truths and ſovereign max-
" ims as he imagined theſe to be, made
" him the moſt *laborious* of all men, in
" compoſing ſyſtems of this kind for our
" *uſe*.—What ſhould we ſay to one of
" theſe anti-zealots, who in the zeal of
" ſuch a cool philoſophy, ſhould aſſure
" us *faithfully*, that we were the moſt
" miſtaken men in the world to imagine
" ſuch things as *natural* faith and juſ-
" tice; that it was only *force* and *power*
" that conſtituted *right*? Sir! the phi-
" loſophy you have condeſcended to
" reveal to us, is moſt extraordinary:
" we are beholden to you for your in-
" ſtruction. But pray, whence is this
" zeal in our behalf? what are *we* to
" *you*? Are you our *father*? Or if you
" were, why this concern for us? Is

" there

" there then ſuch a thing as *natural af-*
" *fection?* If not; why all this pains on
" our account? Of what advantage is it
" to *you*, to deliver us from the cheat?
" 'Tis directly againſt your *intereſt* to
" undeceive us, and let us know that
" only *private* intereſt governs you, and
" that nothing nobler, or of a larger
" kind, ſhould govern us whom you
" converſe with. Leave us to ourſelves,
" and to that notable art by which we
" are happily *tamed* and rendered thus
" mild—'Tis not fit we ſhould know by
" *nature* we are all *wolves*. Is it poſ-
" ſible that one who has diſcovered
" himſelf ſuch, ſhould take pains to
" communicate ſuch a diſcovery?"
Arrian. Epict. Diſſert. l. II. *c.* 20.
Shafts. Char. vol. I. *p.* 88. *et ſeqq.*

(27) After the Romans had become acquainted with the ſyſtem of Epicurus, and converts were daily going over to his opinions; the queſtion concerning the origin of friendſhip ſeems to

to have been much diſcuſſed, not only in the ſchools of the philoſophers, but in the converſation of thoſe ingenious men in general, who had a turn for moral and ſpeculative inquiry. Thus Horace, in that admirable ſatire in which he ſo agreeably laments the impertinence and diſſipation to which his time was unavoidably ſacrificed in Rome; contraſts it with the philoſophical manner in which he paſſed his life at his *ſabine* villa. The ſociety he met with there, it ſeems, was of the moſt rational kind; and, among other intereſting topics of converſation with his ſenſible neighbours, they frequently debated the controverted queſtion, concerning the true nature and origin of friendſhip [a].

Upon this inquiry, as upon almoſt every other, of a moral, or phyſical

[a] *Quidve ad amicitias* uſus rectumve, *trahat nos.* Sat. L. II. 6.

nature,

nature, the Stoics and Peripatetics widely differed from the Epicureans; the former contending, agreeably to the principles repeatedly inſiſted upon, and ſo well ſupported in the preſent treatiſe, that real friendſhip is a generous, diſintereſted affection, ariſing ſolely and ſpontaneouſly from the ſocial *ſenſe* implanted in the human heart: whereas the latter maintained, that it is founded upon the ſame *ſelfiſh* principle which actuates, as they pretended, every other paſſion in the breaſt of man, and ſprings from a motive of *utility* alone. Epicurus indeed, as well as ſome modern advocates of the ſame cauſe, ſeem to have taken their eſtimates of human nature, from its meaneſt and moſt degrading exhibitions: but the nobleſt and more reſpectable philoſophers of antiquity, have choſen, for a much wiſer and better purpoſe, to view it on the brighteſt and moſt advantageous ſide. "It is impoſſible," as the incomparable

Mr.

Mr. Addiſon remarks, "to read a "paſſage in Plato, or Tully, and a "thouſand other antient moraliſts, "without being a greater and a better "man for it. On the contrary," (continues this elegant writer) "I could "never read any of our modiſh French "authors, or thoſe of our own country, "who are the imitators and admirers "of that trifling nation, without being "for ſome time out of humour with "myſelf, and at every thing about me. "Their buſineſs is to depreciate hu-"man nature, and conſider it under its "worſt appearances. They give mean "interpretations and baſe motives, to "the worthieſt actions.—In ſhort, they "endeavour to make no diſtinction be-"tween man and man, or between the "ſpecies of men and that of brutes [b]."

(28) Tarquin the *proud*, ſo called from his haughty and imperious temper, was one of the moſt execrable

[b] Tat. vol. II. N° 103.

tyrants,

tyrants, perhaps, that ever diſgraced a crown. As he opened his way to the throne by the flagitious murder of that excellent prince, Servius Tullius; ſo he exerciſed the ſovereign power in a manner perfectly ſuitable to the cruel means by which he obtained it. At length his intolerable oppreſſions, together with the infamous outrage of one of his ſons on the chaſtity of the celebrated Lucretia, occaſioned a general revolt of his ſubjects; which ending in the expulſion of himſelf and family, produced a total change of government from the regal to the republican form.

Caſſius, altho' he was himſelf a patrician, yet favoured, or at leaſt pretended to favour, the rights of the people. With this view, he endeavoured to procure a law, ordaining, that a certain part of the conquered lands which had been uſurped by the nobles, ſhould be applied to their original deſtination,

tination, and diſtributed among the indigent citizens. This attempt, together with ſome other circumſtances of his political conduct, drew upon him a ſuſpicion that he was ſecretly aiming, under the ſpecious appearance of popular juſtice, to undermine the conſtitutional liberties of his country. He was accordingly arraigned for treaſon; and being condemned to ſuffer death, the ſentence was executed in the Y. of R. 268. *Liv. Hiſt.* II. 41.

(29) Concerning the invaſion of Pyrrhus, ſee Rem. on Cato, p. 217. Humanity was a ſtriking feature in the heroic character of this illuſtrious prince: and he gave a ſtrong proof of that magnanimous quality, in the ſingle victory he obtained over the Roman army; treating the priſoners taken in that battle, with the moſt humane tenderneſs, and generouſly reſtoring them without ranſom. *Flor.* I. 13.

That cruel diſpoſition which Cicero imputes to Hannibal, is unanimouſly attributed to him by all the Roman hiſtorians: Livy, in particular, repreſents him not only of a ſanguinary temper, but void alſo of every principle of honour, juſtice and good faith [a]. But it may well be ſuſpected, that theſe moral deformities in his character, are much aggravated at leaſt, if not abſolutely miſrepreſentations: for it ſhould be remembered, that the picture is drawn by his enemies; who having ſuffered much from his valour and abilities, may fairly be ſuppoſed to have exhibited a caricature, rather than a juſt reſemblance. Accordingly the candid Rollin obſerves, that neither Plutarch nor Polybius, altho' they frequently take occaſion to mention this celebrated Carthaginian, throw out the leaſt hint of his being ſtained by thoſe horrid vices, of which he is accuſed by Livy [b]. In-

[a] Liv. xxi. 4. [b] Rol. Belles Let. vol. iv. p. 93.

deed with regard to *cruelty*, (the particular charge alledged againſt him by Cicero) it is but juſtice to remark, that his reſtraining the ſlaughter his victorious troops were making of their fleeing enemies, at the battle of Cannæ [c]; the reſpect he paid to the military virtues of Flaminius, (who was ſlain in the overthrow of the army he commanded at the battle of Thraſimenus) by cauſing diligent ſearch to be made for his body, in order, if it had been found, to pay it funeral honours [d]; together with the ſame generous tribute of eſteem he paid to the remains of Marcellus [e]; are ſuch inſtances of moderation and true heroiſm of mind, as cannot but impreſs a very favourable opinion of his humanity upon every unprejudiced reader.

For the reſt, Cicero's obſervation, That there is an innate propenſity in the

[c] Flor. ii. 6.
[d] Plut. in. vit. Fab. Max.
[e] See Rem. on Cato, p. 217.

heart

heart of man to admire virtuous actions and abhor their contraries, at what diſtance ſoever placed from their reſpective influence, and antecedently to all reaſoning and reflection, was one of the fundamental tenets of the Athenian *Porch*; as it is the leading principle likewiſe upon which he reaſons, throughout the preſent treatiſe. It ſhould ſeem indeed, that virtue would be left deſtitute of requiſite aid, if ſhe were ſecured by no *internal* auxiliary, bu tmuſt depend entirely for aſſiſtance on the ſlow and deliberate advances of reaſon and experience. Happily, however, there are certain ſymptoms in the conſtitution of human nature, that ſtrongly indicate the reality of a *moral ſenſe*: and this hypotheſis, altho' much controverted, hath been well ſupported by ſome of the moſt diſtinguiſhed philoſophers both antient and modern. The reaſoning of one of its lateſt and moſt reſpectable advocates in our own nation,

is ſo conformable to the paſſage under conſideration, that it may be produced as a collateral ſupport of Cicero's argument. "As ſoon as any action is "repreſented to us," (ſays this ingenious writer) "as flowing from *love*, "*humanity*, *gratitude*, a *ſtudy* of the "good of others, and an ultimate deſire "of their happineſs, altho' it were in "the moſt diſtant part of the world, "or in ſome paſt age; we feel joy "within us, admire the lovely action "and praiſe its author. On the contrary, every action repreſented to us as "flowing from ill-will, deſire of the "miſery of others without view of any "prevalent good to the public, or from "*ingratitude*; raiſes abhorrence and "averſion.—But whence this ſecret "chain, between each perſon and mankind? How is my *intereſt* connected "with the moſt diſtant *parts* of it? "And yet I muſt admire actions which "ſhew good-will towards them, and "love

" love the author. If there is no *mo-*
" *ral ſenſe* which makes benevolent ac-
" tions appear beautiful; if all appro-
" bation be from the *intereſt* of the ap-
" prover,"

What's Hecuba to us, or we to Hecuba [a] *?*
Hamlet.

(30) *Amico vecchio*, ſays the Italian proverb, *è coſe nuova*. There is nothing indeed of a more brittle compoſition, than the common friendſhips of the world: every day's experience ſhews, that the ſlighteſt colliſion is ſufficient to break them to pieces. In fact, ruptures of this kind are ſo frequent, and generally attended with ſuch inconſiderable conſequences, that they ſcarcely make a ſtronger impreſſion upon obſervers, than the moſt uſual and unimportant occurrences of ordinary life. But the eaſy diſſolution of that cement by which worldly amities

[a] Hutchinſon's inquiry concerning moral good and evil, p. 144.

are held together, may become a matter of ſerious reflection, when the union is ſeparated between men, whoſe ſtation and talents give them a powerful influence over the public affairs of a commonwealth. There is a memorable inſtance to this purpoſe, in Roman ſtory. An irreparable breach was made in the intimacy of M. Livius Druſus and Q. Servilius Cæpio, from no higher a cauſe than each perſiſting to bid againſt the other, for a curious ring at a public auction: yet this paltry object of contention kindled between theſe two friends, (both of them men of conſiderable rank and weight in the republic) an enmity that contributed, in its conſequences, to the breaking out of the war between Rome and her Italian allies [a]; in the courſe of which, no leſs than three hundred thouſand lives periſhed in battle. This dreadful havoc of the human ſpecies might have been ſpared, if the Romans

[a] Plin. Hiſt. Nat. xxxiii. c. 1.

had

had yielded at firſt to thoſe moſt juſt claims (as Paterculus expreſsly calls them) of their neighbouring allies [m]; and which, after all the horrors of a long and deſtructive ſcene of ſanguinary contention, they were at laſt compelled to grant [n]. Should there be any circumſtances in modern ſtory, not very diſſimilar from thoſe which attended this impolitic war; it were devoutly to be wiſhed, that no event might verify the ſevere obſervation of an ingenious French writer, *que les ſotiſes de nos devanciers ſont perdues pour nous!*

(31) Caius Marcius Coriolanus was deſcended from an illuſtrious Patrician family: but the honour he derived from the noble blood that flowed in his veins, was not greater than he reflected back on his anceſtors by his own heroic actions. Having, in the year of R. 262,

[m] *Quorum ut fortuna atrox, ita cauſa fuit* juſtiſſima. *Paterc. Hiſt.* I. 15.

[n] Creirer, Hiſt. Rom, vol. ix. p. 541.

made a ſpeech in the ſenate, tending to the abolition of the tribunitial power; it gave ſuch offence to thoſe popular magiſtrates, as to involve him in a proſecution that terminated in condemning him to perpetual baniſhment. He accordingly ſubmitted to the ſentence; but with ſentiments altogether unſuitable to that magnanimous ſpirit, which had hitherto directed his conduct: for he formed the reſolution of revenging on his country the injury he had received from a particular faction. With theſe unworthy ſentiments, he entered into the ſervice of the Volſci, a neighbouring ſtate perpetually engaged in hoſtilities with the Roman republic. *Theſe*, by the inſtigation of Coriolanus, they were induced to renew: and they conferred upon him the command of their troops. He opened the campaign by attacking and recovering ſeveral towns, which had been formerly taken by the republic from the Volſci: after which he led his victorious army to the gates of Rome.

The

The approach of Coriolanus, at the head of ſo formidable an army, threw the city into a general conſternation. In this alarming ſituation, ſeveral overtures of peace having been ineffectually offered to him by the ſenate; it was at length propoſed, as the laſt expedient, to ſend to him a deputation of the principal ladies in Rome, conducted by his mother and wife, accompanied by their children. This ſingular embaſſy was not commiſſioned in vain. The pride and ſpirit of Coriolanus, inflexible as they had appeared upon all the former applications which had been made to him, were not proof againſt the conjugal and filial tenderneſs of his heart: he was prevailed upon to withdraw his army. The antient hiſtorians are not agreed with reſpect to the ſequel. Livy ſpeaks dubiouſly concerning the time and the manner of his death, but cites Fabius Maximus, one of their earlieſt annaliſts, as intimating that he lived to an advanced

vanced age [a]. But Plutarch affirms [b], his yielding to Volumnia's interceſſions coſt him his life; as on his return with the army to Antium, a general council of the ſtate having been convened at his requeſt, in order to give him an opportunity of publicly vindicating his conduct; he had ſcarcely entered upon his defence, when a tumult was raiſed by his enemies, and he was aſſaſſinated in the midſt of the aſſembly.

Livy, Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, and Plutarch, have ſeverally given the ſpeech which they pretend Volumnia addreſſed to her ſon on this memorable occaſion: but as they are totally different from each other, they are equally, it is probable, fictitious. If any one of them could be ſuppoſed genuine, it would be that which Livy has attributed to her. It is expreſſed in a more conciſe, and animated ſimplicity of language and ſentiment; and

[a] Liv. ii. 24. [b] In vit. Coriolan.

conſe-

conſequently more agreeable to the genius and manners of the age, as well as to the ſpirited character of a Roman matron. Shakeſpear in his tragedy upon this ſubject, has copied the harangue from Plutarch; but inſtead of improving the materials he found in that author, they have ſuffered conſiderably by paſſing through his hands. It is by no means wonderful, however, that he ſhould ill ſucceed in an office for which nature never deſigned him: for what Milton ſomewhere ſays of himſelf, is, perhaps, even more unqueſtionably true of Shakeſpear, that his "mother bore him a ſpeaker of what "God made his own, and not a *tranſ-* "*lator.*"

(32) The ſcene to which Cicero alludes, was one of the moſt important ever exhibited in the Roman republic; as the principal actor concerned in it was one of the moſt reſpectable of her diſtinguiſhed citizens. If the reader, however,

however, were to form his opinion of the character and deſigns of the latter, by the repreſentations given of them in the treatiſe before him; he muſt neceſſarily look upon Tiberius Gracchus as a turbulent demagogue, who for the ſole purpoſe of gratifying his impious ambition, had well-nigh overturned the liberties of his country.

In juſtice to the memory therefore of a well-intentioned patriot, and in order alſo to lay open a more diſtinct view of a very intereſting portion of Roman ſtory, it may be proper to inquire, ſomewhat particularly, how far Cicero's cenſures are juſtly founded: eſpecially as ſome modern writers of conſiderable rank have differed much in their judgment concerning them.

Tiberius Gracchus had received by birth, by nature, and by education, every advantage that could render him eminently conſpicuous amongſt the brighteſt

brighteſt ornaments of the common-wealth. His father, Sempronius Gracchus, had paſſed through the moſt conſiderable civil and military employments, with the higheſt reputation: and his mother, Cornelia, the celebrated daughter of the firſt Scipio Africanus, was never excelled by any of her own ſex, in thoſe virtues and accompliſhments which raiſe and dignify the female character. During his youth, he every day gave increaſing hopes, that the example and inſtruction of ſuch wiſe and venerable parents, could not fail of ripening, in due time, thoſe happy ſeeds which nature had ſo liberally ſown in his genius and diſpoſition, into the nobleſt and moſt valuable fruits. With theſe public expectations, he entered upon the great ſtage of the world: and the part he acted, ſeems to have abundantly juſtified them. In a word, (to judge of his conduct with thoſe candid

candid allowances which human imperfection neceſſarily requires) there appears no reaſon to ſuſpect that Paterculus flattered his memory, when he repreſented him as irreproachable in his morals, upright in his intentions, and endowed with every virtue of the heart and every quality of the mind, which conſtitute the character of a truely good and great man [n].

The attempt he made when he exerciſed the office of tribune [o], to revive and enforce the Agrarian laws, is the particular article of his public tranſactions, which Cicero ſo warmly condemns. It will be neceſſary therefore, to give a general view of the nature and origin of theſe laws, and of a few

[n] *Vita innocentiſſimus, ingenio florentiſſimus, propoſito ſanctiſſimus, tanta denique virtutibus adornatus quantis perfecta et naturâ et induſtria mortalis conditio recipit.* *Paterc.* I. 2.

[o] In the Y. of R. 620.

of the principal efforts that, at different periods, were made in order to enforce its due operation.

It was the wiſe policy of the earlier times of the Roman republic, as often as ſhe enlarged her dominions by invaſions on the neighbouring ſtates, to *appropriate* a certain portion of the conquered territory. Part of theſe was put up to public ſale, and the purchaſe money applied towards reimburſing the expences of the war; the remainder was annexed to her demeſnes, and diſtributed among the poorer citizens at an eaſy reſerved rent *p*. By this judicious regulation, not only extreme indigence was baniſhed from the lower claſs of people; but every citizen being thus poſſeſſed of a certain landed property, was perſonally intereſted in the public welfare. The advantages, however, of this politic or-

p Plut. in vit. Gracc.

dinance

dinance were ſoon defeated, by the avarice of the more powerful and opulent members of the commonwealth; who, under a pretence of improving the public revenue, procured the reſerved rents to be raiſed higher than the poor citizens were able to pay: by which means they gradually got into their own hands the excluſive poſſeſſion of theſe territorial farms. In order to relieve the ſufferers from this iniquitous uſurpation, Licinius Stolo, above three centuries before the preſent time, propoſed a law when he was Tribune [q], that no citizen ſhould be allowed to poſſeſs more than five hundred acres of land. A ſtrenuous oppoſition was made by the nobles to this motion; but at length, after a moſt warm and violent contention, the Tribune's party prevailed, and the law was promulgated. Means, however, were ſoon diſ-

[q] In the Y. of R. 373.

covered to fruſtrate its efficacy; the ſeveral commiſſioners occaſionally appointed to diſtribute the newly acquired lands, being prevailed upon by pecuniary preſents, or other intereſted conſiderations, to aſſign them in fictitious names, to thoſe very men whom the legiſlature had rendered incapable of enjoying the legal poſſeſſion. The conſequence was, that in a courſe of years the lower order of citizens were totally deprived of all means of ſubſiſtence.

In this ſituation the affair remained when Tiberius Gracchus, with the honeſt ſpirit and indignation of a laudable reformer, ſtood forth to reſcue the poor from the hand of the oppreſſor. To effectuate this benevolent purpoſe, he exerted the utmoſt efforts of his credit, his intereſt and his eloquence, that this neglected law might be carried into proper execu-

tion. But his ſtrenuous endeavours were withſtood, with equal ardour and vehemence, by thoſe citizens whoſe eſtates principally conſiſted of the lands in queſtion; inſomuch, that the violence of the contending parties, had well-nigh produced a total revolution in the Roman government.

The generality of writers, both antient and modern, who have animadverted upon the conduct of Gracchus in reſpect to this tranſaction, agree with Cicero in imputing his motives to an ambition of acquiring greater power and popularity, than was conſiſtent with the principles of the conſtitution. This charge has been ſupported, with much plauſibility, by Mr. Gordon, in the *political diſquiſitions* prefixed to his tranſlation of Salluſt; as it has, with great ingenuity, been controverted by Mr. Hooke, in his very accurate and elegant Roman hiſtory. But it will

appear, perhaps, in the preſent caſe, as it frequently does in other controverſies, that the truth lies between the two diſputants; the reſpective advocates having greatly, it ſhould ſeem, overſtrained both the *accuſation* and the *defence*: Gracchus is neither wholly to be condemned, nor intirely acquitted. There is abundant reaſon indeed to believe, not only from his general character, but from the nature of thoſe meaſures he *originally* purſued, that the firſt ſteps he took in this important buſineſs, were directed by the pureſt and moſt upright intentions. But it muſt be acknowledged equally evident, that in following his great object, his paſſions kindled by oppoſition; and what he commenced from a principle of public juſtice, he appears to have carried on in the ſpirit of perſonal reſentment. If he had never departed from the terms of his primitive plan, it would certainly have ſtood clear of all reaſonable objection. For

his firſt propoſal was, that "the pre-
"ſent poſſeſſors ſhould be excuſed from
"the penalty they had incurred on
"account of their uſurpations; that
"they ſhould not be compelled to re-
"fund the mean profits; and that they
"ſhould be indemnified out of the
"public treaſury, to the full value of
"the eſtates they were required to re-
"ſign." Nothing could be more equitable than theſe clauſes: and Plutarch, from whom they are cited, has reaſon to add, that there never was a law drawn up againſt inſtances of ſuch enormous avarice and injuſtice, which breathed a ſpirit of greater lenity and moderation [a]. Indeed, had Gracchus continued to hold out theſe juſt qualifications to the parties who were called upon to make the ſurrender; even Cicero himſelf, who ſo repeatedly arraigns him of factious views, could not but have approved the law, and acquitted its author of any unwarrantable deſigns.

[a] Plut. in vit. Grace.

For

For at the time when the ſenate began to be jealous of Pompey's power, Flavius, a Tribune, having propoſed a renewal of the Agrarian laws; Cicero moved that the very *ſame* clauſes juſt now cited ſhould be inſerted: and with thoſe amendments, he acknowledged himſelf willing to concur in the Tribune's motion[r].

Thus far therefore Gracchus ſeems to have acted in a manner worthy of himſelf, and of the cauſe in which he had engaged. But the misfortune was, that in the courſe of thoſe vehement conteſts he had to ſuſtain with the unjuſt and outrageous oppoſers of his projected reformation, his paſſions took fire, and broke out into meaſures much too inflamed for the temperate warmth of a wiſe and well regulated zeal. Thus unhappily yielding to an impulſe, which carried him far wide of the proper bias

[r] *Ad. At.* I. 19.

both of his nature and his principles, he raſhly retracted the ſeveral ſoftenings he had before annexed to his law; and changing his ground, he now inſiſted upon an abſolute and *unconditional* reſtitution of the lands in debate. This was breaking into one of the moſt ſacred boundaries of civil property. For long preſcription has been always admitted, in every equitable ſyſtem of juriſprudence, as a title never to be impeached: and no reaſons of ſtate can render it juſt policy to over-rule this plea, without making the parties in poſſeſſion a full and adequate compenſation. Indeed Mr. Hooke denies that this plea would hold in the preſent inſtance; concluding from a paſſage cited by Aulus Gellius out of a ſpeech of the elder Cato, delivered in the ſenate, that the "Licinian law could not for "any length of time have been evaded, "when Gracchus contended for its "renewal." It is with great reluctance that the author of theſe Remarks finds himſelf

himſelf obliged to diſſent from ſo very reſpectable an authority; but the reſult of his beſt inquiry leads him to obſerve, in the firſt place, that even *two* years peaceable and uninterrupted poſſeſſion of *immoveables*, was by a law of the twelve tables, a ſufficient bar againſt the demands of any claimants; tho' it is confeſſed, that in times long after, this term was conſiderably and upon the trueſt principles of equity, enlarged by Juſtinian: and in the next, that the learned writer lays a greater ſtreſs upon the paſſage he produces, than it ſeems fairly to ſupport. The ſubject of debate in the ſenate was, whether war ſhould be declared againſt the Rhodians, for having in the late hoſtilities between the republic and Perſes king of Macedon, ſhewn a *diſpoſition* to favour the royal cauſe, altho' they had not, by any direct and explicit act, entered as parties into his quarrel. Cato, among other arguments which he urges in defence of the Rho-

dians, aſks if it would not be thought the greateſt injuſtice by every man, were the caſe his own, to be puniſhed merely for an *inclination?* and then, adds, *Quæ tandem lex eſt tam acerba quæ dicat———ſi quis plus quingenta jugera habere voluerit; tanta pœna eſto:——atqui nos omnia plura habere volumus; et id nobis impune eſt*[1].

It would ſeem, that no inference can be juſtly drawn, from theſe words, with reſpect either to the obſervance, or contravention, of the Licinian law: the venerable orator mentions it merely as an illuſtration of his general argument, and as an inſtance that came home to the boſoms of all his auditors. "Every one of us," ſays he, wiſhes, "no doubt, to poſſeſs "more land than the law allows, but "wiſhes with impunity; for what le-"giſlature was ever ſo ſevere as to

[1] *Aul. Gel.* VII. 3.

"make

"make a ſimple act of the mind, an "object of puniſhment?"

But if nothing can be deduced from the above paſſage, in favour of the ingenious advocate's aſſertion; it ſtands equally unſupported by hiſtorical evidence. As Mr. Hooke does not ſeem diſpoſed to allow much credit to Cicero in the preſent queſtion; his teſtimony might, perhaps, be waved, if it were not authenticated by an unexceptionable witneſs. For what the former aſſures us in his book of offices, concerning the *great length* of time theſe eſtates had been in the *families* of the poſſeſſors, is expreſsly confirmed by Florus[t].

The fact is, that the Agrarian law had been diſregarded almoſt as ſoon as

[t] *Quam autem habet æquitatem ut agrum multis annis aut etiam ſæculis poſſeſſum, qui nullum habuit, habeat; qui autem habuit, amittat?* De Off. II. 22.

Relictas

as it was enacted; that is, above three centuries and a half before Tiberius Gracchus attempted to reform the abuſe. For we find the Tribunes warmly contending with the opulent Patricians, in order to obtain a juſt diſtribution of the conquered lands, when the firſt law for that purpoſe had not exiſted full twenty years [u]. Towards the cloſe of the following century, the Licinian law, which has been ſo often mentioned in this remark, was ordained. But the temptation to elude it was ſo ſtrong, that ſome years after it had paſſed, even Licinius himſelf was diſcovered to poſſeſs a greater portion of the public lands than he could legally enjoy: and he was actually

Relictas ſibi a majoribus *ſedes*, ætate *quaſi jure hæreditario, poſſidebant.* Flor. III. 13.

[u] *Vid. Liv.* II. 41. iii. 1. *Dionyſ.* VIII. 2.

arraigned

arraigned and condemned for tranſgreſſing his own law [w].

Upon the whole, it ſeems evident, that many of the eſtates which Gracchus required to be immediately and *unconditionally* ſurrendered, had from time immemorial been in the poſſeſſors families, or in thoſe of the ſeveral perſons from whom they reſpectively derived their titles. To compel therefore the proprietors to ſurrender them not only without an adequate, but without any *compenſation*, was levelling one of the ſtrongeſt and moſt inviolable fences of property: and as it could not poſſibly be effected without involving great numbers of citizens in one common and unmerited ruin; Gracchus in attempting to enforce this injurious law, was too plainly ſacrificing his principles to his paſſions, and for the ſake of taking

[w] Liv. VII. 16.

vengeance

vengeance on his enemies, throwing his country into the moſt dangerous and alarming convulſions.

In conſequence of his thus deviating from the rectitude of his original ſcheme, the wiſe and venerable Mucius Scævola, together with ſome others of the moſt reſpectable perſonages, both in rank and character, whoſe ſanction had given the higheſt credit to his cauſe; equally ſunk it in the public opinion by withdrawing their farther concurrence. Nor was this the only important loſs he ſuſtained, by the violence of his intemperate proceedings. For whilſt, in the obſtinate proſecution of his purpoſed reformation, he was haranguing the people from the ſteps of the capitol, an armed mob, headed by Scipio Naſica, (a ſenator of conſiderable authority, and one of thoſe nobles who had large poſſeſſions in the uſurped eſtates) broke through the crowd, and forcing their way to Gracchus; the latter,

latter, together with 300 of his friends and partizans, were baſely maſſacred upon the ſpot, by the ſavage fury of inſtigated aſſaſſins. *Orat. pro Plan.* 36. *Plut. in vit. Gracch.*

(33) If Plutarch's account of this examination may be relied upon, Cicero has not done juſtice to Bloſius in ſuppreſſing a part of his anſwer to the laſt interrogatory: for, according to the Greek biographer, Bloſius added, that "he was confident Gracchus would never have laid ſuch a "command upon him, if it had not "been for the public advantage[w]." Theſe ſupplemental words very much ſoften the extravagance of his reply, as it ſtands in Cicero's narrative: for they import, not that he was ready, upon a wild notion of friendſhip, to commit any violence which Gracchus ſhould propoſe to

[w] Plut. in vit. Gracc.

him;

him; but that he had ſuch an implicit confidence in the rectitude of his friend's patriotiſm, principles, and underſtanding, as to be well perſuaded it was impoſſible he could recommend to him any action of a public nature, which had not the public welfare for its object.

But even with this mitigation, there was an enthuſiaſtic extravagance in the acknowledgment, utterly inconſiſtent with ſound ſenſe and ſober philoſophy: for a philoſopher, it ſeems, Bloſius, profeſſed himſelf to be. Nevertheleſs, the very ſingular and adventurous Montagne does not ſcruple to aſſert, that the anſwers of Bloſius were preciſely what they ought to have been. His reaſoning is curious: but as it turns entirely upon metaphors, and thoſe of the boldeſt and moſt uncommon kind, they muſt be given in his own language; for no other can expreſs them.—*Ceux qui accuſent cette reponſe—n'entendent*

n'entendent pas bien ce myſtere; *et ne preſuppoſent pas, comme il eſt, qu'il* tenoit la volonté *de Gracchus* en ſa manche, *et par puiſſance et par cognoiſſance. S'etans* parfaitement commis *l'un a l'autre, ils tenoient parfaitement* les renes de l'inclination *l'un de l'autre: et faites guider cet* harnois *par la vertu et cela) duit de la raiſon, (comme auſſi eſt-il du tout impoſſible de l'*atteler *ſans cela) la reponſe de Bloſius eſt telle qu'elle* devoit *eſtre**. This marvellous logic aſſumes, that friendſhip is ſtrictly and *literally*, what Ariſtotle figuratively defined it, "one ſoul in two "bodies;" and conſequently, that Bloſius might be as intimately conſcious of his friend's *intentions*, as he could poſſibly be of his *own*. The ſimple ſtating of a propoſition ſo glaringly abſurd, is to confute it; and it is only produced as a remarkable

* Mont. vol. I. p. 333. ed. par Coſte.

inſtance,

inſtance, among many others which occur, that even a very ingenious underſtanding may ſometimes embrace the moſt irrational and dangerous tenets, by unwarily ſuffering imagination to ſubſtitute *metaphor* for truth.

(34) He fled to the protection of Ariſtonicus, the natural brother of Attalus king of Pergamus. The latter having, by an injurious will, bequeathed all his dominions to the Romans, Ariſtonicus had the ſpirit to take up arms againſt their ill-grounded pretenſions, and the misfortune to be made a priſoner by the conſul Perpenna. The affairs of this prince being thus abſolutely ruined, and the unhappy Bloſius no longer ſecure from the vengeance of his enemies; he put an end to his life by his own hand. *Plut. in vit. Gracc.*

(38) Q.

(35) Q. Æmilius Papus was conſul in the Y. of R. 471, and a ſecond time, four years afterwards; in both which dignities, as alſo in that of Cenſor, Caius Luſcinus Fabricius was his colleague. Concerning the latter, as likewiſe Curius and Coruncanius, ſome account has already been given in the former Remarks [y].

Theſe glorious lights and ornaments of the republic ſhone out together at the ſame period, when as yet neither the philoſophy of Greece [z], nor the luxury of Aſia, had tainted the virtuous ſimplicity of Roman manners. It was theſe gallant commanders and ſagacious ſtateſmen, that gave victory to the arms and wiſdom to the councils of the commonwealth, when Pyrrhus found it expedient to ſend Cyneas

[y] See Rem. on Cato, p. 170.
[z] The *Epicurean*.

upon an embaſſy to Rome with overtures of peace. Accordingly at his return, being aſked by the King his opinion of that city and her ſenate; he replied, that the former ſeemed the *temple of virtue*, and the latter *a council of monarchs*. *Flor.* I. 18.

(36) C. Papirius Carbo poſſeſſed in an eminent degree the talents of a good ſpeaker. As he had entered with great zeal and ſpirit into the meaſures of Tiberius Gracchus during his life, ſo after his death, being elected tribune with Caius Gracchus, he exerted his eloquence and his credit in conjunction with the latter, to enforce the Agrarian law, and to inſtigate the populace to revenge the murder of Tiberius. In alluſion to this part of his conduct, he is deſcribed by Valerius Maximus as a moſt turbulent incendiary, who had well-nigh revived the dying flames of civil diſcord which had

had been kindled by the ſedition of Gracchus [a].

It appears, however, that by the favour and protection of Lælius, he eſcaped the cruel perſecution in which the reſt of the friends and ſupporters of the Gracchi were involved, after the death of their two illuſtrious leaders. It was in return, probably, to ſo good an office, that this man not only changed ſides and eſpouſed the cauſe of the ſenate, but being ſome time afterwards advanced to the conſulſhip, baſely defended, before the people, the aſſaſſination of his friend and collegue Caius Gracchus, as a juſt and neceſſary ſacrifice to the peace and preſervation of the republic. *Pigh. Annal. Cicer. de Orat.* II. 25.

Caius Cato was grandſon of the ve-

[a] *Sepultæ Gracchanæ ſeditionis turbulentiſſimus vindex, et orientium civilium malorum fax ardentiſſima.*

nerable Cenſor. In what particular manner he ſignalized himſelf as a partizan of Gracchus, does not appear: but his joining in the oppoſition to the ſenate, was perfectly agreeable to the principles he may be ſuppoſed to have imbibed from his patriotic anceſtor, whoſe long and honourable life was laid out, in withſtanding the dangerous encroachments, and unjuſt uſurpations, of the too powerful nobles. *Langius. in loc.*

(37) Tiberius Gracchus, in the proſecution of his great object, had recourſe to a very extraordinary privilege annexed to the tribunitial office: he publiſhed an edict, by which he ſuſpended the ſeveral magiſtrates of Rome from exerciſing the functions of their reſpective departments. He fixed his ſeal likewiſe upon the temple of Saturn; and by that means excluded the proper officers concerned in

in the finances, from entering into the public treaſury of the ſtate. *Plut. in vit. Gracc.*

(38) Scipio Naſica was couſin to Scipio Africanus the younger, and related likewiſe to the Gracchi. The people were ſo exaſperated againſt him for the lawleſs and cruel outrage he had committed by the murder of Tiberius Gracchus [b], that they could not be reſtrained from inſulting him as often as he appeared in the ſtreets of Rome. The ſenate, therefore, in order to protect him from the fury of the mob, and give a colourable pretence for conveying him out of their reach, conferred upon him an honorary commiſſion into Aſia. In this kind of baniſhment he wandered for ſome time from place to place, a melancholy and diſpirited exile; till at length grief put an end to his life, in an obſcure town belonging to the territories of

[b] See Rem. 29.

the king of Pergamus. *Plut. in vit. Gracc.*

(39) The ſenatorial vengeance purſued Tiberius Gracchus and all his adherents with ſuch implacable fury, that Carbo is the ſingle inſtance of mercy to be found in the diſgraceful records of this ſanguinary ſcene. Not contented with having deſtroyed Gracchus, the unrelenting victors would not ſuffer his brother to pay his mangled remains the common rites of a decent funeral; but ordered his corpſe, together with three hundred more that were knocked on the head by Scipio Naſica's mercenary mob, to be thrown into the Tyber. Their inſatiable reſentment did not end here; for without any trial, or the leaſt regard to the forms of juſtice, they arbitrarily put to death, and in ſome inſtances with particular circumſtances of cruelty, every friend to the cauſe of Gracchus that fell into their mercileſs hands.

This

This is the firſt inſtance of blood being ſhed, in any of the civil commotions that had happened in Rome; all the former diſſenſions, between the people and the ſenate, having been happily compoſed by one or other of the two contending orders giving up the point in diſpute. The preſent animoſities would probably have terminated in the ſame manner, if more temper and moderation had been ſhewn in the oppoſition to Gracchus: for it does not appear that he was prepared, or had even the moſt diſtant intention, to ſupport his cauſe by any other means, than thoſe with which the tribunitial magiſtracy had legally and powerfully armed him. *Plut. in vit. Gracc.*

(40) Caius Gracchus was ſeveral years younger than his brother Tiberius, and but juſt entering upon the ſtage of the world, when the latter was acting a principal part in that great

political drama which drew the attention, and engaged the paſſions, of the whole Roman commonwealth. It was not till about ten years after the tragical cataſtrophe, which cloſed the life of the elder Gracchus, that Caius opened his way to the tribuneſhip: and he had not yet given any deciſive indications of the uſe he meant to make of his power, when the preſent conference is ſuppoſed to have paſſed. But it ſoon appeared that, actuated by the ſame principles, ſpirit, and abilities which ſo conſpicuouſly marked the character of his illuſtrious brother, and undiſmayed by the example of his unhappy fate; he was determined to purſue and enforce the ſame plan of reformation, or periſh in the attempt. The conſequence was, that after many animated efforts to withſtand the oppoſition of the nobles, he fell a victim to their ſuperior power, and added one martyr more to the cauſe of an injured people.

All

All public ſpirit ſeems to have expired with the Gracchi: for after their death, as a late elegant and ingenious hiſtorian remarks, "there never "aroſe a Tribune honeſt and generous "enough to eſpouſe the true intereſt of "the people. The civil conteſts hence-"forward were between the ſenate te-"nacious of their ſovereign rule, and a "few grandees who ſought to wreſt it "out of their hands; or between one "grandee and another, each ſupported "by an army at his devotion: conteſts "which had their final iſſue in the "ſubjection of Rome to an abſolute "monarchy." *Plut. in vit. Gracc. Hooke's R. H.* II. p. 560.

(41) The original manner of voting among the Romans at the choice of their magiſtrates, was by announcing the name of the perſon to whom the elector gave his ſuffrage. The Tribune Gabinius, in order to prevent the dangerous influence in elections which this

this method gave the rich and powerful, propoſed and carried a law in the Y. of R. 614, by which it was declared, that for the future the elections ſhould proceed by balloting. A few years afterwards, L. Caſſius, another Tribune, extended this mode of voting to the judges on trials before the people. The ſucceſs of bribery muſt ever be much too precarious to be hazarded, where laws of this nature prevail: and one can ſcarcely believe that any real friend of civil liberty, ſhould expreſs himſelf concerning them in the manner which Cicero does in the paſſage to which this note refers. It appears, however, that there was a time when he held a different opinion: for there exiſts a fragment of a ſpeech he delivered the year before he was choſen Conſul, in which he gives the law in queſtion its proper epithet, and calls it "*principium juſtiſſimæ libertatis.*" *Pigh. Annal. Frag. Orat. pro Cornel.*

(42) Themiſ-

(42) Themiſtocles, for the reaſons aſſigned in the text, being ſentenced to baniſhment by that ſingular, but well-known inſtitution among the Athenian laws, called oſtraciſm; entered into the ſervice of Artaxerxes, the ſon and ſucceſſor of Xerxes, whoſe formidable armaments againſt the Grecian ſtates he had ſome years before totally overthrown at the famous battle of Salamis. Altho Cicero poſitively aſſerts, that both Themiſtocles and Coriolanus deſtroyed themſelves by their own hands; yet the diſagreement of hiſtorians upon thoſe points, has left the facts altogether uncertain. *Corn. Nep. et Plut. in vit. Them.*

(43) It appears from ſeveral oblique inſinuations ſcattered through this performance, that altho' Cicero's principal deſign in drawing it up, was to ſettle the true meaſures and offices of a very important moral connection, yet he had an indirect view likewiſe to

to the particular principles of the times, and the circumſtances in which public affairs ſtood when he compoſed it. The preſent paſſage evidently glances at the partizans of Julius Cæſar. No ſtateſman ever poſſeſſed a greater number of perſonal friends; as none ever uſed more addreſs to acquire them, by every artful application to their intereſts or their paſſions. But many of thoſe who joined his faction, entered into it from a diſintereſted affection to the man; and they pleaded the *duties* of friendſhip in their juſtification. Thoſe duties appear, indeed, to have been conſidered by ſome of the antients, as ſuperior to every other claim of moral obligation: it was a frequent ſaying of Themiſtocles, "God forbid "I ſhould ever ſit upon a tribunal "where my friends were not more "favoured than ſtrangers." Agreeably to theſe ſentiments, there are two very curious and ſpirited letters extant in the collection of Cicero's familiar epiſtles,

epiſtles, the one written by Mutius, and the other by Aſinius Pollio, in which they each of them vindicate their adherence to his cauſe, upon the ſole principle of friendſhip. The Engliſh reader may find them in the third vol. of the tranſlation of *Cicero's Letters*, p. 112, *and* p. 207.

(44) It is by no means clear to what ſect of philoſophers Cicero alludes; perhaps, as one of the commentators gueſſes, to the *Cyrenaic*. It is certain at leaſt, that ſome of their tenets, as collected by Laertius in the life of Ariſtippus of Cyrene, their founder, renders the conjecture not improbable.

It was the peculiar character of this philoſopher, that he had the convenient art of accommodating himſelf with much good grace and complacency, to the various ranks and viciſſitudes

ciſſitudes of human life'; as it was the capital doctrine of his cool philoſophy, to preſerve the mind in a conſtant ſtate of perfect tranquillity. This ſelfiſh compoſure can no otherwiſe be poſſeſſed, than by baniſhing from the heart thoſe generous affections, which cannot fail of occaſionally producing the diſquietude of ſympathetic anxieties. Martial has expreſſed theſe ſentiments in a pretty epigram:

Si vitare velis acerba quædam,
Et triſtes animæ cavere morſus,
Nulli te facias nimis ſodalem:
Gaudebis minus et minus dolebis.

Mart. Epig. V. 43.

' *Omnis Ariſtippum decuit color, et ſtatus, et res,*
Tentantem majora, fere præſentibus æquum.

Hor. Ep. I. 17.

Would'ſt

Would'ſt thou ſecure thy guarded breaſt
From many a tender, anxious, pain?
Let cold indifference, wiſer gueſt!
From friendſhip's warmth thy heart reſtrain.
Thy joys will thus be leſs, 'tis true;
But leſs will prove thy ſorrows too.

(45) The Epicureans, whom Cicero particularly points at in this place, although they univerſally aſcribed the ſocial connections of every kind to a principle of *ſelf-intereſt* alone; yet ſome of them acknowledged, that after a long and habitual intercourſe had taken place, the friendly affections might ſtill continue, notwithſtanding every advantage reſulting from the union ſhould totally ceaſe [d]. But this was an unwary conceſſion: for intereſt cannot poſſibly be the neceſſary baſis of friendſhip, if that alliance may in any caſe be equally well ſupported without it.

[d] Torquatus ap. Cic. de Fin. I. 20.

(46) Cicero ſeems in this paſſage to have had his eye upon a particular cuſtom that prevailed in Rome, by which the general whoſe arms had made any new acquiſition of territory to the republic, was the declared patron of thoſe people whom he had ſubdued. *Theſe* were ever afterwards conſidered as the hereditary clients of his family; to the head of which they conſtantly had recourſe as their ſtanding advocate in all thoſe cauſes of a national concern which they had occaſion to plead before the ſenate. *Vid. Cic. de. Offic.* II.

(47) The unhappy Ovid, in one of his plaintive epiſtles from Pontus, gives an example in his own perſon of an unexpected reverſe of fortune, in ſome very pathetic lines:

Ludit in humanis divina potentia rebus,
Et certum præſens vix habet hora fidem.
Litus ad Euxinum, ſiquis mihi diceret, ibes,

Et

Et metues arcu ne feriare Getæ;
I bibe, dixiſſem, purgantes pectora ſuccos,
Quicquid et in tota naſcitur Anticyra:
Sum tamen hæc paſſus!

The gods delight to ſport with human kind,
And ſcarce the preſent moment truſt can find.
" The day will come," if once I had been told,
" When exil'd Thou, where Euxine's waves are roll'd,
" Shalt dread each inſtant, level'd at thy heart,
" The wild Sarmatian's unrelenting dart;"
Go! frantic prophet, I with ſcorn had ſaid,
Go! cool with helebore thy raving head.
Yet ſuch my fate hath prov'd!

(48) *Les grands ſe piquent* (ſays an admirable moral painter[a]) *d'ouvrir une allée dans un foret; de ſoutenir des terres par de longues murailles; de dorer des plafonds; de faire venir dix pouces d'eau;*

[a] Bruyere.

de meubler une orangerie: mais de rendre un cœur content; *de combler une* ame de joie; *de prevenir* d'extremes beſoins, *ou d'y* remedier; *leur curioſité ne s'etend point juſques-la.*

It ſhould ſeem indeed, from the miſapplication uſually made of great wealth, and the remarkable infelicity that hath generally attended the "lords "of uſeleſs thouſands" in all ages, from the *Timon* of Lucian to the *Villars* of Pope; that a curſe is intailed upon immoderate riches. One ſcarcely knows, at leaſt, how elſe to account for ſo aſtoniſhing, yet common a phænomenon in the moral world; that men who are ſupplied with the greateſt abundance of thoſe *external* means which, when properly employed, largely contribute to human felicity, rarely ſeem to be ſenſible of the only modes of application which can prevent them from proving a misfortune. One judicious direction of wealth, as the moſt

productive

productive of heart-felt happineſs, is that which Cicero has particularly pointed out in the preſent paſſage; and if a philoſopher ſhould not be credited, let a poet ſupport his teſtimony.

Callidus effracta nummos Fur auferet arca;
Proſternet patrios impia flamma Lares.
Debitor uſurum pariter ſortemque negabit;
Non reddet ſterilis ſemina jacta ſeges.
Diſpenſatorem fallax ſpoliabit amica;
Merſibus extructas obruet unda rates.
Extra fortunam eſt quicquid donatur amicis:
Quas dederis ſolas ſemper habebis opes.

Martial. L. V. ep. 43.

Some felon hand may ſteal thy gold away;
Or flames deſtructive on thy manſion prey.
The fraudful debtor may thy loan deny;
Or blaſted fields no more their fruits ſupply.
The am'rous ſteward, to adorn his whore,
With ſpoils may deck her from thy plunder'd ſtore.

Thy freighted veſſels, ere the port they gain,
O'erwhelm'd by ſtorms may ſink beneath
the main:
But what thou giv'ſt a friend for friend-
ſhip's ſake,
Is the ſole wealth which fortune ne'er can
take.

(49) The Roman poet, who was not more eminent by his genius than amiable in his moral character, affords, perhaps, the moſt remarkable inſtance that any where occurs, of the *conceſſions* which a mind ſtrongly impregnated with ſentiments of genuine amity, is capable of making. Virgil's ſuperior talents rendered him qualified to excel in all the nobler ſpecies of poetical compoſition: nevertheleſs, from the moſt uncommon delicacy of friendſhip, he ſacrificed to his intimacy with Horace, the unrivalled reputation he might have acquired by indulging his *lyric* vein; as from the ſame refined motive, he forbore to exerciſe his *dramatic*

matic powers, that he might not obſcure the glory of his friend Varius.

Aurum et opes et rura, frequens donabit amicus;
Qui velit ingenio cedere, *rarus erit.*

Mart. VIII. 18.

[e] (49) Dio, the magnanimous deliverer of the Syracuſians from the tyranny of Dionyſius, gave a ſtriking proof of a truely great and elevated mind, when being informed that Calippus, the man in whoſe friendſhip he had always placed the moſt implicit confidence, was engaged in a conſpiracy againſt his life, he refuſed to inquire into the truth of the charge; generouſly declaring, that "death was preferable to the pain of perpetually ſtanding upon the defenſive againſt one's friends *f*."

[e] The numeral in the text, p. 91, referring to the preſent Remark, ought to have been 50, but the *erratum* was not diſcovered till it was too late to be corrected.

f Plut. Apotheg.

Nevertheleſs, there does not ſeem ſufficient reaſon to agree with Scipio in abſolutely, and without reſtriction, condemning the maxim which he deemed ſo unworthy the liberal ſpirit of a true philoſopher. For it is but ſuppoſing that Bias meant to apply it only to thoſe kinds of looſe connections, which in the ordinary language of the world paſs under the abuſed name of *friendſhip*, to render the precept perfectly conſiſtent with a juſt and laudable caution. The philoſopher's maxim, it is probable, had the ſame ſort of connection for its object, which a late noble author had in view when he obſerved in a letter to his ſon, that "the viciſſi-
"tudes of courts frequently make
"friends of enemies, and enemies of
"friends: you muſt labour therefore
"to acquire that great and uncommon
"talent of hating with good breeding,
"and loving with prudence; to make
"no quarrel irreconcileable by ſilly and
"unneceſſary indications of anger; and
"no

"no friendſhip dangerous by a wan-
"ton, indiſcreet, and unreſerved confi-
"dence." *Cheſt. Let. vol.* iv. p. 368. 8*vo. ed.*

(50) Cicero is by no means ſingular when he indulges friendſhip, in certain particular ſituations, with privileges which do not preciſely coincide with the ſtricteſt and moſt ſevere rules of rigid rectitude: for this was a doctrine univerſally maintained by all the antient writers on the ſubject. The preſent paſſage is literally copied from a treatiſe on friendſhip, compoſed by Theophraſtus, the ſucceſſor of Ariſtotle, and one of the moſt celebrated of his diſciples. Aulus Gellius complains, however, that neither Cicero, nor any other of thoſe great maſters who were ſo unanimous in granting this licence, have given ſufficient ſatisfaction to a conſcientious inquirer, in what caſes and to what extent it might juſtly be claimed *z*. But it

z Noct. At. I. 3.

appears by thoſe paſſages which this antient critic has cited from Theophraſtus, that he was ſomewhat more explicit than Cicero, in treating this delicate article; yet upon the whole, his opinion ſeems to have been, that the allowed caſes could only be determined by their own particular nature and circumſtances, as they might occaſionally happen to ariſe.

But Cicero, in that admirable treatiſe on *moral duties*, addreſſed to his ſon, and drawn up for his particular uſe, thought it incumbent upon him to deliver his ſentiments upon this nice queſtion, in clearer and more expreſs terms. Accordingly, he there ſpecifies the two particular caſes evidently alluded to in the text; and marks out, in a diſtinct manner, the conduct which he thinks may, or may not be juſtifiably held when they happen to occur. The inſtances he mentions are, where a man is called upon to act either as a *judge*,

or

or an *advocate*, in the cauſe of his friend. "If it ſhould come before "him in his *judicial* capacity," ſays this excellent moraliſt, "he is no "longer to conſider himſelf in the cha-"racter of a *friend*, but of a magiſtrate "who is ſolemnly ſworn to give ſen-"tence according to evidence: and "the only *favour* he can juſtifiably "ſhew, is to appoint the trial, in con-"ſequence of the diſcretionary power "with which he is inveſted by the "laws, at the time that may be moſt "convenient to the party who is his "friend. But when he appears as an "*advocate*, he is under much leſs re-"ſtraint. He may ſupport the cauſe "of his friend, provided his crime be "not of a very atrocious nature, with-"out any impeachment of his own "integrity: and in this he acts agree-"ably, not only to the general practice "and expectation of the world, but to "the common dictates of humanity. "The *judge*, indeed, muſt ſtrictly and

"invariably

" invariably be governed by truth, as " far as he can diſcover it, in every " queſtion that comes before him: but " the *advocate* may be permitted to give " a plauſible colouring to the fact in " charge, and place it in the moſt ad- " vantageous, though it ſhould not be " its *proper*, light [b]. And this is a doc- " trine," continues Cicero, " which I " would not venture to advance, eſpe- " cially in a treatiſe of ethics, if I were " not ſupported in it by the authority " of Panætius, one of the moſt judi-

[b] *Neque contra* remp. neque contra *jusjurandum ac fidem*, amici cauſâ *vir* bonus *faciet*, *ne ſi* judex *quidem erit de ipſo amico: ponit enim* perſonam *amici* cum induit *judicis*. *Tantum dabit amicitiæ ut veram amici cauſam eſſe velit*; *ut orandæ liti ſtempus*, quod per leges liceat, *accommodet*. *Cum vero* jurato *ſententia dicenda ſit*, *meminerit ſe* Deum *adhibere* teſtem.—*Si omnia facienda ſint quæ amici* velint, *non amicitiæ tales*, *ſed* conjurationes *putandæ ſunt*.—*Cum igitur id quod* utile *videtur in amicitia*, *cum eo quod* honeſtum *eſt*, *comparatur*: jaceat *utilitatis ſpecies*, valeat *honeſtas*.—*Religio ac fides* anteponatur *amicitiæ*. De Off. III. 10.

" cious

" cious and reſpectable writers among " the Stoic philoſophers[i]."

Cicero compoſed his *Offices* after the publication of this Eſſay on Friendſhip; the paſſages therefore here produced from the former, cannot but be conſidered as throwing the ſtrongeſt and moſt unequivocal light upon his meaning in the preſent text. It muſt be acknowledged at the ſame time, that unaſſiſted by this *comparative* view of his ſentiments, they are ſo looſely expreſſed in the ſentence under conſideration, as to juſtify a ſuſpicion that he thought the privileges of friendſhip, in certain circumſtances, ſuperior to moral obligations of a much higher and more

[i] *Nec tamen—habendum eſt religioni*, nocentem *aliquando*, *modo ne* nefarium impiumque, *defendere: vult hoc multitudo*, *patitur conſuetudo*, *fert etiam humanitas. Judicis eſt ſemper in cauſis* verum, *ſequi: patroni non nunquam* veriſimila, *etiam ſi minus ſit* verum *defendere. —Quod ſcribere, præſertim cum de philoſophia ſcriberem, non auderem, niſi idem placeret graviſſimo ſtoicorum Panætio.* De Off. II. 14.

ſacred

ſacred nature. The author, at leaſt, of theſe Remarks confeſſes, it formerly led him to entertain that ſuſpicion, and to expreſs it in a collection of letters publiſhed many years ago under a fictitious name [k]: but having ſince had occaſion to inquire into Cicero's philoſophical tenets with more attention and accuracy, he has great ſatisfaction in the preſent opportunity of thus publicly *retracting* an opinion too haſtily formed, and vindicating, againſt his own cenſure, the principles of this noble moraliſt.

(51) Among the very rare inſtances of this nature which occur in the political hiſtory of mankind, there is not one, perhaps, more worthy of notice than that which was exemplified in the perſons of the two greateſt ſtateſmen and captains that Greece ever produced; Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

[k] See Fitzoſborne's Let. p. 131.

There is nothing, indeed, more to be admired in the ſhining characters of theſe illuſtrious ſupports and ornaments of the Theban commonwealth, than that perfect union and conſtant friendſhip which ſubſiſted between them, during their joint direction of public affairs, both in peace and war. If we obſerve, ſays Plutarch, what happened in the ſame ſituation between Ariſtides and Themiſtocles, Cimon and Pericles, Nicias and Alcibiades; we ſhall find their reſpective adminiſtrations full of tumult, contentions and diſputes. As Epaminondas and Pelopidas poſſeſſed the firſt poſts in the ſtate, all the moſt important intereſts of the republic paſſed through their hands, and was truſted to their management. In ſuch delicate conjunctures, what a variety of incidents muſt naturally ariſe, to give occaſion to mutual jealouſy and diſſenſion! But no diverſity of opinion, no oppoſition of intereſt, nor the ſlighteſt emotion

of

of envy ever interrupted, or impaired, that ſingular harmony in which they lived and acted together. The reaſon, continues Plutarch, is evident; their friendſhip was founded upon an unalterable principle of virtue, which ſolely and conſtantly directed their views, not to what would moſt contribute to the advancement of their own particular intereſt and power, but what would beſt promote the general welfare and glory of their country. *Plut. in vit. Pelopid.*

(52) "*Ma diſgrace*" (ſays an ingenious writer, not leſs diſtinguiſhed by his talents than by the high rank from which he fell [a]) *ma diſgrace me fit perdre le meilleur de mes amis, ou pour mieux dire, elle me ſervit a le* connoiſtre, *et m'apprit que* l'adverſité *etoit bien plus la veritable* borne *de l'amitié, que les* autels.

The fertility of Ovid's genius furniſhed him, in his misfortunes, with a

[a] *Buſſi. Rabutin.*

variety

variety of ſtriking images to illuſtrate the ſame mortifying truth; as there is ſcarcely a poem which he wrote in his exile, that will not afford an affecting proof of Cicero's obſervation. Nothing can be more happily imagined, nor more pathetically expreſſed, than the thought in the following lines:

Ut—comes radios per ſolis euntibus umbra,
Cum latet hic preſſus nubibus, illa fugit;
Mobile ſic ſequitur Fortunæ lumina vulgus,
Quæ ſimul inductâ nocte teguntur, abit.

Triſt. I.

As when the Sun breaks forth with ſplendor gay,
The ſhadow follows his all-gilding ray;
But ſoon as clouds o'ercaſt his happier light,
Follower no more! ſhe takes her faithleſs flight:
The world's vain friends, ungen'rous, thus recede,
When Fortune's gloom to brighter days ſucceed.

It is impoſſible to read his tender but animated remonſtrance in the ſubſequent lines, without feeling the moſt ſenſible indignation at the baſe deſertion which occaſioned them:

Dum mea puppis erat validâ fundata carinâ,
Qui mecum velles currere primus eras:
Nunc quia contraxit vultum Fortuna, recedis;
Auxilio poſtquam ſcis opus eſſe tuo.
Diſſimulas etiam, nec me vis noſſe videri:
Quiſque ſit, audito nomine, Naſo rogas?
Ille ego ſum, quamquam non vis audire, vetuſtâ
Pene puer puero junctus amicitiâ.
Ille ego, qui primus tua ſeria noſſe ſolebam;
Qui tibi jucundis primus addeſſe jocis.
Ille ego convictor denſoque domeſticus uſu:
Ille ego judiciis unica Muſa tuis.
Idem ego ſum, qui an vivam, perfide, neſcis:
Cura tibi de quo quærere nulla fuit!

Ex. Pont. IV. 3.

Ere the rude winds did yet my bark aſſail,
The firſt wert Thou to ſhare the proſp'rous gale.

Now

Now, ſad reverſe! when ſtorms enrage the main,
Thy aiding arm I ſeek, but ſeek in vain:
Each antient tie that bound thee mine, diſclaim'd,
Who Ovid is? thou aſk'ſt, whene'er I'm nam'd.
He *is*, tho' glad to blot him from thy mind,
Whom early friendſhip long with thee had join'd;
The choſen partner of thy varied day,
As ſway'd thy heart the ſerious or the gay;
At thy convivial meals domeſtic gueſt,
Whoſe converſe pleas'd and numbers charm'd thy breaſt.
Yes, this is *He* whom thou diſdain'ſt to know,
Falſe to thy vow, and callous to his woe!
No more the object of thy faithleſs care,
Thou aſk'ſt not if he breathes the vital air!

(53) It was the ſaying of a certain philoſopher cited by Seneca, "that "the ſatisfaction in conciliating a

" friendſhip, is the greateſt pleaſure " of the connection; as an ingenious " artiſt is more delighted in executing " his performance, than when it is " completed." [l] Falſe as this maxim is, Seneca's philoſopher ſeems, however, to have better underſtood the nature of amity, than Cicero's queriſt; as the ſentiment of the former at leaſt implies, that, abſtracted from all conſequences, there is a moſt ſenſible complacency annexed to the ſimple exerciſe of friendly offices. But both were equally miſtaken in ſuppoſing, that, to a mind rightly formed, the ſatisfaction of a well-contracted alliance of this kind, could poſſibly become languid by poſſeſſion. The moral affections can never be ſatiated by the enjoyment of their proper objects:

[l] *Attalus Philoſophus dicere ſolebat, Jucundius eſſe amicum facere, quam habere; quomodo artifici jucundius eſt pingere, quam pinxiſſe.* Senec. Ep. 9.

in

in every other paſſion indeed of the human heart,

The beſt of things beyond their meaſure cloy;
Sleep's balmy bleſſing, love's endearing joy,
The feaſt, the dance, whate'er mankind deſire,
E'en the ſweet charms of ſacred numbers tire [m].

(54) The commentators ſuppoſe, that Cicero's memory failed him in this place; as the ſtory which he applies to Neoptolemus has always been related of Achilles; whoſe mother ſent him to the court of Lycomedes, in order to prevent his going to the Trojan war. *Hygin. Fabul.* 96.

(55) Q. Pompeius, the firſt of his family who was raiſed to any conſiderable poſt in the republic, was anceſtor to Pompey the Great. He was choſen Conſul in the Y. of R. 612: and the

[m] Iliad, Pope's tranſ.

manner by which he obtained that office, moſt deſervedly coſt him, not only the friendſhip of Scipio and Lælius, but the eſteem of every worthy man in Rome. For Lælius intending to appear as a candidate for that dignity at the enſuing election; Scipio applied to Pompeius to know if he had any thoughts of ſtanding; if not, he requeſted him to exert his intereſt in favour of his friend. Pompeius promiſed to comply; but inſtead of keeping his word, he ſolicited, and obtained, the conſulſhip for himſelf. *Plut. Apotheg.*

The diſſenſion between Scipio and Metellus was of a very different nature, and occaſioned ſolely by a diſagreement in opinion with reſpect to public meaſures. A variance of this ſort between men who are equally actuated by the ſame honeſt intentions, and patriotic ſpirit, may produce a coolneſs, but never can riſe into

into enmity. Accordingly it appears that Metellus entertained, all his life, the higheſt reſpect and veneration for the talents and virtues of Scipio. *Val. Max.* L. IV. c. 1. N° 12.

(56) Martial, ſoliciting one of his contemporaries to be admitted into the number of his friends, concludes an epigram which he addreſſes to him for that purpoſe, with a ſentiment perfectly agreeable to Cicero's advice:

Ad FUSCUM.

Si quid, Fuſce, vacas adhucamari,
(Nam ſunt hinc tibi, ſunt et hinc amici)
Unum, ſi ſupereſt, locum rogamus.
Nec me, quod tibi ſum novus, recuſes:
Omnes hoc veteres tui fuerunt.
Tu tantum inſpice *qui* novus *paratur,*
An fieri poſſit vetus *ſodalis.*

Epig. I. 55.

To FUSCUS.

If yet one corner in thy breaſt
Remains, good Fuſcus, unpoſſeſt,
(For many a friend, I know, is thine)
Give me to boaſt that corner mine.
Nor thou the honour'd place I ſue
Refuſe to an acquaintance new:
The oldeſt friend of all thy ſtore
Was once, 'tis certain, nothing more.
It matters not how late the choice,
If but approv'd by reaſon's voice.
Then let thy ſole inquiry be,
If thou can'ſt find ſuch *worth* in me,
That conſtant, as the years are roll'd,
Matures *new* friendſhip into *old*.

(57) This was Ariſtotle's definition of friendſhip [a]. There is a fine paſſage cited by Mr. Pope in his notes on the Iliad, from the lives of thoſe heroes who were engaged in the Trojan war, compoſed by Philoſtratus, which turns upon the ſame ſentiment. Ajax is introduced by that Greek

[a] Εϛι ὁ φιλος αλλος αυτος. Ethic. VIII. 1.

writer,

writer, inquiring of Achilles, "Which "of all the wounds he had received "in battle, was moſt painful to him? "Achilles anſwers, That which he "received from Hector. But Hec- "tor, ſays Ajax, never gave you "a wound. Yes, replies Achilles, a "*mortal* one, when he ſlew my friend "Patroclus."

(58) The advice which Plutarch gives to thoſe, who expect greater perfection in others than they are able, or diſpoſed, to acquire themſelves; is full of that candid and humane ſpirit, which ſo eminently marks the writings of this amiable author. He introduces it by obſerving, that when Anaxagoras was condoled on the death of his ſon; the philoſopher calmly replied, *I perfectly well knew he was mortal.* In like manner, ſays this admirable moraliſt, every man ſhould ſay within himſelf (as the particular occaſion may happen to require)

" I knew that my ſlave was no philo-
" ſopher; that my friend was liable to
" paſſion; that my wife was but a
" woman." " If the man," continues Plutarch, " who is inclined to ani-
" madvert with too much ſeverity on
" the failings of others, would turn his
" eyes inward, and honeſtly aſk his
" heart, *Was I never guilty of the ſame?*
" the true anſwer to that queſtion
" could not fail to render him leſs ob-
" ſervant of thoſe little pardonable de-
" fects in the characters of his connec-
" tions, at which he is apt to take ſuch
" quick offence." *Plut. de cohibend. Iracund.*

(59) Cicero ſeems to have had in his thoughts the happy effects of thoſe *martial* friendſhips which were cuſtomary among the young men in antient Greece, and productive of the moſt glorious exploits;

His

His amor unus erat, pariterque in bella ruebant.

VIRG.

Of this kind was the connection between Niſus and Uryalus, whoſe generous union, bold adventure, and fatal cataſtrophe are ſo beautifully and affectingly related in the ninth Book of Virgil's Æneid. Pelopidas, the famous Theban general, compoſed a battalion conſiſting of three hundred of theſe ſelect friends: and it was principally owing to the courage and magnanimity of this choſen band of *Lovers*, as they were called, that he obtained one of the moſt ſignal victories over the Lacedæmonians that is recorded in their hiſtory [n]. Nor is it only in antient Greece that inſtances of this kind of *heroic* amity occur; they prevailed among the barbarous Scythians, as appears from Lucian's dialogue intitled *Toxaris*; and are ſtill

[n] *Plut. in vit. Pelopid.*

frequent

frequent (as modern travellers of good credit relate) among the ſavage nations of North America.

(60) The profuſion with which Timon diſſipated a very conſiderable fortune; the infidelity of thoſe pretended friends upon whom he had indiſcriminately ſquandered it away; and the utter deteſtation which, on account of their baſe ingratitude, he conceived againſt the whole human race; are circumſtances in the life of this famous miſanthropiſt, which, having been wrought into one of Shakeſpear's celebrated tragedies, are perfectly well known to every Engliſh reader: and it is ſcarcely any thing more than antient hiſtory hath tranſmitted concerning him. All that can be farther collected relating to this extraordinary man, is, that he was a contemporary of Alcibiades, who flouriſhed about four centuries before the Chriſtian æra; that he broke his leg by falling from a tree; and

and that the phyſicians (for in thoſe days the two branches of the healing art were united in the ſame profeſſion) unanimouſly refuſing to come to his aſſiſtance, the fracture turned to a mortification, and put an end to his worthleſs life. *Vid Not. Hemſter. ad Lucian. Colloq. Selecta*, p. 86.

(61) Terence, as has been already remarked in a preceding note, was in the number of that ſelect ſociety of men of genius and literature, in whoſe converſation Scipio and Lælius uſually paſſed their private hours. This gave occaſion to the enemies of the poet to propagate a report, that the merit of his plays was owing to the aſſiſtance he received from theſe his two noble friends. Terence alludes to this circumſtance in his prologue to the Adelphi; but in ſo delicate and artful a manner, that, without denying or admitting the charge, he pays a refined compliment to his ſuppoſed

poſed illuſtrious coadjutors, and at the ſame time turns the reproach into an article of peculiar honour to himſelf:

Nam quod iſti dicunt malevoli, homines nobiles
Hunc adjutare aſſiduèque una ſcribere;
Quod iſti maledictum vehemens exiſtimant,
Eam laudem hic ducit maximam: cum illis placet
Qui vobis univerſis et populo placeant.

—

(62) The *paraſitic* character appears to have been one of the principal objects, againſt which the antient ſatiriſts pointed their ſtrongeſt invective. The faſhion of encouraging foreigners, had introduced an inundation of indigent ſtrangers of various nations into Rome; but it was among the Greek dependants and domeſtics, that the moſt artful and inſinuating of this ſort of men were principally found. Juvenal, in one of his moſt animated ſatires, has directed the keeneſt poignancy of his wit and indignation againſt this ſup-

ple

ple and inſidious tribe. That admirable poem has been ſo happily, and with ſuch a congenial ſpirit, imitated and *applied* in our own language; that a few extracts from it will prove the beſt comment on Cicero's text:

London, the needy villain's general home,
The common-ſewer of Paris and of Rome,
With eager thirſt, by folly or by fate,
Sucks in the dregs of each corrupted ſtate.
Forgive my tranſport on a theme like this;
I cannot bear a French metropolis.—
All ſciences a faſting Monſieur knows;
And bid him go to Hell, to Hell he goes.—
Studious to pleaſe, and ready to ſubmit,
The ſupple Gaul was born a paraſite:
Still to his intereſt true, where'er he goes,
Wit, bravery, worth, his laviſh tongue beſtows;
Practis'd his maſter's notions to embrace,
Repeat his maxims, and reflect his face;
To ſhake with laughter ere the jeſt he hear,
To pour at will the counterfeited tear;

And

And as his patron hints the cold or heat,
To ſhake in dog-days, in December ſweat.
How, when competitors like theſe contend,
Can ſurly Virtue hope to find a friend?

Dodſley's Miſc. Vol. I. p. 101.

(63) By an antient ordinance of the republic, no perſon could be choſen twice into the ſame magiſtracy, unleſs an interval of at leaſt ten years had paſſed ſince his laſt election. But Caius Papirius Carbo, when he was tribune [o], endeavoured to procure a repeal of this law, and to impower the people to chooſe the ſame perſon immediately on the expiration of his office. *Langius in loc.*

(64) It was cuſtomary, when the orators harangued the people upon any public occaſion in the forum, to addreſs them with their faces turned

[o] In the Y. of R. 622.

towards

towards the contiguous temple in which the ſenate uſually met; as a mark of reſpect to that ſupreme council of the ſtate. But Licinius, to ſhew his contempt of the order, ſpoke with his back turned upon that aſſembly. The ſpeech which Lælius delivered upon this occaſion, ſeems to have been a maſterpiece of that mild and inſinuating ſpecies of eloquence which was the diſtinguiſhing characteriſtic of his oratory; as Cicero, taking notice of it in another part of his writings, emphatically ſtyles it *aureolam oratiunculam*.

(65) Seneca, in one of his letters addreſſed to Lucilius, has a ſentiment upon this ſubject worthy of thoſe pure morals, which ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed that philoſophy he profeſſed to follow. After recommending to his friend an unlimited confidence, ſo eſſential to the genuine ſpirit of true amity; he adds the following admirable reflection: *Tu quidem ita vive, ut nihil tibi*

committas, niſi quod committere etiam inimico poſſis: ſed quia interveniunt quædam quæ conſuetudo fecit arcana; cum amico omnes curas, omnes cogitationes tuas, miſce. Senec. Ep. 3.

(66) Concerning Paulus, ſee before note 9. p. 174: with reſpect to Gallus and Cato, ſee Rem. on Cato, p. 233, note 56. and p. 154, note 6. The perſon here mentioned by the ſingle appellation of *Naſica*, was probably Publius Cornelius Scipio Naſica, ſurnamed *Optimus* on account of his eminent virtues. He was conſul in the Y. of R. five hundred and ſixty-two. The preſent conference is ſuppoſed to have paſſed immediately after the death of Scipio, which happened in the ſix hundred and thirtieth Y. of R. and the fifty-ſixth of his own age. Now Lælius ſpeaks of himſelf in this treatiſe, not only as ſenior to his deceaſed friend, but as being arrived at a time of life when, according to the common courſe of nature, he muſt ſoon follow

low him. Admitting therefore, what ſeems to be a reaſonable conjecture, that he was at this time about ſeventy, and that Naſica was elected conſul when he was forty-two, (which was as ſoon as he could be legally choſen) the latter muſt have been advanced in life when the former was about twenty: and this perfectly coincides with the early date which Lælius here gives to the commencement of their friendſhip.

Gracchus, the laſt perſon mentioned in this paſſage, was memorable not only for his own illuſtrious virtues, but as being father of the two Gracchi; thoſe celebrated patriotic martyrs, whoſe political conduct, and unhappy cataſtrophe, have been the ſubject of a former remark.

The ſeveral venerable perſonages whom Lælius names as in the number of his *early* friends, were each of them among the principal orna-

ments of his own times [a]. The advantage of entering into the world under the ſteerage of ſuch wiſe and approved pilots, cannot be more forcibly illuſtrated than by the experimental teſtimony of one of the moſt reſpectable characters which our country has produced: Lord Clarendon was often heard to ſay, "that next the immediate "bleſſing and providence of God Al-"mighty, which had preſerved him "throughout the whole courſe of this "life from many dangers and diſad-"vantages, in which many other young "men were loſt; he owed all the "little he knew, and the little good "that was in him, to the friendſhips "and converſation he ſtill had been "uſed to, of the moſt excellent men "in their ſeveral kinds that lived in "that age, by whoſe learning, and in-"formation, and inſtruction, he formed "his ſtudies, and mended his under-"ſtanding, and by whoſe example he

[a] See Rem. on Cato, p. 167. No. 21.

"formed

" formed his manners, ſubdued that " pride, and ſuppreſſed that heat and " paſſion he was naturally inclined to " be tranſported with. And always " charged his children to follow his ex- " ample in that point; proteſting that " in the whole courſe of his life he " never knew one man, of what condi- " tion ſoever, arrive to any degree of " reputation in the world, who made " choice or delighted in the company " or converſation of thoſe who in their " qualities and their parts were not " much ſuperior to himſelf." *Clarendon's Memoirs of his own life*, Vol. I. p. 29.

(67) Among the many *private* virtues which added luſtre to the public characters of Scipio and Lælius, their ſingular *temperance* was particularly conſpicuous, in an age when the riches that had flowed into Rome in conſequence of her Aſiatic conqueſts, had begun to ſpread wide the contagion of ſenſual gratifications. Every nobler emulation was at this time yielding to the contemptible vanity of excelling

in the moſt expenſive indulgencies of the table. Lucilius, a contemporary poet, and one of the firſt ſatyriſts that appeared among the Romans, expoſed with great ſpirit and manly indignation this mean and inverted ambition. The following lines, in which he celebrates Lælius for his abſtemious and exemplary courſe of diet, have been preſerved among the very few fragments remaining of that poet's works:

O lapathe, ut jactare neceſſe eſt, Cognitu' cui ſis!
In quo Læliu' clamores ſophos, ille ſolebat
Edere, compellans gumias ex ordine noſtros.
Læliu' præclarè et rectè ſophos, illudque vere:
" *O Publi, ô gurges, Galloni: es homo miſer,*" *inquit,*
" *Cœnaſti in vita nunquam bene, cum omnia in*
" *iſta*
" *Conſumis ſquilla, atque acipenſere cum de-*
" *cumano.*"

Ap. Cic. de Fin. II. 8.

" Delicious ſorrel! were thy merits known,
" E'en pamper'd ſenſu'liſts thy worth would own!

" Twas

'Twas thus *ſage* Lælius (for his virtues claim
The well-earn'd title of that honour'd name)
Oft, with indignant warmth, aloud would cry,
As ſome ſwoln glutton ſtruck his wond'ring eye.
" And thou, Gallonius, man of mighty maw!
" A right good feaſt," he ſaid, " did'ſt ne'er enjoy,
" Tho' thy vain wealth's conſum'd to load the diſh
" With the proud weight of each gigantic fiſh!"

Sea-fiſh of enormous magnitude, was one of the moſt extravagant articles of luxurious indulgencies among the Romans. Beſides the original coſt, which was very conſiderable, the price of the ſeveral ingredients with which their ſauce was compoſed, together with that of a cook properly ſkilled in the art of dreſſing them; was raiſed to a ſum beyond what even modern profuſion could eaſily conceive. Theſe articles alone were purchaſed at an expence equal to

that of the moſt magnificent triumphs; and no qualification was held in ſuch high repute, as being an adept in the moſt ruinous modes of faſhionable cookery [p]. As theſe leviathans of luxurious tables, were the produce alone of the ocean; large ſtore ponds of ſea-water were conſtructed at great coſt, in order to guard againſt diſappointments when the ſeaſon or circumſtances of the year might render it impoſſible to procure them from their native element. Lucullus was at the expence of perforating a mountain contiguous to his villa near Naples, in order to introduce a conſtant ſupply of ſea-water into a reſervoir of this kind [q]. Martial deſcribing the elegant villa of Appollinaris on the ſea-coaſt; among other voluptuous accommodations with which it was furniſhed, celebrates with par-

[p] *Nunc coci* triumphorum pretiis *parantur* et coquorum piſces; *nulluſque prope jam mortalis* æſtimatur pluris, *quam qui peritiſſimé* cenſum *domini mergit*. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. IX. 17.

[q] Plin. H. N. IX. 54.

ticular

ticular encomium his *piſcinæ* or ſtore ponds:

Si quando Nereus ſentit Æoli regnum,
Ridet procellas tuta de ſuo menſa.
Piſcina, rhombum paſcit et lupos vernas;
Natat ad magiſtrum delicata muræna,
Nomenclator mugilem citat notum,
Et adeſſe juſſi prodeunt ſenes mulli.

Ep. X. 30.

In vain rude Æolus deforms
Old ocean's brow with riſing ſtorms:
Thy ſplendid board, ſecure, defies
The angry main and threat'ning ſkies.
Within thy ample baſon ſee
Each nobler fiſh that ſwims the ſea.
The ſtately ſturgeon, ocean's pride,
The mugil, fond in ſands to hide[r],
The turbot, and the mullet old,
Are paſtur'd in thy liquid fold:
Train'd to the ſummons, lo! they all
Riſe at the feeders well-known call.

[r] *Mugilum natura ridetur in metu, capite abſcondito totos ſe abſcondari credentium.* Plin. H. N. IX. 16.

Among the ſeveral fiſh ſpecified by the poet, the *mullet* (ſuppoſed to be what in England and France is called the *ſurmoulet*) appears to have been in higheſt eſtimation and greateſt ſcarcity. Six thouſand *nummi*, (ſomewhat more than forty-three pounds ſterling) is mentioned by Juvenal to have been paid for *one* only of theſe rarities; and Macrobius ſpeaks of another, that was purchaſed at a ſtill more enormous price. The coſt of this ſingle article renders it leſs ſurprizing that the fiſh which Lucullus had collected in his reſervoirs, were ſold after his death, for no leſs a ſum than thirty-two thouſand two hundred and ninety-one pounds of our money; and both together afford a ſtriking ſpecimen of the wealth and extravagance of ſome individuals, in the luxurious ages of degenerate Rome. *Plin. H. N.* IX. 54. *Arbuthnot's tables of ant. coins, &c.* p. 132.

(68) The antient moraliſts were not agreed in what claſs of ſocial merit to rank

rank friendſhip; ſome placing it high in the ſcale of moral virtues, and others conſidering it as having no claim, in a ſtrict and proper ſenſe, to be admitted into their number[a]. The notions of two celebrated moderns in eſtimating the value of this connection, are at a ſtill greater diſtance from each other. The noble author of the *characteriſtics*, animated with a warm ſenſibility of the moral charms of this generous affection; and not being able, it ſeems, to diſcover that it is either *enjoined*, or *encouraged*, by the Chriſtian inſtitution, imputes this pretended omiſſion as a capital *defect* in the code of evangelical

[a] Ariſtotle ſpeaks doubtfully: εϛι γαρ αρετη τις, η μετα αρετης. *Ethic. ad Nichom.* VIII. 1. And ſo his paraphraſt Ariſtonicus: εϛι γαρ η φιλια αρετη τις, η επεται τη αρετη. *p.* 363. *ed. Cantab.* Cicero in the preſent paſſage evidently conſiders it as an affection diſtinct from virtue. Seneca, on the contrary, recommends it as a virtue of conſiderable magnitude: *Sapiens habere amicum vult; ſi ob nihil aliud, ut exerceat amicitiam, ne tam* magna virtus *jaceat.* Ep. 9.

ethics.

ethics [b]. On the contrary, a late ingenious advocate for that ſacred cauſe, which it was the unhappy direction of this accompliſhed nobleman's learning and talents to depreciate, far from diſcerning any thing laudable or meritorious in private friendſhip, has attempted to prove, that "it is totally incom-"patible with the *genius* and *ſpirit* of the "goſpel [c]." Thus the very ſame *ſuppoſed* circumſtance, which appears to have been no inconſiderable obſtruction to the noble philoſopher's faith, is aſſigned by the elegant defender of Chriſtianity, as one of thoſe *internal* marks which authenticate its divine origin.

---Mihi convivæ prope diſſentire videntur
Poſcentes vario multum diverſa palato:
Quid dem, quid non dem? Renuis *tu, quod* Jubet *alter.* HOR.

[b] *Character.* vol. I. p. 93, *et ſeqq.*
[c] *A View of the Internal Evidence of the Chriſtian religion*, p. 51, 52.

Widely,

Widely, however, as theſe admired writers differ in their moral taſte; there is one point in which they may be perfectly united: for the ſame mode of reaſoning which overturns either of their reſpective poſitions, will equally confute both.

That private friendſhip does not expreſsly enter into the precepts of Chriſtianity, is unqueſtionably true: for, the nature of the connection *neceſſarily* excludes it from being the ſubject of a religious, or moral, obligation. The diſtinctive character of this relation, conſiſts in a *ſpontaneous* ſentiment of the heart, unconſtrained and uninfluenced by *compulſive*, or *external*, motives of every kind and degree. To attempt therefore to produce a voluntary affection, by the authority of a poſitive *command*, would be to publiſh a law evidently deſtructive of its own end: for, its ſanctions could no ſooner operate as *primary*, or *determining*, inducements,

ments, than the ſentiment they were deſigned to create would utterly be prevented from exiſting.

But a *general* ordinance for this purpoſe, would not merely be abſurd; it would be unjuſt: becauſe it would require *univerſally*, what is not in every man's power to perform. A great variety of circumſtances muſt concur, to form and cement this union: and theſe are of a nature ſo exceedingly contingent and fortuitous, that they are frequently never realized in the courſe of the longeſt life. Indeed, they ſo rarely meet together, that what a ſagacious obſerver of mankind remarks concerning love, holds equally true in reſpect to *friendſhip*; *il eſt du* veritable *comme de l'apparition des eſprits*; *tout le monde en* parle, *mais peu de gens ont* vû [d].

If what the noble author requires from revelation is, in the firſt inſtance, inconſiſtent with the eſſential nature of

[d] *Rochefoucault.*

its

its object; it implies, in the next, an aſſertion no leſs contrary to fact: for altho' friendſhip could not, either in reaſon or juſtice, have been *commanded* by the precepts, it is evidently encouraged by the ſpirit, of Chriſtianity. Univerſal benevolence or good-will to mankind, is the vital principle that animates and pervades the whole ſyſtem of evangelical morality: and it is by a proper cultivation of this enlarged and comprehenſive virtue, that the heart is beſt prepared and qualified to enter into the engagements, and diſcharge the offices, of private friendſhip. This the noble moraliſt himſelf acknowledges in a ſubſequent treatiſe: for when the religion of his country was not in his immediate contemplation, and his inveterate prejudices had not their uſual object to call them forth; his lordſhip aſks, "Can any friendſhip "be ſo heroic, as that towards man-"kind? Do you think—that *particular* "friendſhip can *well ſubſiſt* without

" ſuch an *enlarged* affection and ſenſe " of obligation to ſociety[e] ?" This kind of reaſoning, however, when applied to revelation, will not ſatisfy his demands; he contends, that " friendſhip " is no *eſſential* part of a Chriſtian's " charity[f]." But if there were any force in this objection, it would overſhoot its intended aim, and wound *natural* religion no leſs than *revealed*; as friendſhip, for the reaſons above aſſigned, can no more be the *eſſential* part of a theiſt's *benevolence*, than it is ofa Chriſtian's.

In confirmation of his lordſhip's opinion, he cites the authority of Biſhop Taylor, who aſſerts that " the word " *friendſhip*, in the ſenſe we commonly " mean by it, is not ſo much as *named* " in the New Teſtament; and our holy " religion takes no *notice* of it." But

[e] The Moraliſts. Charact. vol. II. p. 239.
[f] Id. vol. I. p. 99.

it

it may be queſtioned, perhaps, whether this very reſpectable ornament of our church, would have been able to juſtify his aſſertion in its full latitude. Does not Chriſt himſelf make the moſt honourable mention of friendſhip, in the *preciſe* and *proper* ſenſe of that word? For, diſcourſing with his diſciples upon the ſubject of his approaching crucifixion, he illuſtrates the magnitude of that benevolence which induced him to ſubmit to the painful and ignominious death he was going to ſuffer, by a compariſon drawn from the higheſt poſſible inſtance of human amity: "Greater love than "this," He obſerves, "hath no man, "than that he layeth down his life for "his friends." To which he immediately adds, "ye are my *friends* if "ye do whatſoever I command you [z]:" that is, ye ſhall ſtand to me in the *ſame* relation as that term *imports*. For, the

[z] John XV. 13, 14.

meaning

meaning of the word *friends*, in the latter of theſe paſſages, muſt bear the ſame ſenſe it evidently does in the former; otherwiſe the idea would be ſuddenly changed, without the leaſt mark to diſtinguiſh its difference.

But the texts juſt cited, are not more unfavourable to the learned Prelate's aſſertion, than to that of the ingenious author of the "*Internal Evidence.*" For it cannot, ſurely, be ſuppoſed with the leaſt degree of reaſon, that our Saviour, either by way of analogy, or compariſon, would have choſen to repreſent himſelf under a character, the genuine principles of which "are to-"tally *incompatible* with the genius and "ſpirit" of thoſe moral laws, which it was one great object of his divine commiſſion to confirm, or promulgate.

Nor is it ſolely by neceſſary implication, or circumſtantial inferences, that the Chriſtian revelation recognizes friendſhip:

friendſhip: it ſtrongly and expreſsly recommends and encourages this amiable alliance; if exhibiting it in the nobleſt and moſt animating exemplar, may be allowed to have an immediate and direct influence over the heart of man. Two very remarkable inſtances for this purpoſe occur, in the hiſtory of our Saviour's life: and they have repeatedly been pointed out. Nevertheleſs, as the principal writers who have animadverted upon the reſpective tenets under examination, have contented themſelves with ſlightly alluding to them; it may not, perhaps, be altogether unneceſſary to ſtate them in all their ſtriking circumſtances; eſpecially as they ſeem to have been overlooked, or not duly conſidered, by the truly right reverend author, on the credit of whoſe opinion Lord Shafteſbury has endeavoured to ſupport his own.

The evangeliſt, in relating the miracle which Chriſt performed at Bethany

by reſtoring a perſon to life who had lain ſome days in the grave [b]; introduces his narrative by emphatically obſerving, that "Jeſus *loved* Lazarus;" intimating, it ſhould ſeem, that the ſentiments which Chriſt entertained of Lazarus, were a diſtinct and peculiar ſpecies of that general benevolence with which he was actuated towards all mankind. Agreeably to this explication of the ſacred hiſtorian's meaning, when the ſiſters of Lazarus ſent to acquaint Jeſus with the ſtate in which their brother lay; they did not even mention his name; but pointing him out by a more honourable and equally notorious deſignation, the terms of their meſſage were, "behold! He whom thou *loveſt* is ſick!" Accordingly, when he informs his diſciples of the notice he had thus received, his expreſſion is, "our *friend* Lazarus ſleepeth." Now that Chriſt did not upon

[b] John XI. 1. et ſeqq.

this

this occaſion uſe the word *friend* in its looſe undiſtinguiſhing acceptation, but in a reſtrained and ſtrictly appropriated ſenſe; is not only manifeſt from this plain account of the fact itſelf, but appears farther evident from the ſequel. For, as he was advancing to the grave, accompanied with the relations of the deceaſed, he diſcovered the ſame emotions of grief as ſwelled the boſoms of thoſe with whom Lazarus had been moſt intimately connected; and ſympathizing with their common ſorrow, he melted into *tears*. This circumſtance was too remarkable to eſcape particular obſervation: and it drew from the ſpectators, what one ſhould think it muſt neceſſarily draw from every reader, this natural and obvious reflection, "Behold! how he *loved* him!"

But in the concluding cataſtrophe of our Saviour's life, he gave a ſtill more deciſive proof that ſentiments of the

ſtrongeſt *perſonal* attachment and friendſhip, were not unworthy of being admitted into his ſacred boſom: They were too deeply, indeed, impreſſed, to be extinguiſhed even by the moſt excruciating torments. In thoſe dreadful moments, obſerving among the afflicted witneſſes of his painful and ignominious ſufferings, That faithful follower who is deſcribed by the hiſtorian as "the diſciple whom he *loved*;" he diſtinguiſhed him by the moſt convincing inſtance of ſuperior confidence, eſteem and affection that ever was exhibited to the admiration of mankind. For, under circumſtances of the moſt agonizing torments, when it might be thought impoſſible for human nature to retain any other ſenſibility but that of its own inexpreſſible ſufferings; he recommended to the care and protection of this his tried and approved *friend*, in terms of peculiar regard and endearment, the moſt tender and ſacred object of his private affections.

But

But no language can repreſent this pathetic and affecting ſcene, with a force and energy equal to the ſublime ſimplicity of the evangeliſt's own narrative: "Now there ſtood by the croſs "of Jeſus, his mother, and his mo- "ther's ſiſter,—and Mary Magdalene. "When Jeſus ſaw his mother, and the "diſciple *(ſtanding)* by, whom he *lov-* "*ed*; He ſaith to his mother,—Be- "hold thy *ſon!* then he ſaith to the "diſciple, Behold thy *mother!* And "from that hour That diſciple took "her to his own home[i]."

It may ſafely be aſſerted, that among all thoſe memorable examples of friendſhip, which have been celebrated with the higheſt encomiums by the antients; there cannot be produced a ſingle inſtance, in which the moſt diſtinguiſhing features of exalted amity are ſo ſtrongly diſplayed, as in the forego-

[i] John XIX. 25, 26.

ing relation. The only one, perhaps, that bears even a faint ſimilitude to it, is that famous tranſaction, recorded by a Greek author, which paſſed between Eudamidas and Aretheus[k]. But when the very different circumſtances attending the reſpective examples are duly conſidered; it muſt be acknowledged, that the former riſes as much above the latter in the proof it

[k] The ſtory is related by Lucian in his dialogue intitled *Toxaris*. Eudamidas being on his death-bed, made his will, by which he bequeathed his aged mother to the care and protection of Aretheus; and his daughter, to Charixenus, to be diſpoſed of in marriage according to his diſcretion; injoining him at the ſame time, to give her as ample a portion as his circumſtances would admit. He added, that in caſe either of the legatees ſhould happen to die, he ſubſtituted the ſurvivor in his ſtead. Charixenus died very ſoon after the teſtator: in conſequence of which, Aretheus took each of theſe ſingularly *confidential* legacies to himſelf; and celebrating the marriage of his only daughter and that of his friend, on the ſame day, he divided his fortune equally between them.

exhibits

exhibits of ſublime friendſhip, as it does in the dignity of the characters concerned.

Upon the whole then it appears, that the divine Founder of the Chriſtian religion, as well by his own example as by the ſpirit of his moral doctrine, has not only encouraged but *conſecrated* FRIENDSHIP.

FINIS.


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